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I 
Summary 
The knowledge of the distribution of assets and liabilities as well as the key determinants of 
the distributions of private wealth represent an important basis for decision-making for social 
and political action like levying taxes. In the three papers, which make up this dissertation, I 
contribute to these aspects for several European countries.  
In the first paper (with M.M. Grabka) the data quality of the Household Finance and Consump-
tion Survey (HFCS) is investigated. The survey provides information and enables comparison of 
assets and liabilities held by households in the Euro area. We investigate potential methodo-
logical constraints regarding cross-country comparability and evaluate their impact on the 
surveyed net wealth (assets minus liabilities). In addition, we investigate item non-response 
patterns, a serious issue in wealth surveys. We find that the surveyed net wealth in Finland, 
the Netherlands, Italy and Slovakia is most likely not comparable with the other countries.  
The second paper (with C. Westermeier) empirically investigates wealth transfers (inheritances 
and gifts) – a key determinant of household wealth. We analyze the percentages of households 
with a transfer as well as the capitalized present values of transfers received in households in 
core European (Austria, Belgium, France and (West) Germany) and Mediterranean countries 
(Cyprus, Greece, Portugal and Spain). Additionally, we tackle the question of how important 
transfers are for the current economic position of households in each country. We find that 
the relationship between the propensity to receive a transfer and the level of household in-
come is stronger in the core European than in the Mediterranean countries, whereas the posi-
tive correlation between income position and the values of those transfers is high in all coun-
tries. However, considering the value of inheritances and gifts as a percentage of current net 
wealth we see some of the results reversed as the share is not positively correlated with in-
come. In fact, the significance of transfers for household wealth decreases with higher income. 
In the third paper I compare the effective tax rates of intergenerational wealth transfers be-
tween European countries and over time. Based on different preferences for distribution, I 
discuss how the taxation of transfers may look like for the different types of welfare state re-
gimes. I analyze the United Kingdom, Germany and Sweden since the 1950s and calculate ef-
fective tax rates for typical households with different sizes and portfolios of intergenerational 
transfers to represent the whole wealth distribution. I find that the intergenerational transfer 
legislation and its changes are in line with the respective welfare state regimes in the United 
Kingdom and Germany, but not in Sweden. Changes over time are due to specific develop-
ments in each country and overall trends like tax competition, influence of interest groups and 
the median voter. 
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1. Introduction 
Why should we care about the distribution of private wealth1 in Europe? The material prosper-
ity of individuals consists of the two main resources income and wealth. While especially the 
possession of wealth offers extended consumption options, can compensate a loss of income 
and secures the own pension (for example via owner-occupied housing), it also finances the 
education of children and is accumulated to make bequests. Thus wealth creates a financial 
independence and great wealth may be accompanied by economic and political power (Davies 
& Shorrocks 2000). Therefore the knowledge of the distribution and development of assets 
and liabilities as well as the key determinants for distributions of wealth represent an im-
portant basis for decision-making for social and political action.  
In the course of the financial and economic crisis and the resulting sovereign debt crisis around 
the year 2010, (material) inequality between and within countries in the European Union came 
to the fore (McGrath 2015). Especially the book “Capital in the Twenty-First Century” by the 
economist Thomas Piketty fueled the broader public debate. He gathered and analyzed time 
series data (mainly from tax databases) on income, private and public wealth as well as inher-
itances for several (industrialized) countries; in some cases reaching back to the 19th century. 
His message in a nutshell: Inequality is on the rise again. In addition, many other researches 
contributed to the discourse, most notably Cingano (2014) from the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Dabla-Norris, Kochhar, Suphaphiphat, Ricka & 
Tsounta (2015) from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). They published that (income) 
inequality hurts economic growth by undermining education opportunities for children from 
low-income households.2  
Even though the findings from Piketty (2014) were also controversially discussed (see for ex-
ample Góes 2016, Hudson & Tribe 2016), his data gathering is widely acknowledged (Bartels & 
Bönke 2015). However, the aggregated tax data cannot tell us something about the distribu-
tion of assets and debts on the level of households or individuals or between different socio-
economic groups. This clearly is an advantage of survey data. Until recently, for many countries 
in Europe representative information about household wealth was not available or, if availa-
ble, not comparable between countries.3 This situation recently changed due to a new survey 
                                                          
1
  In this dissertation the term wealth refers to net wealth held by individuals or households, this 
means the value of (material) assets minus liabilities. 
2
  Other recent popular contributions to the debate about (material) inequality are from Milanovic 
(2016), Fratzscher (2016), Atkinson (2015), Bourguignon (2015), Zucmann (2015) and Stiglitz (2012, 
2015).  
3
  The Luxembourg Wealth Survey (LWS) already tries to make independent wealth surveys compara-
ble with each other via an ex-post harmonization for several years (LIS 2016). However, so far this 
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from the European central bank. The Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) pro-
vides information about household wealth, income and indicators of consumption and credit 
constraints from almost all Euro-countries4 around the year 2010 (first wave). The second 
wave (in some countries partly a panel) will be made available soon and therefore the survey 
will not only allow comparisons between countries but also over time (ECB 2016).  
The release of the data caused a lot of attention and was followed by several discussions as 
the differences between countries regarding wealth possession were larger and in some cases 
in a different order than expected. The data (see figure 1.1) shows that within the sample 
around the year 2010, the households in Luxemburg and Cyprus have the highest median 
wealth (397,800 Euro and 266,900 Euro) and German households the lowest (51,400 Euro), 
followed by Slovak households (61,200 Euro). The median over all surveyed Euro-countries is 
109,200 Euro. The differences between median and average net wealth also point to an une-
qual distribution of wealth within many countries.  
Figure 1.1: Household net wealth in the Euro Area 
 
Source: HFCS (2010) 
                                                                                                                                                                          
never completely worked. For example, in some cases the definitions of core variables do not fully 
overlap in the harmonized surveys.  
4
  Current countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Greece, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. Additional countries in the future: Es-
tonia, Ireland and Latvia. 
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Part of the differences between the countries can be explained by structural differences like 
household size or age patterns (Fessler, Lindner & Segalla 2014). Other important sources are 
homeownership and house price dynamics (Arrondel, Bartiloro, Fessler, Lindner, Mathä, Ram-
pazzi, Savignac, Schmidt, Schürz & Vermeulen 2014, Mathä, Porpiglia & Ziegelmeyer 2014, 
Lindner 2015, Adam & Zhu 2015, Enderlein & Ständer 2016). The structure of the welfare state 
also plays an important role. Fessler & Schürz (2015) find that in countries with an effective 
and well developed welfare state households accumulate less private wealth, because they 
just do not have to as the (welfare) state takes over some of the securing functions that pri-
vate wealth has, like compensating a loss of income. Another important source for differences 
between countries is based on methodological reasons (ECB 2013). This issue is investigated in 
the second chapter. 
Another source for differences between and also within countries can be the way wealth is 
accumulated. This is basically done via savings out of income (labor or capital income) or 
wealth transfers, which means inheritances and gifts (Davies & Shorrocks 2000). Current re-
search suggests that wealth transfers are (again) an important factor for household wealth in 
European countries (Semyonov & Lewin-Epstein 2013, Arrondel, Roger & Savignac 2014, 
Mathä et al. 2014, Fessler & Schürz 2015, Piketty & Zucman 2015, Humer, Moser & Schnetzer 
2016). As inheritances and gifts can be seen as a way of accumulating wealth without effort 
some argue that this development may even pose a threat to democracy (Piketty 2014, Cor-
neo, Bönke & Westermeier 2016). How much of the current net wealth in Europe is attributed 
to inheritances and gifts is analyzed in the third chapter. 
One way for governments to decrease differences with regard to material resources within a 
country are taxes. They can directly influence the distribution of economic resources and in 
addition, tax revenues can be redistributed (Brunner 2014). As wealth transfers seem to be on 
the rise it would be interesting to know how they are taxed over time in different countries 
and if and why changes occurred. However, calculating effective wealth transfer tax rates is 
not that simple. Different tax rates, allowances, exemptions etc. for different amounts and 
types of wealth need to be taken into account. The current literature either just focus on single 
countries (Henrekson & Waldenström 2015, Du Rietz, Henrekson & Waldenström 2015) or one 
point in time for several countries (Scheffler & Spengel 2004, Heinemann, Spengel, Bräutigam 
& Evers 2015). In the fourth chapter this research gap is closed.  
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1.1. Contributions and Main Findings 
In this dissertation I address empirically different aspects of the distribution of private wealth 
in Europe.5 It consists of three research papers. In the first one (chapter 2) I investigate the 
data quality of the HFCS (co-authored with Markus M. Grabka). In the second paper (chap-
ter 3) I analyze the role of intergenerational wealth transfers for European households’ eco-
nomic position (co-authored with Christian Westermeier). I conclude (chapter 4) with a com-
parison of different intergenerational wealth transfer tax systems between European countries 
and over time. 
Chapter 2: Comparing Wealth – Data quality of the HFCS (with Markus M. Grab-
ka)6  
The HFCS provides information about household wealth (real and financial assets as well as 
liabilities) from 15 Euro-countries around the year 2010. The survey will be the key dataset for 
this topic in the future. However, several aspects point to potential methodological constraints 
regarding cross-country comparability. Therefore the aim of the second chapter is to evaluate 
data quality of the first wave of this important data source. This will help users (including my-
self) to understand and interpret their results better. In addition, we make a contribution to 
improve data quality further. The framework for our analysis is the “Guidelines for Micro Sta-
tistics on Household Wealth” from the OECD (2013). We have two main focuses: First, we 
compare the sampling processes, the interview modes, the oversampling techniques, the unit 
and item non-response rates and how it is dealt with it via weighting and imputation as well as 
further points which might restrict cross-country comparability of net wealth. We classify the 
approach in each country and evaluate the impact on the surveyed net wealth. Second, we 
give a first insight in the selectivity of item non-response in a cross-national setting. We make 
use of logit models to identify differences in item non-response patterns across countries as 
well as between households within countries. 
We find that net wealth is most likely not comparable with the other countries in the sample in 
Finland, the Netherlands and Italy due to deviating survey modes, the absence of various 
wealth components or the lack of oversampling. Researchers who are interested in subgroup 
analyses should also prescind from looking at Slovenia, Malta and Luxemburg due to rather 
small sample sizes. In addition, due to quota sampling the first wave from Slovakia should not 
be used. Regarding the non-response behavior we confirm the results from individual country 
                                                          
5
  I cite literature from a broad range of the field of political economy and beyond, leading from politi-
cal science, sociology, law and statistics to economics. My main focus lies however on the economic 
literature. 
6
  Content of the chapter is published in Tiefensee & Grabka (2016). 
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cases in the literature (Groves, Dillman, Eltinge & Little 2001, Frick, Grabka & Markus 2010). 
Moreover, we make suggestions for further improvements of data quality at the end of the 
chapter. 
Chapter 3: Comparing the joint distribution of intergenerational transfers, income 
and wealth across the Euro area (with Christian Westermeier)  
In the third chapter the role of wealth transfers for current households’ wealth in Europe is 
empirically analyzed. The investigation is based on the HFCS, which provides comparable data 
for core European (Austria, Belgium, France and (West) Germany) and Mediterranean coun-
tries (Cyprus, Greece, Portugal and Spain). We also contribute an overview of the inheritance 
and gift taxation of each investigated country for the present and the most important changes 
over the last years. 
The joint distribution of income and wealth transfers reveals that the relationship between 
income and the propensity to receive an inheritance or gift is higher in core Europe, whereas 
the correlation between income position and the capitalized present values of those transfers7 
is high across all countries. This means that high-income households have in the past inherited 
significantly higher amounts than low-income households. A series of country-specific multi-
variate regressions via logit and OLS confirm these findings and suggest that higher education 
levels also go along with higher absolute transfer values. Expectedly, the capitalized present 
transfer values monotonously increase with households’ net wealth position.8 Using recently 
established methods by Wolff & Gittleman (2014) and Piketty, Postel-Vinay & Rosenthal (2014) 
to analyze the capitalized present value of inheritances and gifts as a percentage of current net 
wealth sees some of the results reversed. Apparently, the relative importance of wealth trans-
fers does not increase with the level of income or wealth. Using a fractional logit regression we 
find that for higher income quintiles the share of current net wealth due to past intergenera-
tional transfers tends to be decreasing. Taken together we find that high income households 
seem to be able to build up wealth out of their own income as well as substantial inheritances 
and gifts. This can be seen as an indication for low intergenerational mobility.  
  
                                                          
7
  We calculate the present value of all past wealth transfers that a household received in 2010 prices 
and capitalize them using a real annual rate of return of three percent (base scenario). 
8
  Due to endogeneity, net wealth is not used as an explanatory variable in our multivariate analyses. 
Introduction 
6 
Chapter 4: Estate and inheritance taxation – Tax regimes and effective tax rates 
in Europe since the 1950s  
In the fourth chapter I compare the effective tax rates of intergenerational wealth transfers 
between countries and over time. I contribute to the literature in combining the optimal taxa-
tion literature on intergenerational transfers with the welfare state theory by Esping-Andersen 
(1990), which categorizes societies among other things by different preferences for redistribu-
tion. Based on that I argue how the taxation of intergenerational transfers may look like for the 
different types of welfare state regimes. However, comparing intergenerational transfer taxa-
tion between countries and over time is complex and usually just done for one country over 
time or for several countries at just one point in time. Different tax rates, allowances, exemp-
tions etc. need to be taken into account. I do this and analyze the legislations in the United 
Kingdom, Germany and Sweden since the 1950s and calculate effective tax rates for typical 
households with different sizes and portfolios of intergenerational transfers to represent the 
whole wealth distribution. Therefore, I also tackle an empirical research gap. 
I find that the intergenerational transfer legislation and its changes are in line with the respec-
tive welfare state regimes in the United Kingdom and Germany, but not in Sweden. Changes 
over time are due to individual country developments and overall trends. The following three 
trends are investigated: First, tax competition between countries increased due to a more 
globalized world. I find decreasing tax revenues from taxes on property or a shift of taxation 
towards less mobile assets. Second, theory implies that due to higher wealth concentration the 
influence of interest groups might have increased as well. However, the empirical proof with 
regard to estate and inheritance taxation in the investigated countries still needs to be made. 
Third, the influence of the median voter can also be seen, as he/she never had to pay (high) 
estate or inheritance taxes in the three countries. In addition, wealth transfer tax increases are 
more likely under a left government, while decreases are more likely under a right govern-
ment. 
1.2. Limitations and Further Research  
Research is never finished and knowledge is always in motion. By tomorrow today’s truth 
might be outdated due to some new results. The research field of private wealth and also this 
dissertation are certainly no exception. After World War II private wealth was not a hot topic 
in Europe, as big parts were destroyed and people cared more about (tomorrow’s) income. 
This was also reflected in academic work. After a couple of years this started to change and 
(mainly) theoretical work on private wealth got published (for an overview see Davies & Shor-
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rocks 2000). In the last couple of years improved data availability and quality also enabled 
(quantitative) empirical work.  
Of course researchers are always in need of new (or at least qualitatively better) information. 
However, in the case of private wealth the availability of data is still a challenge which should 
not be underestimated. What we know today about assets and liabilities in Europe is especially 
limited in two ways. In some countries (particularly those which are not part of the Euro area) 
either there is still no information about wealth (on a micro level) available at all, or it is not 
comparable with other countries. In countries where we can find (comparable) information 
about private wealth this often comes from survey data. The challenge with this sort of data is 
typically that it captures quite well who does not possess (much) wealth and we are also in-
formed about the middle part of the distribution. However, regarding the upper part of the 
distribution and especially the top 1 percent, we still have to rely on approximate simulations 
as this part of the distribution is usually not represented well in surveys (for the HFCS see Ver-
meulen 2014). Therefore, we need more (reliable) data about the upper part of the distribu-
tion.9 Of course this lack of data also had consequences for this dissertation. All estimations in 
chapter 2 and 3 are not representative for (at minimum) the top 1 percent of the wealth dis-
tribution. Due to the skewed distribution of private wealth this probably has some not meas-
urable distorting effect.  
Further research would be desirable with regard to the item non-response behavior in the 
HFCS (chapter 2). With additional paradata it could be possible to separate substantial cross-
country differences from methodological distinctiveness. In addition, the second (and all fol-
lowing) waves have to be examined for comparability.  
Another point which needs to be investigated further and where a causal relationship still 
needs to be proven is the indicated channel of low intergenerational mobility in chapter 3. In 
the future this might even be possible with the HFCS as some countries will survey panel data.  
Clearly it would be helpful to have effective tax rates available for more countries and even 
over longer periods of time as presented in chapter 4. Certainly this information could also 
improve the overview of the inheritance and gift taxation of the investigated countries in chap-
ter 3. For the UK an investigation of contemporary parliamentary prints as already done in 
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  A successful example is certainly the “Poverty and Wealth Report” from the German government. 
Since the 2000’s years each new government reports about the distribution of income and increas-
ingly also about wealth. The report builds upon different academic studies which are specially de-
signed for this purpose (BMAS 2016). For the next report (probably released in spring 2017) a survey 
about the “high-net-worth-individuals” (at least one million Euros financial assets) was conducted 
(Lauterbach, Ströing, Grabka & Schröder 2016). Even though this survey is not representative it goes 
into the right direction and can serve as an example for other countries.  
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Germany and Sweden would be informative. In addition, more research is needed with regard 
to the general causes of the tax changes – especially investigations about the influence of in-
terest groups would be interesting.  
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2. Comparing Wealth – Data quality of the HFCS10 
2.1. Introduction 
In spring 2013 the European Central Bank (ECB) released the Household Finance and Con-
sumption Survey (HFCS 2010). The first wave of the HFCS provides information about house-
hold wealth, income and indicators of consumption and credit constraints from (nearly) all 
Euro-countries11 around the year 2010. The survey is of general interest because for the first 
time it is possible to compare real and financial assets as well as liabilities on the household 
level between Euro-countries.
12
 For several countries this was not even possible on a national 
level before. The survey will therefore be the central dataset in this topic in the future.  
The release of the data caused a lot of attention and was followed by several discussions be-
cause the bigger picture drawn by the numbers was somehow surprising. The figures (all ECB 
2013a) showed that in comparison with the other investigated countries the households in 
Luxemburg and Cyprus have the highest median wealth (397,800 Euro and 266,900 Euro). On 
the other side German households hold only 51,400 Euro, this is the lowest value, followed by 
Slovak households (61,200 Euro). The median over all surveyed Euro-countries is 109,200 Euro. 
The explanations of the ECB for these differences ranged from structural differences like 
household sizes or age patterns, over different macroeconomic dynamics to varying historical, 
cultural and institutional factors like intergenerational transfers, land ownership or allocation 
of household wealth between real and financial assets (ECB 2013b). The public debate quickly 
added additional explanations like wars, the German reunification, transition processes in 
eastern countries or tax systems (Fessler 2013). Furthermore the survey only collects private 
pension wealth while wealth accrued from public pension schemes is not provided by the 
HFCS. The latter may affect wealth accumulation dependent on the generosity of public pen-
sion systems (Fessler & Schürz 2015, OECD 2013). 
Another important but not widely discussed source for differences between countries might 
be due to methodological reasons. A look into the data documentation (ECB 2013c) reveals 
further restrictions for comparison. Reference periods are not the same in all countries, only 
some countries oversampled the wealthy households, which for them can increase precision, 
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  Content of the chapter is published in Tiefensee & Grabka (2016). 
11 
 Current countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Greece, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. Additional countries in the future: Es-
tonia, Ireland and Latvia. 
12 
 Other projects like the Luxembourg Wealth Survey (LWS) try to make independent wealth surveys 
comparable with each other via an ex-post harmonization. The HFCS is intended for comparison 
from the start.  
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while those without oversampling may suffer from coverage errors. Some countries did not 
survey all mandatory variables and Finland estimated a lot of information from registers. Very 
low initial response rates in some countries are another challenge for cross-country compara-
bility. Furthermore, the item non-response rate is a serious problem in lots of surveys especial-
ly if they deal with a sensitive and difficult subject like wealth (Frick, Grabka & Marcus 2010a, 
Kennickell 2011). The potential underlying selectivity of non-response needs to be considered 
in a proper imputation otherwise it influences survey estimates.  
All of these aspects point to potential constraints when making cross-country analyses regard-
ing wealth based on the HFCS. Therefore the aims of this paper are to get a better insight in 
the data quality of the first wave of this important data source to help users to understand and 
interpret their results better as well as to make a contribution to improve data quality further. 
We first define the term quality by applying the “Guidelines for Micro Statistics on Household 
Wealth” from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2013). 
Then we go through the seven proposed criteria institutional environment, relevance, coher-
ence, timeliness, accessibility, comparability and accuracy (section 2.2). The main focus will be 
on the last two points. Therefore we present a synopsis of cross-country differences which is 
the core of the paper (section 2.3). We compare the sampling processes, the interview modes, 
the sample sizes and the unit and item non-response rates and how it is dealt with them via 
weighting and imputation. In addition, we show which countries oversampled wealthy house-
holds based on which data, compare the survey periods as well as further points which might 
restrict country comparability. This part is mainly based on the documentations of the ECB and 
the national central banks; what we add is further literature on the individual topics to classify 
the individual country behavior and to evaluate the impact on net wealth and its components. 
Under the characteristic “accuracy” we focus on non-response and in particular on item non-
response in a cross-national setting (section 2.4). We make use of logit models to identify dif-
ferences in item non-response patterns for different wealth components across countries as 
well as between households within countries and thus give a first insight in the selectivity of 
item non-response in a cross-national setting. This approach is to our knowledge completely 
unique for this set of countries. In section 2.5 we summarize our results and make suggestions 
for improvements for the dataset. 
2.2. Definition of Data Quality  
The framework for our analysis is the internationally agreed “Guidelines for Micro Statistics on 
Household Wealth” from the OECD (2013) which provides “guidelines on best practice meth-
ods of assessing quality” (OECD 2013, p. 191). There, in accordance with the International Or-
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ganization for Standardization (ISO 9100), quality is defined as the “degree to which a set of 
inherent characteristics fulfills requirements” (OECD 2013, p. 191). Before this backdrop the 
OECD defines the following seven criteria to describe data quality: institutional environment, 
relevance, coherence, timeliness, accessibility, comparability, accuracy. Hereinafter we apply 
all these criteria to the HFCS. 
2.2.1. Institutional environment 
Institutions producing the data should be “impartial, objective, independent from political and 
other institutional pressures and free of potential conflicts of interest” (OECD 2013, 192f). In 
addition, they need to be “adequately resourced to produce the statistics of interest” and have 
a “mandate to collect the relevant data” (OECD 2013, p. 202). In the case of the HFCS the sur-
vey is coordinated by the ECB and carried out by the national central banks and in three cases 
by the national statistical institutes (France, Finland and Portugal).13 The main operational reg-
ulations of these institutions can be found in the Treaties of the European Union, the Statute 
of the European System of Central Banks as well as in the national bank acts/laws on national 
statistic institutes which ensure the required points. 
2.2.2. Relevance 
Relevance defines the “degree to which statistics meet the needs of actual and potential users 
[…] thus it depends upon coverage of the required topics and the use of appropriate defini-
tions or concepts” (OECD 2013, p. 193). The HFCS surveys an extensive balance sheet (see fig-
ure 2.1) and some variables about income, consumption and credit constraints. An extension 
to this balance sheet can be claims on public pension funds although there are discussions 
whether this should be a component of total private household wealth or not. The literature 
tends to recommend to analyze it not as standard component but alongside private net wealth 
(Davies & Shorrocks 2000, OECD 2013).14 
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  Together all these institutions build the Household Finance and Consumption Network (HFCN). 
14
  Public pension funds are not tradable or acceptable as collateral (OECD 2013). Further, there is no 
standard market interest rate (such as interest and dividends from capital), limits to bequeathing 
(which goes beyond survivors pensions) as well as the issue of liquidation/immediate availability and 
finally pension wealth is not associated with economic power (as compared to high net wealth). The 
OECD (2013) recommends to exclude entitlements of all social security schemes, however, “primarily 
for practical reasons and to maintain consistency with the SNA [System of National Accounts] defini-
tion of financial assets” (OECD 2013, p. 71). In many countries reliable estimates may not be availa-
ble (yet). However, they also acknowledge that in several countries claims on public pension funds 
are a highly relevant wealth element and “without some measurement of this asset, any estimate of 
total wealth is an underestimate of the true wealth of the household” (OECD 2013, p. 119). As Frick 
and Grabka (2013) have shown the net present value of all public pension entitlements for example 
in Germany nearly doubles standard aggregate net wealth and thereby significantly reduces wealth 
inequality. 
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Figure 2.1:  Households’ balance sheet in the HFCS 
Assets Liabilities 
Real assets: Collateralized debt: 
• Main residence • by main residence 
• Other real estate property • by other real estate property 
• Investments in self-employed businesses 
 
• Vehicles 
 
• Valuables   
+ + 
Financial assets: Uncollateralized debt: 
• Sight accounts • Bank overdrafts 
• Savings deposits • Credit card debt 
• Savings plans with building and loan associations • Other uncollateralized loans 
• Life insurance policies 
 
• Mutual funds 
 
• Debt securities 
 
• Publicly traded stocks 
 
• Money owned to household 
 
• Other   
 
GROSS WEALTH DEBT 

GROSS WEALTH minus DEBT = NET WEALTH 
Source: Based on Fessler, Mooslechner & Schürz (2012). 
2.2.3. Coherence 
Coherence concerns the “adequacy [that the data can] be reliably combined in different ways 
and for various uses” (OECD 2013, p. 199). Internal coherence refers to “coherence between 
different economic variables collected in the same cross-section or inferable from the longitu-
dinal component of the survey” (OECD 2013, p. 199). So far for most countries in the HFCS only 
the first part is relevant. It is among other things achieved via the editing and imputation pro-
cess as well as the survey mode CAPI (computer assisted personal interviews), which automat-
ically recognizes inconsistencies (Banca d’Italia 2012). External coherence is related to the “co-
herence with external sources of information, such as the national accounts or population 
census” (OECD 2013, p. 199). Net wealth levels in the HFCS are lower than in the national ac-
counts and range between 50 and over 90 percent. However, there exist significant differences 
between the two concepts related to methodology, coverage etc. (ECB 2013c).15 In some coun-
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  For example both reflect a different target population. Compared with the HFCS SNA also include 
non-profit institutions serving households, like churches, trade unions or political parties. In addition, 
they cover persons living in institutions (further details on that regarding the HFCS see table 2.2). 
This will certainly lead to higher wealth aggregates in the SNA. Another caveat for comparison is that 
in surveys the valuation of assets is based on the self-assessment of the households and in the SNA it 
is based on estimated market values (ECB 2013c). 
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tries another possibility is to check for external coherence trough comparison with existing 
wealth surveys.16 
2.2.4. Timeliness 
Timeliness is the “interval of time between publication and the period to which the data refer” 
(OECD 2013, p. 201). The ECB released the HFCS in spring 2013, before that, extensive data 
preparations were made. The reference periods of ten countries are between spring 2010 and 
summer 2011. For the other five they are however between the winters 2008 and 2009, thus a 
time-lag of five years can be on hand. 
2.2.5. Accessibility 
Accessibility refers to the “degree to which users are able to use the data. The concept of ac-
cessibility spans physical requirements for access, structure of the data files, tools available for 
access, restrictions placed on accessing the data, adequacy of supporting documentation” 
(OECD 2013, p. 201). With an academic affiliation the micro data is accessible with a managea-
ble effort.17 The data is already multiple imputed and contains survey weighting factors as well 
as information for calculating the variance (bootstrap replicate weights, which contains for 
example sample design information). However, some variables like the geographical location 
of the households are not (centrally) available for all countries and have to be requested indi-
vidually at each central bank. The ECB also provides files and explanations how to work with 
the individual files (household, personal etc.) and implicates (1-5).18 Still, the data is quite 
complex to deal with. The ECB meanwhile tries to account for that for example via a google 
group.19 Para data is in general not accessible. 
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  This is in principle possible in case of e.g. Germany. However, here too differences in concepts need 
to be considered. While in the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) information about the value of vehicles 
is not collected (Grabka & Westermeier 2014), the German Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS) 
provided by the Federal Statistical Office do not ask for business assets (Frick, Grabka & Hauser 
2010b). 
17
  Researchers have to fill in a form in which they explain the ECB who they are, what they want to do 
with the data, how they will store it and that they ensure confidentiality. After examination trough 
the ECB the researcher will get a link for download of the data set (available formats: SPSS, Stata, 
ASCII). 
18
  Further accompanying documents are the survey questionnaire, variables descriptions and a central 
methodological report. Here it would be nice to also have methodological reports (in English) for the 
individual countries, explaining their procedure in more detail (see for for example OeNB 2012). 
19
  https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/hfcs-users (02.02.2016). 
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2.3. Comparability Issues of the HFCS 
Comparability refers to the “degree to which data can be compared over domains, across 
countries, and over time” (OECD 2013, p. 198). To get a better understanding which countries 
are comparable with each other in which dimensions or under which conditions regarding net 
wealth table 2.2 summarizes main comparability issues (ECB 2013c, 2013d). In addition, to the 
extensively methodological report of the ECB some countries reveal further more or less de-
tailed information about their procedure (see Banca d’Italia 2012, Bover 2011, Caruana & Pace 
2013, Mathä, Porpiglia & Ziegelmeyer 2012, OeNB 2012, Statistics Finland 2015, Tzamourani 
2012, von Kalckreuth, Eisele, Le Blanc, Schmidt & Zhu 2012). 
2.3.1. Sampling, sampling frames and target population 
In the first wave in total 62,521 households where surveyed (see figure 2.2). Slovenia has the 
smallest net sample size consisting of 343 households, which is therefore “not (be) deemed 
fully representative for the country” (ECB 2013c, p. 9), followed by Malta (843 households) and 
Luxembourg (950 households). In the last two countries analyses for small subgroups tend to 
be hindered due to the small sample size. On the other side France surveyed the most house-
holds (15,006) followed by Finland (10,989) and Italy (7,951). However, even for those coun-
tries analyses at a detailed regional level seem to be not reasonable. In general larger samples 
reduce sampling errors (see also section 2.4) (Fowler 2014) and allow more precision (lower 
variance) when estimating unknown population parameters. 
All surveys except for Slovakia have a probabilistic design. This means each household in the 
sample frame has a positive probability of being drawn into the sample. However, Slovakia 
used a quota sampling for the first wave (based on the income distribution of EU-SILC). There-
fore correct sampling and standard errors as well as confidence intervals are impossible to 
calculate (Fessler & Schürz 2013).20 Types of sampling frames differ across countries. In most 
countries units were drawn from some sort of population or dwelling register; in Belgium from 
telephone register and in Cyprus from the customer register of the electricity authority. The 
stratification criteria as well as the number of stages also differ between the countries. The 
target population of the HFCS consists of all members of private households residing in the 
national territory at the time of data collection. Persons living in collective households and 
institutions as well as homeless are excluded in most of the countries. How well the sampling 
frames represent this target population is not clear for each country. In particular a telephone 
register may not cover the total population given that some households do not have a tele-
phone or there are telephone numbers which are protected and thus not available (Häder, 
                                                          
20
  Slovakia will have a probabilistic design from the second wave on. 
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Häder & Kühne 2012).21 In the Netherlands people who do not speak Dutch and also blind 
people were excluded from the target population from the beginning, which most likely bias 
mean net wealth upwards, given that migrants’ wealth is typically lower than average wealth 
(Cobb-Clark & Hildebrand 2006).22 In Greece smaller villages where excluded (comprising 
about seven percent of the total number of households).23 
Figure 2.2: Number of surveyed households in the HFCS by country (in total 62.521 
households) 
 
Source: Based on ECB (2013c). 
                                                          
21
  Unfortunately information about the existence of a telephone in the surveyed households is not 
available in the HFCS. Thus we make use of the SOEP to show effects on net wealth (Wagner, Frick & 
Schupp 2007). Those households in Germany who do not report to have a telephone have only one 
third of net wealth compared to those who have both a landline telephone and a mobile phone 
(59,000 Euro vs. 182,000 Euro in 2012). Thus it can be assumed, that ceteris paribus in Belgium net 
wealth most likely is significantly overestimated. 
22
  Once again SOEP data can be used to give an idea about the relevance of such an assumption. Those 
migrants who state that they speak the national language only fairly bad or not at all show an indi-
vidual net wealth which only achieves 22 percent of the net wealth of the total population. However, 
the affected population in Germany is rather small with a share of roughly 1 percent.  
23
  Again one would expect an upward bias, given that the value of property wealth is usually lower in 
the countryside than in city regions. For Germany with SOEP data this presumption can be con-
firmed. Households living in small villages with less than 2,000 inhabitants, show a net wealth of 
nearly 90 percent of that of the total population. 
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2.3.2. Survey modes and interviewer training 
The survey mode is consistent in most of the countries. They mainly used Computer Assisted 
Personal Interviews (CAPI) – only Cyprus, Finland and the Netherlands mainly/only used Paper- 
and Pencil Interview (PAPI), Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews (CATI) or Computer As-
sisted Web Interviews (CAWI). The literature shows that CAPI is the most reliable method for 
data collection (Honkkila & Kavonius 2013). Face to face surveys have notably higher response 
rates and lower item non-response rates than those without (Tourangeau, Rips & Rasinski 
2000), but also construct more socially desirable answers (De Leeuw 1992, 2008). Therefore 
especially the (item) non-response behavior of the Netherlands which mainly used CAWI has 
to be investigated in more detail (see section 2.4).24 Finland in addition drew a lot of infor-
mation from registers or by a modeling process based on previous survey data (Statistics Fin-
land 2015) which might be problematic with regard to cross-country comparability as has been 
stressed by Lohmann (2011). In general administrative register data have two major ad-
vantages, they usually cover the whole population and accuracy is typically ensured. Disad-
vantages are systematic error, which can occur for example from the modeling process based 
on previous survey data and conceptual differences for example due to a different definition of 
certain variables like in the case of business.25 Furthermore in some cases (as for fiscal purpos-
es) households have an incentive to minimize their values (OECD 2013). Unfortunately, the 
impact of different survey modes on net wealth cannot be analyzed with the HFCS. However, 
the so-called CHINTEX-project compared mean equivalence income for Finland using survey 
data and register data from the ECHP for the very same persons. Here the result was a signifi-
cant underreporting in the survey data of nearly 8 percent for the total population in 1995 
(Rendtel, Nordberg, Jäntti, Hanisch & Basic 2004). For the top income decile this underreport-
ing further increases to almost 20 percent. If this finding is also true for wealth then the Finn-
ish data of the HFCS tend to be systematically higher and may show less wealth inequality for 
the whole population than if the same survey mode had been used.26  
Further differences are found regarding the length of interviewer training. In the majority of 
the countries it is at most eight hours. In France and Spain interviewers were trained almost 30 
                                                          
24
  It is also known from the experiences of EU-SILC that the use of different survey modes may influ-
ence data quality. E.g. Germany was the only country with self-administered interviews in EU-SILC 
while other EU-SILC countries performed predominantly CAPI. However, self-administered inter-
views with cover letters only in the local language tend to discourage in particular migrants to take 
part in such a survey which in fact happened in Germany (Hauser 2007). 
25
  In Finland the variable “business” does not contain the value of non-self-employment not publicly 
traded businesses (ECB 2013c).  
26
  A comparison of income inequality supports this assessment, given that the Finnish register data 
show a smaller Gini-coefficient and less income poverty than survey data (Rendtel et al. 2004, table 
2.4). 
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hours. Taking into account that these countries continued preexisting wealth surveys it can be 
assumed that the interviewers in these countries are much more experienced than in others 
and might therefore have a positive impact on e.g. item non-response behavior and response 
quality in general. 
2.3.3. Unit non-response and weighting  
The response rates (see figure 2.3) in the 15 countries range from only 18.7 percent in Germa-
ny to almost 70 percent in France, where participation is compulsory like in Portugal (64.1 per-
cent) “though participation is never enforced” (ECB 2013c, p. 41).27 In Finland, France, Italy, 
the Netherlands and Spain a preexisting wealth survey was adjusted and continued.28 The re-
sponse rates for the countries with a preexisting panel component where on average higher 
because people are already used to the survey content and the interviewer. It is also well 
known that panel surveys are affected by learning effects (Haunberger 2011) and by selective 
panel attrition (Kroh 2014). Thus households from cross-sections may most likely differ from 
those of existing panel studies.29  
Survey weights are used to adjust for the unit nonresponse behavior; which is assumed not to 
be random due to the sensitive topic of the survey (see for example Kennickell and Woodburn 
1999 and section 2.4). Therefore nonresponse weights are calculated to reduce bias (Fessler & 
Schürz 2013). This is done in a similar way in each country. In a first step design weights are 
calculated as the inverse probability of being selected into the sample. In a second step the 
design weights are adjusted to coverage issues and non-response behavior and are calibrated 
to external sources. From the documentation of the ECB it is not completely clear in which 
ways the calculation processes differ between the countries. Information is available on cali-
bration variables like age, gender, household size, region and some other variables – all from 
external sources – as well as on the existence of weight trimming or limitations for weight ad-
justment factors. However, just a few country documentations identify which information is 
available on non-respondents and/or if additional information collected from the interviewer 
is used. Therefore the quality of the weights cannot be judged with the available HFCS data 
here. 
                                                          
27
  Finland even has a higher response rate (82.2 percent), but due to the fact that Finland drew a lot of 
information from registers, it is not completely comparable.  
28
  In Cyprus and Portugal an existing wealth survey was discontinued and replaced by the HFCS. 
29
  Frick and Grabka (2005) have shown that first time respondents have a significantly higher share of 
item-non-response than panel participants from subsequent waves. The effect on net wealth then 
heavily depends on a proper imputation technique to control for this type of measurement error. 
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Figure 2.3: Initial response rates in the HFCS 
 
Arrows point to response rate for households interviewed for the first time (countries with pre−existing panels only) 
Source: Based on ECB (2013c). 
2.3.4. Oversampling 
The goal of oversampling is to increase precision of estimates for wealth in general and for 
those (financial) assets which are only owned by a small fraction of households (Fowler 2014, 
Kennickell 2007). Theoretically oversampling has no effect on the expected values of measured 
wealth. The empirical fact that countries without oversampling of the wealthy might be more 
likely to underestimate wealth (especially at the top) and wealth inequality (Bover 2011, Ken-
nickell 2007) comes from the connection of how the oversampling is often practically imple-
mented. As a priori information about the wealth distribution (or some correlated variable) is 
needed, countries with an accurate oversampling scheme mostly achieve higher coverage than 
those without. The method for oversampling as well as the range in which people were identi-
fied as wealthy was different in almost each country (see table 2.1). Spain and France over-
sampled wealthy households based on individual information about net wealth from a wealth 
tax register. Finland and Luxembourg used individual income information – Cyprus household 
information about the electricity bill. Greece, Belgium and Germany applied geographical in-
formation, in the first case regional real estate prices and in the two others regional-level in-
Comparing Wealth – Data quality of the HFCS 
21 
come information.30 However, this can lead to increased estimation variance if variance within 
areas is high (OECD 2013). Austria, Portugal, Slovenia and also Germany oversampled big cities 
and Italy, Malta, the Netherlands and Slovakia did not oversample at all. It is obvious that pure 
regional information, income or electricity bills are only weak proxies to identify top wealth 
households. The effective oversampling rate demonstrates the degree to which the share of 
wealthy households in the sample exceeds their share in the population. The effective over-
sampling rate of the top ten percent (explanation see table 2.1) clearly shows that Spain and 
France have the highest values with 192 and 129 respectively (based on individual wealth in-
formation). Vermeulen (2014) tries to compensate the undercoverage of top wealth holders in 
the HFCS by a simulation of the respective population using information from the Forbes list. 
He showed that the wealth share hold by the top 1 percent significantly increase for those 
HFCS-countries who do not implement a proper oversampling. The strongest effect can be 
observed for Austria where this share increased from 23 percent to almost 36 percent. But 
even also in other countries this increase amounts to 9 percentage points in Germany, 8 for 
the Netherlands or 6 percentage points for Italy, while for Spain no effect of this simulation of 
top wealth holders has been shown. Therefore it can be expected that those surveys with a 
proper oversampling get a good coverage of the top wealth holders. For countries with no or 
weak oversampling it can be assumed that they underestimate the true degree of wealth ine-
quality, wealth levels and aggregates.31 
                                                          
30
  In Germany this is only done for municipalities < 100,000 inhabitants. Big cities (> 100,000 inhabit-
ants) were divided into wealthy sections and others based on information about the quality and type 
of the building and purchasing power indicators.  
31
  The authors tried to approximate the degree of bias on wealth levels and inequality by excluding the 
top wealth holders of the oversample. However, the HFCS data do not provide any indicator variable 
to differentiate between “normal” sample members and those from the oversample. It would be 
helpful to find such a variable in a next release of the HFCS. In order to reflect the relevance of such 
an oversampling the SOEP can be used exemplary. In 2002 a top income sample was drawn to im-
prove capturing wealthy households. When excluding this oversample mean net wealth would drop 
by more than 6 percent (based on own calculations).  
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Table 2.1: Oversampling strategies in the HFCS 
Country 
Oversampling 
wealthy house-
holds 
Basis for oversampling 
effective over-
sampling rate of the 
top 10 % 
Spain Yes individual information from taxable wealth 192 
France Yes individual information from net wealth 129 
Finland Yes 
individual information from income + socio-economic 
status 
68 
Luxembourg Yes individual information from income 55 
Cyprus Yes household information from electricity bills 81 
Germany Yes geographic income and other information 117 
Belgium Yes geographic income information 47 
Greece Yes geographic real estate price information -2 
Slovenia Partly geographic information (Ljublijana, Maribor) 22 
Portugal Partly geographic information (Lisbon, Porto) 16 
Austria Partly geographic information (Vienna) 1 
Netherlands No - 87 
Italy No - 4 
Malta No - -5 
Slovakia No - -11 
*  Explanation taken from ECB (2013c, p. 37): “if the share of rich households in the net sample is exactly 10%, the 
effective oversampling rate of the top 10% is 0. If the share of households in the wealthiest decile is 20%, the ef-
fective oversampling rate is 100, meaning that there are 100% more wealthy households in the sample than 
would be if all households had equal weights”. 
Source: Based on ECB (2013c). 
2.3.5. Item non-response and imputation 
Another important issue of data quality is the share of item non-response (INR) and how it is 
dealt with (Bover 2010, Zagorsky 1999). The share of INR rates differ significantly between 
different assets and liabilities and also within one component between the countries (see sec-
tion 2.4). Except for Finland and Italy all countries used multiple imputation by chained equa-
tions (MICE) to estimate the missing values (five implicates).32 The number of covariates used 
for the multiple imputations greatly differs between countries as well as for assets and liabili-
ties. The goal is not to use the same set of variables for all countries. From the literature we 
know that a more detailed set of covariates may better capture the selectivity of the non-
response behavior than only a very limited set of covariates (Barceló 2008, Mathä et al. 2012). 
In Spain 239 covariates were used to impute missing values of the household main residence, 
Malta only used four, the Netherlands six. For the most important mortgage for the household 
main residence Greece used 154 variables, Slovenia only four. Which variables were used or 
how the INR patterns look like in the individual countries and for the wealth components or 
other indications for the imputation quality (such as trace plots or comparisons of the distribu-
                                                          
32
  The same procedure is used in the Survey of Consumer Finances in the USA (Kennickell 1998) and in 
the Spanish Survey of Household Finances (Barceló 2006), which served as prototypes. The later one 
is now part of the HFCS.  
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tions of observed and imputed data values) are not documented for most of the countries.33 
Therefore the quality of the estimations and if “variance was traded against bias” or the other 
way around34 cannot be judged completely (Fessler & Schürz 2013, p. 47).35 
Single imputation provides only one value and does not reflect the uncertainty of the imputa-
tion. Therefore the standard error of the variable might be underestimated (Rubin 1987). Due 
to very low rates of INR two countries make use of single instead of multiple imputations. Fin-
land estimated a lot of information from registers and Italy had a special agreement with the 
survey company, which only considers interviews below a certain level of INR as completed. 
On the one hand this approach may maximize superficial data quality. On the other hand it 
may influence the incentives of the interviewers or the respondents; in consequence they 
might report unreliable values. In addition, it can be assumed that such a precondition may 
yield to a selective sample of respondents and can lead to selectivity bias in the survey esti-
mates (OECD 2013).36 
2.3.6. Reference periods  
The reference periods for the assets and liabilities also differ between the countries and thus 
impair cross-country comparability (see figure 2.4). They range from 2008 to 2011 (almost 
three years between the first and the last one), but for most countries they are between 2010 
and 2011.37 Especially for Spain comparability issues might occur due to the financial crisis and 
its effects. Here the reference period already starts in November 2008. Estimates from the 
OECD show that house prices declined by more than 10 percentage points (real) from 2008 to 
the beginning of 2011.38 Considering the deteriorating house prices the mean of real estate in 
Spain would ceteris paribus only account to 221,000 Euro instead of 251,000 Euro and net 
                                                          
33
  It would be highly welcomed if this kind of documentation would be made available by the ECB.  
34
  If variance is traded for bias, estimations will more often be significant “even though they may have 
larger true bias” (Fessler & Schürz 2013, p. 47). Fessler and Schürz (2013) provide more details about 
the bias variance trade off with regard to the HFCS.  
35
  To estimate the effect of different imputation techniques on net wealth a simulation strategy would 
be necessary as has been used by e.g. Frick and Grabka (2005). They applied the very same imputa-
tion method to two different surveys and compared the effect on income levels and inequality to the 
original imputation strategy, finding significant differences. 
36
  For illustration: Austria and Italy have comparable average values for household main residences. In 
Austria the average value is 258,000 Euro and drops to 245,000 Euro if imputed values are not con-
sidered. This is significant to the five percent level.  
37
  The reference periods will be further harmonized and will coincide from wave three onward (Tza-
mourani 2012).  
38
  Information about house prices are used from OECD (doi: ~10.1787/hsprice-table-2014-1-en). House 
price indices are often based on current transaction prices and not on self-estimation like it is done 
in surveys. Therefore differences may accrue and the estimations can only be seen as an approxima-
tion. 
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wealth would then only amount to on average 252,000 Euro instead of 291,000 Euro (signifi-
cant to the five percent level).39 In addition, one should also account for inflation and the in-
terest rate. Despite from Spain this should also be done in Greece and France where the refer-
ence periods also start before 2010. Another challenge is the long lasting collection periods in 
some countries. Sierminska and Medgyesi (2013) show that during the collection period in 
many countries the stock-market index fluctuated between 10 percent and 20 percent. The 
house-price index already changed by 11-18 percent within the collection period in Austria, 
Germany, Spain and Portugal. While financial assets are usually only hold by a minority of the 
households, housing makes up to two-third of the wealth portfolio. Summing up, a fixed refer-
ence point (e.g. the 31.12. of a given year as has been done in three countries) may improve 
cross-country comparability instead of rather long reference periods. 
Figure 2.4: Reference periods for assets and liabilities in the HFCS: 2008-2011 
 
* Valuation date: December 31
st
  
Source: Based on ECB (2013c). 
2.3.7. Questionnaire and variable catalogue 
The individual national banks agreed on a common blueprint questionnaire for the HFCS, 
which served as a basis for the national questionnaires. This means it is not directly translated 
(not input harmonized) to account for the diversity of (financial) institutions in Europe as well 
as to accommodate pre-existing wealth surveys (von Kalckreuth et al. 2012). The questionnaire 
is divided into three parts: (1) harmonized data, which is output harmonized and collected in 
every country (so called core variables), (2) harmonized data, which is also output harmonized 
                                                          
39
  Spain already surveyed the second wave of the HFCS in 2010. Maybe this will serve as a better basis 
to compare net wealth between the countries. 
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however not collected in every country (so called non-core variables) and (3) country specific 
data, which is not harmonized. Real and financial assets as well as liabilities fall into category 
(1). In each household a reference person40 answered the very detailed and extensive ques-
tions about household’s assets and liabilities as well as some information about intergenera-
tional transfers, gifts and consumption patterns. Information about income, pensions and in-
surances policies as well as employment are available for each person in the household older 
than 16 years. Demographic characteristics (age, gender, country of birth, since when living in 
current country, relationship to the reverence person) are available for all household mem-
bers. 
A closer look into the data documentation and the variable catalogue reveals nevertheless 
some comparability issues regarding the core variables (ECB 2013c, 2013d, 2013e). The biggest 
deviations are in Finland: Several core variables are not provided at all: valuables, non-self-
employment not publicly traded business, additional assets in managed accounts, money 
owed to the household, other assets, outstanding credit line/overdraft balance and outstand-
ing credit cards balance.41 It is obvious that net wealth in Finland is biased downwards given 
these restrictions. The average share of these missing wealth components from total assets is 
in the other countries almost nine percent. For liabilities it is a bit over one percent. In conse-
quence this would mean a significant increase of net wealth ceteris paribus from 161,500 Euro 
to 179,000 Euro in Finland. Other variables are only available in an “aggregated form”. This 
means for example for mortgages on the household main residence Finland only provides one 
variable with all mortgages on the household main residence whereas all other countries 
asked for the first, the second, the third and all additional mortgages on the household main 
residence (all together maximal four variables per household). This practice is also applied in 
several other countries for some assets and liabilities categories (see figure A.2.1 in the ap-
pendix). Therefore the variables could be underestimated because people might tend to forget 
about a small for example mortgage if not asked separately for it. In addition, analysis with all 
countries cannot be done separately for all single components for example mortgages. Fur-
thermore the variable “mutual funds” is not collected in a uniform way over the countries. 
Taken together researchers should check carefully depending on the individual research ques-
tion if the chosen variables are really comparable between the countries. 
                                                          
40
  For selection criteria see ECB (2013c, pp. 16-17). 
41
  The last liability is also not surveyed in France due to institutional differences (ECB 2013c, p. 83). 
Comparing Wealth – Data quality of the HFCS 
26 
Table 2.2: Methodological differences across countries in the HFCS 
n 
RR Sampling Design 
Mode 
Int. T
a 
Weighting Oversampling Imputation
c 
% Frame Strata Excl. Groups h Trim. Lim.
b 
Basis Details Hmr Mort Save 
Austria 
2.380 56 List of enumeration dis-
tricts;  
register of post-box ad-
dresses 
NUTS III region, popu-
lation of municipality 
Homeless, all institu-
tionalized population 
CAPI 7 No No Geographic 
areas 
some oversampling 
in Vienna because 
of higher expected 
non-response rate 
104 51 133 
Belgium 
2.364 22 Telephone register and 
street register 
NUTS I region and 
average income by 
neighborhood of resi-
dence 
Homeless, prisoners CAPI 6 No No Geographic 
information 
about aver-
age income  
Neyman allocation, 
based on the 
standard deviation 
of income in stra-
tum and stratum 
size 
46 31 49 
Cyprus
d,e 
1.237 31 Customer register of the 
Electricity authority of 
Cyprus 
Census districts divid-
ed into urban and 
rural 
Homeless, prisoners, 
population of the 
areas of Cyprus not 
under the effective 
control of the Gov-
ernment of Cyprus 
CAPI (12 %)  
PAPI (88 %) 
5 No No Household 
information 
about elec-
tricity bill 
61 % of the gross 
sample was drawn 
from households 
within the top 10 % 
according to elec-
tricity consumption 
50 38 48 
Finland
f,g 
10.989 82
h 
Central population regis-
ter using master sample of 
50,000 persons 16+ and 
members living in the 
same household-dwelling 
unit 
Socio-economic crite-
ria of the highest 
income-earner 
All institutionalized 
population 
CAPI (3 %)  
CATI (97 %) 
40
i 
Yes Yes Individual 
information 
about in-
come and 
socio-
economic 
status  
from population 
register (High-
income employees, 
self-employed and 
farmers) 
Single Imputation 
France
g 
15.006 69
j 
List of geographical units 
(based on Census); list of 
dwellings 
Region, regional popu-
lation; socio-economic 
criteria 
All institutionalized 
population 
CAPI 27 No N.a. Individual 
information 
about net 
wealth 
Four strata have 
been made. For 
each primary unit 
and each stratum, 
an allocation pro-
portional to main 
residences is com-
puted. Then, a 
17 12 21 
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n 
RR Sampling Design 
Mode 
Int. T
a 
Weighting Oversampling Imputation
c 
% Frame Strata Excl. Groups h Trim. Lim.
b 
Basis Details Hmr Mort Save 
systematic selec-
tion is made within 
each couple stra-
tum-primary unit 
Germany 
3.565 19 Clusters of addresses from 
municipalities (NSI); list of 
street sections, popula-
tion registers of munici-
palities 
Demographic size, 
average taxable in-
come of municipali-
ties; additionally 
wealth-related param-
eters of street sections 
for large municipalities 
Homeless, all institu-
tionalized population 
CAPI 11 No Yes Geographic 
information 
about taxa-
ble income 
and other 
information 
HH in smaller mu-
nicipalities 
(<100,000 inhabit-
ants) were over-
sampled using 
income tax statis-
tics. A municipality 
is declared as 
“wealthy” if a share 
of more than a 
fixed percentage of 
taxpayers with a 
total taxable in-
come was above a 
fixed threshold. In 
larger municipali-
ties (>100,000 
inhabitants) the 
oversampling of 
wealthy street 
sections was based 
on information 
about the quality 
and type of the 
building and pur-
chasing power 
indicators. Knerr et 
al. (2012) 
84 10 17 
Greece 
2.971 47 List of municipalities 
(Census); random routing 
for  secondary sampling 
units 
NUTS II region, degree 
of urbanization 
Homeless, all institu-
tionalized popula-
tion, smaller villages 
(comprising about 7 
CAPI 8 No No Geographic 
information 
about real 
estate prices  
The sampling rate 
for Athens and 
Thessaloniki is 
proportional to the 
233 154 49 
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n 
RR Sampling Design 
Mode 
Int. T
a 
Weighting Oversampling Imputation
c 
% Frame Strata Excl. Groups h Trim. Lim.
b 
Basis Details Hmr Mort Save 
% of the total num-
ber of households) 
real estate prices of 
each cluster 
Italy
g,k 
7.951 52
h 
List of municipalities; 
resident lists from munici-
palities 
NUTS II region and 
population of the 
municipality 
Homeless, all institu-
tionalized population 
CAPI (85%) 
PAPI (15%) 
8 No No --- --- Single imp. (excep. 
save: 10) 
Luxembourg 
950 20 Addresses of fiscal house-
holds from social security 
register 
Individual income, 
nationality, employ-
ment status 
Diplomats, non-
resident citizens, 
homeless, interna-
tional civil servants 
and in general 
households  where 
no individual is enti-
tled to be registered 
in the social security 
register, all institu-
tionalized population 
CAPI 6 No Yes Individual 
information 
about per-
sonal income 
subject to 
social contri-
butions  
20 % of the gross 
sample was drawn 
from the top in-
come decile ac-
cording to the 
social security 
register and the 
self-employed-
headed fiscal 
household sub-
population 
86 118 31 
Malta 
843 30 Dwelling register of the 
NSI 
Statistical region Diplomats, non-
resident citizens, 
armed forces, home-
less, civilians living in 
military institutions, 
prisoners 
CAPI (81%) 
PAPI (19%) 
9 Yes Yes --- --- 4 10 14 
Netherlands
g 
1.301 58 Postal addresses --- Blind people, people 
who do not speak 
Dutch, all institu-
tionalized population 
CAWI N.a. No No --- --- 6 7 7 
Portugal
e 
4.404 64
j 
List of geographical areas; 
list of private dwellings, 
from Census 
NUTS II region All institutionalized 
population, home-
less, people living in 
military area 
CAPI 16 No No Geographic 
areas 
Metropolitan areas 
of Lisbon and Porto 
oversampled, 50 % 
of gross sample 
drawn from these 
areas 
16 23 17 
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n 
RR Sampling Design 
Mode 
Int. T
a 
Weighting Oversampling Imputation
c 
% Frame Strata Excl. Groups h Trim. Lim.
b 
Basis Details Hmr Mort Save 
Slovakia
l 
2.057 N.a. List of municipalities, 
households chosen by 
random walk  
NUTS III region, popu-
lation of municipality. 
In each stratum, ten 
income quotas were 
prescribed, which 
interviewers had to 
fulfill 
Homeless, all institu-
tionalized population 
CAPI 4 No Yes --- --- 102 31 69 
Slovenia
m 
343 36 List of districts from Cen-
sus; list of persons 16+ 
from population register 
Population of the 
municipality, with 
adjustments for ex-
pected non-response 
All institutionalized 
population, diplo-
mats, homeless, 
non-citizens, armed 
forces, civilians living 
in military area 
CAPI 7 No Yes Geographic 
areas 
Municipalities of 
Ljubljana and Ma-
ribor were over-
sampled, as higher 
non-response rates 
were expected 
47 4 14 
Spain
g 
6.197 57
h 
Municipal census (list of 
addresses) supplemented 
by tax office information; 
list of addresses 
Population of the 
municipality, taxable 
wealth 
All institutionalized 
population 
CAPI 28 No Yes Individual 
information 
about taxa-
ble wealth  
Eight wealth strata 
were defined and 
were oversampled 
progressively at 
higher rates 
239 104 159 
Note: Estonia, Ireland and Latvia are not part of the first. 
a  Interviewer Training  
b  Limits for weight adjustment factors  
c  Imputation technique: multivariate imputation by 
chained equations, MICE, unless otherwise noted. 
Number of covariates used for main variables: value of 
household main residence (hmr), outstanding amount 
of most important hmr mortgage (mort), value of sav-
ings accounts (save).  
d  Statement of the ECB: “The data for Cyprus appears not 
to be comparable with those for other Euro area coun-
tries in a number of dimensions and should therefore 
be interpreted with caution.” (ECB 2013c, p. 4)  
e  Existing wealth survey was discontinued and replaced 
by the HFCS.  
f  Register and estimated data.  
g  Preexisting wealth survey continued.  
h  Response rate for HH interviewed for the first time are 
as follows: Finland 70; Italy 35; Spain 40  
i  Includes general interviewer training modules of the 
NSI.  
j  Participation compulsory.  
k  Only interviews with a level of item non-response below 
a certain threshold were considered  
l  Quota sampling for the first wave; all other countries 
probabilistic design. In the second wave the country will 
adopt a probabilistic design.  
m Reduced sample size; “not [be] deemed fully repre-
sentative for the country” (ECB 2013c, p. 9)
Source: If not otherwise noted ECB (2013c, d). 
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2.4. Accuracy 
Accuracy is linked to the “degree to which the data correctly allow estimation of the popula-
tion characteristics they are designed to describe” (OECD 2013, p. 193). Usually it is described 
in terms of sources of errors. The total survey error (TSE) refers to the “accumulation of all 
errors that may arise in the design, collection, processing, and analysis of survey data” (OECD 
2013, p. 193). The sources of error can be divided into sampling and non-sampling error. The 
first one refers to an “inaccuracy that arises because data is collected only from a sample that 
may not be fully representative of the total population of interest” (OECD 2013, p. 202). The 
second one “mainly relate[s] to measurement, data collection and processing” (OECD 2013, p. 
193). It can be classified in specification error (relevant variables are missing or are only ap-
proximated), coverage error (sampling does not completely cover reference population) non-
response error (households do not participate in the survey or do not answer all applicable 
questions), measurement error (errors made by the interviewer or the respondents) and pro-
cessing error (inaccuracy during data entry, editing etc.). Typically accuracy can be improved 
more or less in every survey. A big challenge to data quality in cross-sectional surveys comes 
from the response process; it can induce bias to the estimates. Therefore we will focus in the 
following analysis on nonresponse and especially on item non-response in the HFCS.42 
2.4.1. Item non-response in the HFCS 
A common problem in population surveys and in particular in surveys dealing with wealth is 
the failure to collect complete information. While a refusal to the total questionnaire is named 
unit non-response (UNR), item non-response (INR) refers to single questions that are not an-
swered. The UNR behavior can be adjusted for through weighting of the data and INR is typi-
cally corrected through imputation (also see section 2.3). A survey with a higher response rate 
is assumed to produce a better and less biased sample than one with lower rates (Fowler 
2014). INR may be caused by a respondent’s reservation to answer a question that appears to 
be too sensitive, i.e. it affects confidentiality and privacy or simply from the fact that the cor-
rect answer is not known (given the underlying complexity of the surveyed construct). In gen-
eral, simple demographic information such as gender, age or marital status is not very sensi-
tive to ask for, leading to low incidence of INR. Wealth or income questions, however, are typi-
cally associated with higher rates of INR (see for example Grabka & Westermeier 2014, 
Riphahn & Serfling 2005). Furthermore the survey mode (self-administered vs. conducted by 
                                                          
42
  Another reason for our choice is that due to confidential reasons users of the HFCS are not able to 
use Para data or information about non-responding units etc. Therefore the possibilities of investiga-
tions are rather limited. 
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interviewers), the question structure (for example open-ended questions) and the interview-
er’s characteristics (like experience or character) can have an effect on INR (Groves, Dillman, 
Eltinge & Little 2001). There is increasing literature which explicitly acknowledges the INR phe-
nomenon in micro-econometric research as a specific form of measurement error (see for 
example Cameron & Trivedi 2005, p. 193). Most importantly, INR on wealth questions has 
been found to be selective with respect to inequality (see for example Frick et al. 2010b) and 
thus can lead to biased results. 
As long as the missing process of INR is completely missing at random (MCAR) the potential 
bias could be disregarded (see Rubin 1987). However, it is typically assumed that INR follows a 
missing at random process (MAR), which means that the missing data depend on observed 
information in a data set. Another type of missing data is called missing not at random 
(MNAR). Here the missing data cannot be explained by observed characteristics and may be 
for example dependent on missing values itself. The latter both missing mechanisms are non-
ignorable and need to be carefully considered. In general older people and those with less 
education have a higher probability for INR (Groves et al. 2001). It has been shown for example 
in the SOEP that the probability for missing wealth information is lower for males, persons 
with higher education levels and civil servants. It is higher for self-employed (Frick et al. 
2010a). A proper imputation has to consider the missing process and thus the underlying se-
lectivity. 
Based on the imputation method applied in the HFCS the relevance of the imputed values is 
almost 30 percent for gross real assets in Austria and more than 40 percent for gross financial 
assets in the Netherlands. For the other countries which make use of multiple imputation the 
respective shares vary between five and 30 percent (see figure 2.5). Hence INR and the respec-
tive imputation have a significant impact on wealth levels and inequality. 
We will therefore analyze the INR patterns in the HFCS for selected assets and liabilities in all 
countries. We want to know, whether the selectivity of INR is uniform across countries or if 
there are structural differences – which one could interpret as cultural discrepancy of INR. As 
Couper and De Leeuw (2003) argue, non-response in cross-national studies has so far not been 
extensively researched and this is still the case. However, differential response rates and pat-
terns between countries can threaten the validity of cross-national comparisons (Couper & De 
Leeuw 2003). In case of sensitive information such as wealth with rather high INR the problem 
of cross-country comparability may be of important relevance. 
Comparing Wealth – Data quality of the HFCS 
32 
Figure 2.5: Relevance of imputation in the HFCS* 
 
* Weighted sum of all components of the aggregate that were imputed divided by the weighted sum of the aggre-
gate variable. 
Source: Based on ECB (2013c, p. 57). 
In order to reduce complexity we will focus on assets and liabilities with a high incidence and 
those with a high quantitative relevance.43 As assets we choose the variables “household main 
residence” (real asset) and “saving accounts” (financial asset); both have an incidence greater 
than 50 percent. Regarding relevance (measured by the mean)“business 1” (real asset) will be 
added; the variable has quite a high relevance and even incidence in some countries – espe-
cially in the southern part of Europe (Malta, Portugal, Cyprus, Italy). For the liabilities, the fur-
ther investigation is based on “mortgage of the household main residence 1” and “non-
collaterised loan 1” – they both have an incidence around 20 percent. Regarding relevance 
(measured by the mean) no additional variable is added. 
The HFCS provides flag variables which give information about potential reasons for the non-
response. In total 16 different values are available. There is a category for edited values and 
one for estimated ones. The imputed category has five different characteristics. One can dif-
                                                          
43
  Regarding assets mutual funds and private pensions/life insurances are excluded from the analysis. 
The first one is further divided in subgroups in several countries however not in all and the second 
one is collected on an individual and not on household level. Finland and Slovenia will not be part of 
the analysis. The first one does not really have item non-response because of the use of register in-
formation and the second one has too few households to investigate. 
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ferentiate between the responses “Don’t know” and “No answer”. Furthermore the categories 
“Originally not collected due to missing answer to a previous question”, “Originally collected 
from a range or from brackets” and “Collected value deleted or value not collected due to a 
CAPI or interviewer error” can be identified. Furthermore there are different categories for 
missing values, which were not imputed.44 In addition, one can see of course which variables 
were collected as complete observations and which were not applicable (recorded as missing). 
For the following analysis we will concentrate on the edited and imputed ones.  
Figure 2.6 illustrates the share of INR as well as the reason for it for the selected assets and 
liabilities by country.45 It is obvious that the shares differ not only significantly between the 
components but also between and within countries. Especially France and Italy have conspicu-
ous response patterns compared with the other countries. In the case of France the value of 
household main residence and business 1 has been completely imputed. In the latter case 
respondents were only asked for a range, which is a slightly different approach than in the 
other countries where respondents were first asked for the “exact” value and in a second step, 
if they had difficulties answering the question, for a range. On the other side Italy has in almost 
all observed variables no imputed or edited data, which is due to the already mentioned 
agreement with the survey company. Relying on this information the percentage of imputed 
cases of the value of saving accounts above 50 percent is quite surprising. Malta and Austria 
have – compared with the other countries – quite high shares of INR. High numbers of imputed 
values introduce, given a proper imputation, broader confidence bands for these values and in 
consequence a poorer estimator. Countries with a general low rate of INR are Germany46 and 
Portugal.  
                                                          
44
  They were not used extensively but only in some countries, which may be a hint of problems in 
cross-country comparability. However, the documentation gives no information for the rationale of 
this procedure. 
45
  The variables refer to the question of the value of the respective wealth component not the holding 
of the asset or liability. 
46
  The low item non-response rate might be a counterpart to the high unit non-response rate. The 
interviewed household were few but cooperative (von Kalckreuth et al. 2012). 
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Figure 2.6: Information from flag-variables for selected assets and liabilities – only those 
holding the respective wealth/liability component 
 
Source: Own calculations based on HCFS (2010). The data for business in Belgium is based on a corrected version 
from the national Bank of Belgium 
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Looking at the different reasons for INR one finds that edited values are scarce. Imputations 
due to “previous question missing” (filter information whether a specific wealth component is 
held by the household) just play a minor role, although it arises more often in the Netherlands 
(especially for business 1). The category “Don’t know” is frequently filled for business 1, given 
that it is rather problematic for a respondent to give a precise valuation of their own enter-
prise. One can interpret a “No answer” as a strong refusal by the interviewees. However, the 
respective share is usually not much above 10 percent (exception: “non-collaterised loan 1” in 
the Netherlands).47 Deleted and then imputed values (considered incorrect or unreliable) are 
also especially present for business 1.48 Most of the imputed values are collected from a range 
or from brackets, which means that respondents do not know the exact amount of their asset 
or liability but subsequently unfolding brackets are offered to narrow the value down into 
ranges, which eases the imputation process. In addition, this procedure reduces complete item 
non-response (Heeringa, Hill & Howell 1995, Vazquez Alvarez, Melenberg & van Soest 2001). 
However, from a data user point of view, it yields to missing information which need to be 
handled carefully. 
2.4.2. Estimation strategy and results for item non-response 
After the general descriptions of the different INR patterns for the chosen assets and liabilities 
as well as the differences between the countries we will now analyze the similarities and dif-
ferences due to characteristics. The multivariate part consists of a logit model with the follow-
ing equation: 
𝑝𝑗(𝑤) = 𝐹(𝛼 +  𝛽𝑋𝑗  +  𝜀𝑖) 
where 𝑝𝑗  denotes INR probability of households in country 𝑗 for a particular wealth compo-
nent 𝑤, 𝛼 is an intercept, 𝜀𝑖 a random error term. 𝑋𝑗 is the matrix of all explanatory variables, 
which include predominately socio-demographic information: age, gender, work status and 
education of the reference persons, income of the household, the value of its assets and liabili-
ties,49 its size and if children under 14 years are present.50 We will do this for the Euro-
                                                          
47
  Studies confirm these findings: “questions that require more cognitive effort to be answered receive 
more don’t knows” (here: business) and “more sensitive questions get more refusals” (here: non-
collaterised loan 1) (Shoemaker, Eichholz & Skewes 2000, p. 1). 
48
  It is not fully clear on which basis this decision has been made. The ECB should provide more infor-
mation why this has been done. 
49
  It is assumed that with a higher value of assets and/or liabilities the wealth portfolio gets more com-
plex therefore more questions have to be answered. The variables hence also serve as controls for 
complexity.  
50
  More methodological variables which give information about the interview process (such as infor-
mation about characteristics of the interviewer, given that there exist interviewer-interviewee re-
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countries as a whole (pooled analysis) and for each country separately.51 France, Italy and Por-
tugal are not part of all regressions.52  
The average marginal effects of the pooled logit estimations, which calculate INR probabilities 
for the selected assets and liabilities for the whole Euro area with dummy variables for the 
individual countries53 (see table A.2.1 in the appendix) show that for all chosen wealth compo-
nents men have a lower INR probability than women. These points into the direction that men 
tend to know on average their wealth portfolio better or are just more certain of it. The same 
holds for the liabilities of the household. The higher they are the less likely the household has 
INR and is therefore on average better informed about its wealth portfolio. The opposite is the 
case for the assets of the households (only for household main residences the assets follow the 
same pattern as for the liabilities). Four out of the five components show that people in the 
first and second income quintile (compared with the third) tend to have higher INR probabili-
ties. In respectively two of the investigated cases the following holds: people over the age of 
65 tend to have higher INR than middle aged ones; self-employed have on average higher non-
response shares than employed. This seems intuitively right because in most countries they 
have to make provisions for their pensions on their own which makes their wealth portfolio 
more complicated. Persons with primary education tend to have higher probabilities for INR 
than those with secondary education. The more people live in a household the more complex 
a wealth portfolio usually is. Thus, the probability for INR for people in a two-person house-
hold is lower than for larger households.54 In general the results found here follow the patterns 
described in the previous literature (see for example Frick et al. 2010a, Groves et al. 2001). 
                                                                                                                                                                          
sponding effects, see Pickery, Loosveldt, & Carton 2001) are unfortunately not available. This could 
be a valuable extension of the HFCS data in the future. 
51
  Code from the ECB (2013f) and OeNB (2012) has been used to merge the five data files together.  
52
  In France the variables household main residence and business 1 are completely imputed. In Italy the 
variables household main residence, its most important mortgage and the most important loan do 
not have imputed values. In Portugal the variable business 1 has too few imputed values to be ana-
lyzed here. 
53
  We choose Germany as a reference category. Slovenia has a very small sample size, Malta and Lux-
embourg have rather small ones as well. Slovakia used a quota sampling. Finland used register data. 
The Netherlands applied CAWI, Cyprus PAPI. France and Italy have for some variables 100 or 0 per-
cent imputation. Portugal has for some variables too few imputed observations. We are left with: 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain and Greece. From this countries Germany has on average the low-
est INR-rates and a middle size sample size. 
54
  The described results are significant at least at the 10 percent level. The estimations are done with-
out weights. Including them only leads to minor changes in the values but not in sign. 
Comparing Wealth – Data quality of the HFCS 
37 
Controlling for the various countries Austria, Malta and Slovakia show for all five considered 
wealth components positive effects compared with the reference category Germany.55 
The effects for the separate country regressions do not show clear patterns (see table A.2.2 in 
the appendix). Significant effects on the Euro area level are not generally confirmed on the 
country level. This can be partly explained by small sample sizes at the country level. But we do 
also find opposing effects. This does apply for asset and liability levels when looking at the 
value of housing main residence. At the Euro area level these covariates point to a significantly 
lower probability for INR – which is confirmed for at least three HFCS countries – while Slo-
vakia stands out with significant positive effects. When looking at saving accounts again Slo-
vakia and Malta show opposite effects for asset levels.56 A common pattern across countries 
however can be found for gender. Although this covariate is not significant in all HFCS coun-
tries, we find the general effect, that if women are the reference person they have a signifi-
cantly higher probability for INR. We also confirm for several countries the effect for the 
household size. The more people are living in a household the more complex is the wealth 
portfolio and thus the higher is the probability for INR. Altogether there is not a harmonized 
item nonresponse pattern across the HFCS countries.57 This implies the necessity for well 
aligned imputation models. But as indicated above the documentation is not very precise how 
and with which imputation models item non-response has been handled. In addition, further 
analyzes which take unit nonresponse patterns into account would be desirable, however are 
not possible with the user data set. 
2.5. Conclusion 
The HFCS micro dataset is a milestone for cross-country comparisons of private wealth in the 
Euro area. The core questionnaire and also the survey methodology was largely pre-
harmonized, however there are significant differences across country surveys which impair 
cross-country comparability of net wealth and inequality and thus should be carefully taken 
into account by researchers. The aims of this paper are to get a better insight in the data quali-
ty of the first wave of this important data source to help users to understand and interpret 
their results better as well as to make a contribution to improve data quality further. Based on 
                                                          
55
  Further tests show that the differences between the single countries are in the majority of the cases 
significant. Further research especially with Para data is needed to analyze differences between 
countries further and to identify clear structures. 
56
  Again contrarious effects can be found for Slovakia when considering liability levels for mortgages of 
household main residence. 
57
  We also applied a decomposition method suggested by Fairlie (1999, 2005) to identify structural 
(cultural) differences in the item non-response missing process. However, we could not find unified 
structures. Results can be found in the Working Paper Tiefensee and Grabka (2014). 
Comparing Wealth – Data quality of the HFCS 
38 
the “Guidelines for Micro Statistics on Household Wealth” from the OECD (2013) we defined 
the term quality. We then went through the seven criteria institutional environment, rele-
vance, coherence, timeliness, accessibility, comparability and accuracy (with the main focus on 
the last two points) and checked how the HFCS implemented these points. We present a syn-
opsis of methodological differences in the HFCS dataset to shed some light on cross-country 
comparability and thus on potential restrictions for wealth comparisons. We find that net 
wealth is most likely biased in Finland due to a deviating survey mode and more importantly 
the absence of various wealth components which may lead to an underestimation of assets (9 
percent) and liabilities (1 percent). The Netherlands also deviates with respect to the survey 
mode, however a quantification of this effect is not possible here. For a wealth survey over-
sampling of rich households is crucial to reduce potential coverage error. As has been shown 
by Vermeulen (2014) the lack of oversampling, like in the Netherlands and Italy, lead to a sys-
tematic undervaluation of mean net wealth and the wealth share of the top 1 percent. When 
researchers are interested in subgroup analyses, they should prescind from looking at Slove-
nia, Malta and Luxemburg due to rather small sample sizes. Finally Slovakia should not be used 
so far, given that only a quota sample has been used to survey the population, which does not 
fulfill accepted quality requirements. 
In addition, under the point accuracy incidence and selectivity of item non-response in a cross-
national setting are investigated, which gives a first insight in different nonresponse patterns 
for the chosen assets and liabilities as well as for the individual countries. Strong refusals when 
respondents are not willing to give an answer are acceptably low in the HFCS with a share of 
less than roughly 10 percent, while UNR play a larger role in the HFCS. Nevertheless, imputa-
tion took place up to 100 percent for all those holding a wealth component in France for hous-
ing main residence and business assets. After controlling for demographic characteristics via a 
pooled and country specific logit regressions we in principle confirm the results from individual 
country cases in the literature, but cannot find harmonized item non-response patterns across 
countries. However, due to the lack of more methodological information (such as interviewer 
characteristics) or about the unit non-response process we are not able to investigate this as-
pect further. 
Taken together the HFCS is at the moment the best dataset for cross country comparisons of 
wealth levels and inequality in the Euro area and it is definitely a first (big) step into the right 
direction. Nevertheless some improvements are very helpful. First, we would suggest publish-
ing detailed methodological reports for all countries in English, in addition to the methodologi-
cal report from the ECB. Second, methodological differences which are not based on country 
specific differences should be reduced or better even vanish. Desirable points to work on are 
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for example the full (output) harmonization of the collected and provided wealth and liability 
components (which is essential for cross-country comparability of wealth levels and inequali-
ty), the application of more harmonized sampling frames, the reduced sample size in Slovenia, 
the survey modes in Cyprus, the Netherlands and in Finland, a harmonization and shortening 
(in some cases) of the reference periods and even a more harmonized procedure with respect 
to the oversampling of top wealth households, given that these households have a pro-
nounced effect when looking at the skewed wealth distribution. An oversample identifier 
could also ease analyses about the relevance off such a methodological add-on. Third, neces-
sary country specific differences like in the case of weighting or imputation should be docu-
mented in more detail for example has Para data been used for the construction of weights 
and what covariates are used for the imputation, which would allow other researchers to go 
further than the study at hand to analyze the data quality of the HFCS. If it is not possible to 
make some information publicly available due to data protection, one could examine the pos-
sibility of a protected platform for data users. Additionally, countries with a very low initial 
response rate like Germany should make endeavors to raise the willingness of the respondents 
to take part in such a survey, not only to reduce potential bias in a cross sectional, but more 
importantly in a longitudinal sense. Further, exemptions such as Italy, that achieved very low 
INR by a special agreement with the survey company, to only consider interviews below a cer-
tain level of non-response as completed, should be avoided to ease comparability. The ECB 
should also reconsider to survey public pension entitlements in the HFCS and to provide this 
information in a separate variable to enable data users to decide whether this information 
might be considered in wealth analyses. Finally, it should be checked whether Para data could 
be made available for external researchers to better separate substantial cross-country differ-
ences from methodological distinctiveness for example for investigating INR patterns further. 
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Appendix 
Part A: Figures 
Figure A.2.1: Differences in variables collection  
 
Source: HFCS (2010). 
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Part B: Tables 
Table A.2.1:  Average marginal effects of the pooled logit estimations  
  HMR Business 1 Saving account HMR mortgage1 Loan1 
  Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Std.err. 
Men -0.031 *** 0.005 -0.074 *** 0.014 -0.022 *** 0.006 -0.036 *** 0.009 -0.022 ** 0.009 
Age group (reference: age 45-54) 
16-34 0.020 ** 0.009 0.029 
 
0.023 0.009 
 
0.010 0.020 
 
0.014 -0.017 
 
0.015 
35-44 0.015 * 0.008 0.030 * 0.018 0.003 
 
0.009 0.014 
 
0.012 0.000 
 
0.013 
55-64 0.012 
 
0.008 -0.003 
 
0.018 -0.011 
 
0.009 -0.019 
 
0.015 0.009 
 
0.014 
65 plus 0.032 *** 0.010 0.000 
 
0.028 -0.010 
 
0.012 -0.038 
 
0.027 0.045 ** 0.022 
Employment status (reference: employed) 
Self-employed 0.031 *** 0.008 -0.011 
 
0.015 0.025 *** 0.009 0.002 
 
0.012 -0.004 
 
0.013 
Unemployed/other 0.008 
 
0.008 0.048 ** 0.024 0.000 
 
0.010 0.005 
 
0.015 0.004 
 
0.014 
Retired 0.000 
 
0.009 0.035 
 
0.029 -0.014 
 
0.010 0.012 
 
0.021 -0.044 ** 0.018 
Education (reference: secondary) 
Primary 0.007 
 
0.007 -0.013 
 
0.019 0.013 * 0.007 0.018 
 
0.012 0.025 ** 0.011 
Tertiary 0.010 * 0.006 -0.003 
 
0.015 -0.015 ** 0.007 -0.010 
 
0.010 -0.014 
 
0.011 
Income quintiles (reference: Third) 
First 0.026 *** 0.008 0.003 
 
0.035 0.040 *** 0.010 0.050 ** 0.020 0.010 
 
0.018 
Second 0.009 
 
0.007 0.056 ** 0.027 0.003 
 
0.009 0.030 * 0.016 -0.005 
 
0.015 
Fourth -0.007 
 
0.007 -0.021 
 
0.021 -0.004 
 
0.008 -0.004 
 
0.013 -0.019 
 
0.013 
Fifth 0.002 
 
0.007 -0.023 
 
0.020 -0.002 
 
0.008 0.007 
 
0.013 -0.013 
 
0.013 
Log assets -0.010 *** 0.003 0.012 ** 0.005 0.006 *** 0.002 0.019 *** 0.006 0.011 *** 0.003 
Log liabilities -0.003 *** 0.001 -0.003 ** 0.001 -0.004 *** 0.001 -0.024 *** 0.003 -0.021 *** 0.002 
Household size (reference: 2 persons) 
1 0.001 
 
0.007 -0.051 ** 0.024 -0.048 *** 0.007 0.007 
 
0.015 -0.006 
 
0.014 
3 0.001 
 
0.007 0.005 
 
0.018 0.044 *** 0.008 -0.009 
 
0.014 -0.006 
 
0.013 
4 -0.001 
 
0.008 0.009 
 
0.019 0.059 *** 0.010 0.015 
 
0.014 0.013 
 
0.015 
5 plus 0.025 ** 0.010 0.019 
 
0.023 0.075 *** 0.013 0.010 
 
0.018 0.024 
 
0.018 
HH with child. <14yrs. -0.008 
 
0.008 -0.026 
 
0.018 -0.046 *** 0.009 -0.016 
 
0.012 0.004 
 
0.013 
Mortgage 0.008 
 
0.009 
            Country (reference: Germany) 
Austria 0.097 *** 0.010 0.272 *** 0.029 0.230 *** 0.013 0.214 *** 0.022 0.137 *** 0.029 
Belgium -0.035 *** 0.012 0.132 *** 0.031 0.080 *** 0.015 0.084 *** 0.021 0.019 
 
0.029 
Cyprus 0.079 *** 0.012 0.186 *** 0.027 -0.048 * 0.029 -0.002 
 
0.026 -0.060 * 0.034 
Spain -0.027 *** 0.009 0.101 *** 0.021 0.004 
 
0.016 -0.052 ** 0.022 -0.024 
 
0.023 
France 
      
0.485 *** 0.009 0.115 *** 0.018 0.148 *** 0.019 
Greece -0.041 *** 0.011 -0.084 *** 0.030 0.125 *** 0.039 0.076 *** 0.024 -0.074 ** 0.033 
Italy 
   
-0.478 *** 0.035 0.315 *** 0.013 
      Luxembourg 0.034 ** 0.014 0.146 *** 0.040 0.273 *** 0.017 0.014 
 
0.029 -0.034 
 
0.036 
Malta 0.125 *** 0.012 0.218 *** 0.044 0.430 *** 0.018 0.143 *** 0.038 0.126 *** 0.040 
Netherlands -0.052 *** 0.017 0.219 *** 0.046 -0.284 *** 0.035 -0.038 
 
0.027 0.333 *** 0.028 
Portugal -0.055 *** 0.011 
   
-0.025 
 
0.016 0.074 *** 0.021 -0.040 
 
0.028 
Slovakia 0.041 *** 0.011 0.187 *** 0.027 0.222 *** 0.019 0.158 *** 0.028 0.059 ** 0.029 
N 19.959 4.618 29.353 8.479 8.99 
Rp
2 
0.06 0.23 0.20 0.05 0.06 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own calculations based on HFCS (2010). 
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Table A.2.2:  Average marginal effects of the country logit estimations  
HMR 
Austria Belgium Cyprus Germany Spain 
Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. 
Men -0.062 ** 0.026 0.001 
 
0.013 -0.082 *** 0.025 -0.049 *** 0.014 -0.030 *** 0.009 
Age group (reference: age 45-54) 
             
16-34 0.118 ** 0.048 0.007 
 
0.029 -0.021 
 
0.042 0.053 * 0.029 0.033 
 
0.023 
35-44 0.025 
 
0.043 -0.045 
 
0.029 0.004 
 
0.036 0.061 *** 0.023 0.001 
 
0.018 
55-64 -0.069 
 
0.047 -0.004 
 
0.023 -0.016 
 
0.044 0.021 
 
0.022 0.009 
 
0.014 
65 plus -0.015 
 
0.055 0.001 
 
0.033 -0.041 
 
0.086 0.011 
 
0.033 0.033 ** 0.016 
Employment status (reference: employed 
            
Self-employed 0.063 
 
0.041 0.024 
 
0.029 0.007 
 
0.039 0.037 * 0.022 0.029 * 0.015 
Unemployed/other 0.050 
 
0.047 0.039 * 0.022 0.006 
 
0.041 0.029 
 
0.022 -0.015 
 
0.014 
Retired 0.036 
 
0.049 0.006 
 
0.028 0.111 
 
0.077 -0.008 
 
0.029 -0.007 
 
0.015 
Education (reference: secondary) 
             
Primary 0.113 *** 0.033 -0.011 
 
0.018 -0.009 
 
0.034 -0.038 
 
0.029 0.006 
 
0.013 
Tertiary -0.013 
 
0.040 0.008 
 
0.016 -0.020 
 
0.029 0.010 
 
0.015 0.010 
 
0.013 
Income quintiles (reference: Third) 
             
First 0.123 *** 0.046 0.019 
 
0.025 0.056 
 
0.043 0.028 
 
0.033 0.020 
 
0.014 
Second -0.028 
 
0.042 0.024 
 
0.022 -0.017 
 
0.039 0.057 ** 0.025 0.009 
 
0.013 
Fourth -0.023 
 
0.038 0.000 
 
0.021 -0.043 
 
0.037 -0.005 
 
0.023 -0.011 
 
0.014 
Fifth -0.027 
 
0.039 0.020 
 
0.021 -0.043 
 
0.040 -0.011 
 
0.022 -0.023 
 
0.014 
Log assets 0.016 
 
0.016 -0.004 
 
0.009 -0.046 *** 0.014 -0.001 
 
0.008 -0.003 
 
0.005 
Log liabilities 0.003 
 
0.005 -0.002 
 
0.003 -0.004 
 
0.004 -0.002 
 
0.002 -0.004 *** 0.001 
Household size (reference: 2 persons) 
            
1 -0.054 
 
0.035 0.009 
 
0.018 -0.104 ** 0.046 0.047 ** 0.020 0.001 
 
0.011 
3 -0.029 
 
0.042 0.038 * 0.021 -0.027 
 
0.041 0.027 
 
0.021 0.010 
 
0.012 
4 -0.008 
 
0.049 0.014 
 
0.026 -0.018 
 
0.043 0.017 
 
0.026 0.002 
 
0.015 
5 plus 0.131 ** 0.057 0.070 ** 0.030 -0.038 
 
0.046 0.050 
 
0.031 0.013 
 
0.022 
HH with child. < 14 
yrs. 
-0.035 
 
0.048 -0.044 * 0.026 0.019 
 
0.035 0.016 
 
0.025 -0.009 
 
0.017 
Mortgage 0.060 
 
0.055 -0.006 
 
0.027 0.016 
 
0.034 0.007 
 
0.024 0.006 
 
0.017 
N 1,181 1,708 984 2,013 5,387 
R2_P 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.03 
 
HMR 
Greece Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Portugal Slovakia 
Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. 
Men -0.028 * 0.014 0.009 
 
0.028 -0.014 
 
0.045 -0.011 
 
0.020 -0.017 
 
0.012 -0.025 
 
0.020 
Age group (reference: age 45-54) 
16-34 0.002 
 
0.026 0.004 
 
0.055 -0.132 
 
0.088 0.020 
 
0.030 0.077 ** 0.032 -0.025 
 
0.031 
35-44 0.023 
 
0.024 0.036 
 
0.042 -0.013 
 
0.065 -0.016 
 
0.026 0.062 ** 0.025 0.000 
 
0.031 
55-64 0.074 *** 0.023 0.005 
 
0.045 0.017 
 
0.060 -0.066 ** 0.031 0.059 *** 0.021 0.075 ** 0.035 
65 plus 0.084 *** 0.028 0.033 
 
0.059 0.049 
 
0.071 -0.087 ** 0.040 0.062 ** 0.024 0.094 * 0.057 
Employment status (reference: employed 
Self-
employed 
0.026 
 
0.022 0.059 
 
0.043 0.198 *** 0.074 -0.013 
 
0.033 0.022 
 
0.020 -0.036 
 
0.037 
Unem-
ployed/oth
er 
0.030 
 
0.021 0.006 
 
0.049 0.034 
 
0.060 -0.021 
 
0.039 0.005 
 
0.020 0.055 
 
0.034 
Retired -0.011 
 
0.025 -0.033 
 
0.051 -0.032 
 
0.067 0.073 ** 0.036 0.025 
 
0.019 -0.035 
 
0.044 
Education (reference: secondary) 
Primary -0.065 *** 0.018 0.004 
 
0.034 -0.004 
 
0.048 0.005 
 
0.022 -0.005 
 
0.019 0.029 
 
0.050 
Tertiary 0.004 
 
0.019 0.001 
 
0.032 -0.001 
 
0.061 0.005 
 
0.020 0.016 
 
0.023 0.050 ** 0.024 
Income quintiles (reference: Third) 
First 0.005 
 
0.023 0.086 * 0.051 -0.137 * 0.070 0.012 
 
0.027 0.048 *** 0.017 -0.068 * 0.040 
Second 0.002 
 
0.021 -0.046 
 
0.052 0.000 
 
0.060 0.000 
 
0.024 0.030 * 0.017 -0.022 
 
0.031 
Fourth 0.016 
 
0.022 -0.027 
 
0.042 0.145 ** 0.059 -0.048 * 0.026 0.003 
 
0.019 -0.027 
 
0.030 
Fifth 0.046 *** 0.023 0.001 
 
0.044 0.122 * 0.064 -0.022 
 
0.022 0.022 
 
0.019 0.043 
 
0.031 
Log assets -0.014 
 
0.009 -0.007 
 
0.020 -0.084 *** 0.025 0.007 
 
0.016 -0.018 *** 0.005 0.037 ** 0.015 
Log liabili-
ties 
-0.003 
 
0.002 -0.011 ** 0.004 -0.014 ** 0.006 0.002 
 
0.003 -0.002 
 
0.002 0.012 *** 0.003 
Household size (reference: 2 persons) 
1 0.025 
 
0.018 -0.041 
 
0.040 0.083 
 
0.060 0.024 
 
0.023 0.003 
 
0.014 0.022 
 
0.034 
3 -0.036 * 0.020 -0.054 
 
0.045 -0.128 ** 0.058 0.044 
 
0.029 0.009 
 
0.015 -0.037 
 
0.030 
4 -0.057 ** 0.024 0.018 
 
0.044 -0.124 * 0.064 0.037 
 
0.031 0.016 
 
0.020 -0.038 
 
0.035 
5 plus -0.030 
 
0.034 -0.001 
 
0.053 -0.231 ** 0.090 0.062 * 0.035 0.096 *** 0.023 -0.051 
 
0.047 
HH with 
child. < 14 
yrs. 
-0.039 
 
0.026 -0.050 
 
0.044 0.119 * 0.065 -0.029 
 
0.028 -0.024 
 
0.021 0.042 
 
0.029 
Mortgage 0.023 
 
0.027 -0.075 
 
0.049 -0.046 
 
0.074 0.013 
 
0.033 0.045 * 0.025 0.064 * 0.039 
N 1,986 664 642 855 2,958 1,581 
R2_P 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.03 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, b: coefficient; SE: standard error.  
Source: Own calculations based on HFCS (2010). 
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Business 1 
Austria Belgium Cyprus Germany Spain 
Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. 
Men -0.162 *** 0.062 -0.230 *** 0.077 -0.128 ** 0.062 -0.149 *** 0.040 -0.088 ** 0.035 
Age group (reference: age 45-54) 
16-34 -0.022 
 
0.107 0.161 
 
0.131 -0.012 
 
0.098 0.108 
 
0.077 0.110 
 
0.073 
35-44 0.038 
 
0.083 -0.057 
 
0.115 0.015 
 
0.072 0.039 
 
0.058 0.052 
 
0.048 
55-64 -0.004 
 
0.090 -0.031 
 
0.118 -0.001 
 
0.089 -0.051 
 
0.055 0.011 
 
0.039 
65 plus -0.064 
 
0.151 0.040 
 
0.260 0.321 
 
0.212 -0.064 
 
0.095 0.032 
 
0.056 
Employment status (reference: employed 
Self-employed 0.056 
 
0.073 0.116 
 
0.090 -0.114 * 0.060 -0.037 
 
0.047 0.016 
 
0.041 
Unemployed/other 0.264 
 
0.206 0.320 ** 0.163 0.322 
 
0.254 0.040 
 
0.092 0.138 ** 0.058 
Retired 0.091 
 
0.146 0.266 
 
0.222 0.184 
 
0.219 0.005 
 
0.099 0.064 
 
0.065 
Education (reference: secondary) 
Primary 0.051 
 
0.127 0.079 
 
0.152 -0.029 
 
0.085 -0.097 
 
0.120 -0.010 
 
0.042 
Tertiary -0.147 ** 0.072 0.023 
 
0.087 -0.004 
 
0.061 0.016 
 
0.042 -0.005 
 
0.039 
Income quintiles (reference: Third) 
First -0.028 
 
0.187 0.192 
 
0.299 0.214 
 
0.151 0.005 
 
0.123 -0.059 
 
0.088 
Second -0.062 
 
0.161 -0.461 ** 0.186 0.181 * 0.104 0.076 
 
0.111 0.127 * 0.066 
Fourth -0.197 * 0.105 -0.103 
 
0.129 0.029 
 
0.084 -0.190 ** 0.077 0.039 
 
0.053 
Fifth -0.170 * 0.101 -0.068 
 
0.120 0.100 
 
0.081 -0.177 *** 0.067 0.027 
 
0.050 
Log assets 0.048 
 
0.029 -0.008 
 
0.037 -0.027 
 
0.025 0.037 ** 0.015 0.001 
 
0.012 
Log liabilities -0.012 ** 0.006 -0.016 ** 0.007 0.003 
 
0.007 -0.000 
 
0.004 -0.004 
 
0.003 
Household size (reference: 2 persons) 
1 -0.229 ** 0.097 0.085 
 
0.132 -0.092 
 
0.154 -0.082 
 
0.083 -0.044 
 
0.059 
3 -0.054 
 
0.090 0.085 
 
0.124 0.017 
 
0.109 -0.012 
 
0.061 -0.028 
 
0.039 
4 -0.132 
 
0.097 0.110 
 
0.127 -0.092 
 
0.107 0.076 
 
0.064 -0.014 
 
0.044 
5 plus 0.057 
 
0.120 0.020 
 
0.160 -0.013 
 
0.109 0.031 
 
0.080 0.038 
 
0.056 
HH with child. < 14 yrs. -0.028 
 
0.100 0.025 
 
0.123 0.017 
 
0.071 0.013 
 
0.062 -0.039 
 
0.044 
N 215 164 333 474 1,230 
R2_P 0.15 0.12 0.06 0.08 0.02 
 
Business 1 
Greece Italy Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Slovakia 
Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. 
Men -0.011 
 
0.054 0.009 
 
0.010 -0.279 *** 0.098 0.242 
 
0.193 -0.254 
 
0.218 -0.058 
 
0.061 
Age group (reference: age 45-54) 
16-34 -0.066 
 
0.072 0.014 
 
0.020 0.292 
 
0.221 0.060 
 
0.211 -0.041 
 
0.261 0.054 
 
0.080 
35-44 0.011 
 
0.063 0.016 
 
0.015 0.049 
 
0.133 0.273 * 0.157 -0.012 
 
0.239 0.064 
 
0.081 
55-64 -0.013 
 
0.087 0.014 
 
0.014 -0.068 
 
0.155 0.078 
 
0.151 -0.388 * 0.233 0.092 
 
0.108 
65 plus -0.185 
 
0.222 0.006 
 
0.017 0.330 
 
0.347 -0.203 
 
0.255 -0.787 ** 0.391 0.117 
 
0.344 
Employment status (reference: employed 
Self-employed -0.036 
 
0.072 0.001 
 
0.013 0.062 
 
0.124 -0.343 * 0.179 -0.090 
 
0.167 -0.108 
 
0.070 
Unemployed/ 
other 
0.053 
 
0.085 -0.005 
 
0.025 0.000 
 
0.000 0.097 
 
0.196 0.000 
 
0.000 -0.207 * 0.107 
Retired 0.034 
 
0.154 0.024 
 
0.016 -0.333 
 
0.292 -0.213 
 
0.235 0.125 
 
0.326 -0.085 
 
0.212 
Education (reference: secondary) 
Primary -0.066 
 
0.061 -0.013 
 
0.010 -0.279 
 
0.185 -0.138 
 
0.139 0.020 
 
0.262 -0.255 
 
0.293 
Tertiary 0.050 
 
0.063 -0.014 
 
0.013 0.026 
 
0.114 0.008 
 
0.158 -0.489 * 0.262 0.073 
 
0.068 
Income quintiles (reference: Third) 
First 0.135 
 
0.098 0.000 
 
0.000 0.029 
 
0.259 -0.618 * 0.319 0.038 
 
0.331 -0.139 
 
0.223 
Second 0.103 
 
0.095 -0.008 
 
0.019 -0.171 
 
0.212 0.052 
 
0.227 0.025 
 
0.254 0.282 ** 0.140 
Fourth 0.010 
 
0.085 -0.003 
 
0.013 -0.066 
 
0.208 -0.272 
 
0.182 0.191 
 
0.224 -0.005 
 
0.112 
Fifth 0.103 
 
0.074 -0.001 
 
0.013 -0.354 * 0.185 -0.434 *** 0.166 0.075 
 
0.210 -0.068 
 
0.098 
Log assets 0.014 
 
0.025 -0.000 
 
0.004 0.138 *** 0.036 0.102 
 
0.065 0.317 ** 0.126 0.024 
 
0.022 
Log liabilities -0.007 
 
0.005 -0.000 
 
0.001 -0.015 
 
0.010 -0.006 
 
0.011 -0.026 
 
0.022 0.006 
 
0.007 
Household size (reference: 2 persons) 
1 -0.122 
 
0.138 0.003 
 
0.014 0.268 * 0.159 -0.186 
 
0.233 -0.106 
 
0.227 -0.176 * 0.102 
3 -0.022 
 
0.070 -0.012 
 
0.012 0.144 
 
0.142 0.138 
 
0.168 -0.096 
 
0.228 0.083 
 
0.086 
4 0.011 
 
0.069 -0.014 
 
0.014 0.378 ** 0.164 -0.117 
 
0.162 -0.556 ** 0.262 0.135 
 
0.096 
5 plus -0.000 
 
0.086 -0.001 
 
0.017 -0.018 
 
0.217 0.075 
 
0.187 -0.794 * 0.421 -0.034 
 
0.118 
HH with child. < 
14 yrs. 
-0.050 
 
0.062 -0.006 
 
0.015 0.092 
 
0.147 0.019 
 
0.158 0.281 
 
0.244 -0.153 ** 0.073 
N 319 1,290 82 76 53 297 
R2_P 0.05 0.06 0.27 0.24 0.14 0.07 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, b: coefficient; SE: standard error.  
Source: Own calculations based on HFCS (2010). 
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Saving account 
Austria Belgium Cyprus Germany Spain France 
Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. b   Std.err. 
Men -0.015 
 
0.022 -0.041 ** 0.019 -0.045 
 
0.032 -0.037 *** 0.013 -0.065 *** 0.019 -0.013 
 
0.009 
Age group (reference: age 45-54) 
   
16-34 0.024 
 
0.036 0.042 
 
0.038 -0.020 
 
0.062 0.014 
 
0.023 0.142 *** 0.046 -0.007 
 
0.017 
35-44 0.028 
 
0.036 0.035 
 
0.035 0.089 * 0.046 0.010 
 
0.022 0.059 
 
0.038 -0.014 
 
0.015 
55-64 -0.056 
 
0.039 -0.023 
 
0.035 0.027 
 
0.056 -0.067 *** 0.023 0.051 * 0.031 0.001 
 
0.015 
65 plus 0.018 
 
0.046 -0.057 
 
0.050 0.276 ** 0.109 -0.068 ** 0.034 0.077 ** 0.035 -0.023 
 
0.020 
Employment status (reference: employed 
   
Self-employed 0.077 ** 0.037 0.070 * 0.042 -0.041 
 
0.050 0.022 
 
0.023 0.033 
 
0.030 0.018 
 
0.013 
Unemployed/other 0.058 
 
0.037 0.049 
 
0.032 -0.014 
 
0.059 0.030 
 
0.022 -0.012 
 
0.029 -0.040 ** 0.017 
Retired 0.016 
 
0.040 0.053 
 
0.042 -0.202 * 0.105 0.032 
 
0.031 0.010 
 
0.032 -0.035 ** 0.017 
Education (reference: secondary) 
   
Primary 0.034 
 
0.030 0.024 
 
0.026 -0.036 
 
0.049 0.006 
 
0.023 0.015 
 
0.025 0.001 
 
0.011 
Tertiary 0.009 
 
0.032 -0.027 
 
0.022 0.096 ** 0.038 -0.025 * 0.014 -0.003 
 
0.025 -0.030 *** 0.011 
Income quintiles (reference: Third) 
   
First 0.083 ** 0.037 0.025 
 
0.036 0.064 
 
0.061 0.024 
 
0.028 0.044 
 
0.035 0.046 *** 0.016 
Second -0.042 
 
0.033 -0.014 
 
0.032 0.066 
 
0.054 0.031 
 
0.023 0.038 
 
0.032 0.009 
 
0.014 
Fourth -0.086 *** 0.032 0.008 
 
0.029 -0.040 
 
0.052 -0.043 ** 0.021 0.065 ** 0.029 0.017 
 
0.013 
Fifth -0.107 *** 0.035 0.026 
 
0.031 -0.078 
 
0.053 -0.048 ** 0.020 0.013 
 
0.030 0.028 ** 0.014 
Log assets 0.033 *** 0.007 0.016 ** 0.007 0.024 ** 0.012 0.022 *** 0.005 0.012 
 
0.008 -0.003 
 
0.003 
Log liabilities -0.006 ** 0.002 -0.010 *** 0.002 -0.009 *** 0.003 -0.004 *** 0.001 -0.003 
 
0.002 -0.004 *** 0.001 
Household size (reference: 2 persons) 
   
1 -0.085 *** 0.028 -0.012 
 
0.026 -0.018 
 
0.060 -0.029 
 
0.019 -0.015 
 
0.025 -0.067 *** 0.011 
3 0.079 ** 0.036 0.030 
 
0.032 0.086 * 0.049 0.031 
 
0.021 -0.016 
 
0.025 0.060 *** 0.015 
4 0.194 *** 0.042 0.015 
 
0.038 0.026 
 
0.056 0.037 
 
0.025 0.036 
 
0.029 0.085 *** 0.017 
5 plus 0.139 ** 0.056 0.067 
 
0.047 0.037 
 
0.059 0.060 * 0.032 0.115 *** 0.040 0.084 *** 0.021 
HH with child. < 14 yrs. -0.161 *** 0.040 -0.031 
 
0.035 -0.064 
 
0.045 -0.015 
 
0.023 -0.051 
 
0.034 -0.044 *** 0.016 
N 2,085 1,841 461 2,906 1,947 13,082 
R2_P 0.04 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.01 
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Saving account 
Greece Italy Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Portugal Slovakia 
Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. 
Men 0.010 
 
0.085 0.036 
 
0.024 -0.090 ** 0.039 -0.062 
 
0.045 -0.005 
 
0.013 -0.004 
 
0.021 -0.026 
 
0.042 
Age group (reference: age 45-54) 
16-34 -0.066 
 
0.149 -0.050 
 
0.058 0.050 
 
0.066 -0.113 
 
0.086 0.028 
 
0.024 0.012 
 
0.043 -0.002 
 
0.061 
35-44 -0.050 
 
0.131 0.011 
 
0.042 0.109 * 0.057 -0.129 * 0.069 0.034 * 0.020 -0.022 
 
0.033 -0.042 
 
0.065 
55-64 0.054 
 
0.120 -0.036 
 
0.040 -0.055 
 
0.071 -0.139 ** 0.058 0.006 
 
0.019 -0.000 
 
0.027 0.132 * 0.071 
65 plus -0.169 
 
0.182 -0.054 
 
0.049 0.044 
 
0.095 -0.203 *** 0.071 0.018 
 
0.024 0.028 
 
0.035 0.149 
 
0.129 
Employment status (reference: employed 
Self-employed 0.249 ** 0.106 0.018 
 
0.042 0.077 
 
0.058 -0.046 
 
0.080 0.029 
 
0.019 -0.037 
 
0.029 -0.044 
 
0.075 
Unemployed/other 0.339 *** 0.119 0.073 * 0.044 0.060 
 
0.075 -0.045 
 
0.063 -0.006 
 
0.018 -0.008 
 
0.033 0.038 
 
0.077 
Retired 0.082 
 
0.160 0.045 
 
0.042 -0.040 
 
0.078 -0.023 
 
0.064 -0.019 
 
0.022 -0.024 
 
0.029 -0.203 ** 0.097 
Education (reference: secondary) 
Primary 0.259 ** 0.104 0.019 
 
0.028 0.025 
 
0.051 0.016 
 
0.048 0.004 
 
0.015 0.052 * 0.027 0.392 *** 0.143 
Tertiary 0.108 
 
0.099 0.027 
 
0.039 0.019 
 
0.045 -0.060 
 
0.058 -0.011 
 
0.014 0.015 
 
0.030 0.070 
 
0.049 
Income quintiles (reference: Third) 
First 0.169 
 
0.165 -0.006 
 
0.041 -0.075 
 
0.078 0.049 
 
0.064 0.003 
 
0.017 0.071 ** 0.029 -0.068 
 
0.094 
Second -0.193 
 
0.187 -0.015 
 
0.038 0.026 
 
0.068 0.014 
 
0.057 -0.025 
 
0.019 0.011 
 
0.028 -0.128 * 0.067 
Fourth -0.164 
 
0.133 -0.036 
 
0.037 -0.108 * 0.059 0.089 
 
0.058 -0.020 
 
0.017 -0.012 
 
0.026 0.075 
 
0.062 
Fifth -0.027 
 
0.123 -0.044 
 
0.039 -0.054 
 
0.061 0.038 
 
0.061 -0.008 
 
0.016 -0.005 
 
0.026 0.212 *** 0.067 
Log assets -0.020 
 
0.039 -0.009 
 
0.009 0.035 ** 0.016 -0.028 * 0.014 0.010 * 0.006 0.046 *** 0.008 -0.039 ** 0.019 
Log liabilities -0.022 ** 0.010 -0.010 *** 0.003 -0.009 ** 0.004 -0.003 
 
0.005 0.001 
 
0.001 -0.002 
 
0.002 -0.002 
 
0.007 
Household size (reference: 2 persons) 
1 -0.179 
 
0.178 0.061 * 0.034 -0.070 
 
0.056 0.007 
 
0.057 0.037 ** 0.015 -0.033 
 
0.026 0.015 
 
0.076 
3 0.021 
 
0.125 0.076 ** 0.034 0.113 * 0.060 -0.011 
 
0.054 0.013 
 
0.022 0.010 
 
0.022 -0.093 
 
0.062 
4 0.091 
 
0.138 0.060 
 
0.040 0.075 
 
0.066 0.036 
 
0.062 -0.019 
 
0.034 0.006 
 
0.029 -0.108 
 
0.075 
5 plus -0.152 
 
0.253 0.079 
 
0.058 0.027 
 
0.078 0.052 
 
0.085 -0.000 
 
0.035 0.011 
 
0.044 -0.016 
 
0.093 
HH with child. < 14 yrs. 0.055 
 
0.116 -0.134 *** 0.040 -0.068 
 
0.059 -0.013 
 
0.066 -0.034 
 
0.029 -0.012 
 
0.029 0.014 
 
0.062 
N 118 2,029 707 705 1,016 1,902 554 
R2_P 0.22 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.06 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, b: coefficient; SE: standard error.  
Source: Own calculations based on HFCS (2010). 
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HMR mort-
gage 1 
Austria Belgium Cyprus Germany Spain France 
Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. 
Men -0.151 *** 0.048 -0.050 
 
0.033 -0.096 *** 0.029 -0.071 *** 0.023 -0.074 *** 0.020 0.017 
 
0.021 
Age group (reference: age 45-54) 
16-34 0.165 ** 0.083 -0.069 
 
0.057 0.036 
 
0.044 0.098 ** 0.039 0.004 
 
0.031 -0.013 
 
0.032 
35-44 0.110 
 
0.068 -0.021 
 
0.042 -0.016 
 
0.039 0.013 
 
0.033 -0.020 
 
0.025 -0.006 
 
0.025 
55-64 0.047 
 
0.096 -0.082 
 
0.063 0.007 
 
0.051 0.004 
 
0.033 -0.006 
 
0.027 -0.011 
 
0.035 
65 plus -0.014 
 
0.135 -0.080 
 
0.118 -0.051 
 
0.140 0.001 
 
0.056 -0.007 
 
0.044 -0.103 
 
0.071 
Employment status (reference: employed 
Self-
employed 
0.108 
 
0.073 0.056 
 
0.057 -0.066 
 
0.051 0.011 
 
0.032 0.056 ** 0.026 0.002 
 
0.024 
Unemployed/ 
other 
0.073 
 
0.090 0.066 
 
0.055 -0.065 
 
0.056 0.010 
 
0.039 0.025 
 
0.023 0.019 
 
0.049 
Retired -0.076 
 
0.108 0.101 
 
0.089 0.015 
 
0.112 0.043 
 
0.050 0.039 
 
0.043 0.047 
 
0.051 
Education (reference: secondary) 
Primary 0.074 
 
0.076 -0.027 
 
0.058 -0.006 
 
0.053 -0.055 
 
0.056 0.006 
 
0.023 0.048 * 0.026 
Tertiary -0.044 
 
0.069 0.022 
 
0.037 0.054 
 
0.034 0.036 
 
0.024 -0.012 
 
0.024 -0.023 
 
0.022 
Income quintiles (reference: Third) 
First 0.118 
 
0.131 0.070 
 
0.071 0.129 ** 0.057 0.078 
 
0.065 0.028 
 
0.039 0.033 
 
0.046 
Second -0.074 
 
0.092 -0.023 
 
0.071 0.066 
 
0.051 0.081 
 
0.056 0.011 
 
0.030 0.024 
 
0.038 
Fourth -0.089 
 
0.074 -0.069 
 
0.052 -0.008 
 
0.048 0.053 
 
0.044 0.014 
 
0.025 -0.000 
 
0.029 
Fifth -0.022 
 
0.074 0.024 
 
0.049 -0.016 
 
0.050 0.045 
 
0.042 -0.031 
 
0.028 -0.002 
 
0.030 
Log assets -0.012 
 
0.034 0.009 
 
0.029 -0.002 
 
0.018 0.047 *** 0.015 0.031 *** 0.011 -0.011 
 
0.015 
Log liabilities 0.018 
 
0.015 -0.018 
 
0.015 0.021 
 
0.017 -0.041 *** 0.007 -0.026 *** 0.004 -0.025 *** 0.009 
Household size (reference: 2 persons) 
1 -0.050 
 
0.084 0.070 
 
0.056 -0.078 
 
0.061 0.052 
 
0.041 -0.104 ** 0.042 0.033 
 
0.034 
3 -0.129 * 0.074 0.055 
 
0.054 -0.071 
 
0.052 0.015 
 
0.033 -0.057 ** 0.027 0.004 
 
0.033 
4 -0.019 
 
0.085 -0.037 
 
0.058 -0.019 
 
0.048 0.058 * 0.035 -0.007 
 
0.026 0.041 
 
0.034 
5 plus 0.022 
 
0.104 -0.025 
 
0.068 -0.006 
 
0.051 0.019 
 
0.047 0.015 
 
0.033 0.028 
 
0.041 
HH with 
child. < 14 
yrs. 
-0.084 
 
0.079 0.022 
 
0.047 -0.088 ** 0.038 0.015 
 
0.033 -0.005 
 
0.024 -0.011 
 
0.029 
N 392 646 548 838 1,190 2,185 
R2_P 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.17 0.11 0.02 
 
HMR mortgage 1 
Greece Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Portugal Slovakia 
Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. 
Men -0.018 
 
0.046 0.020 
 
0.041 0.031 
 
0.104 -0.030 
 
0.030 -0.042 
 
0.032 0.019 
 
0.062 
Age group (reference: age 45-54) 
16-34 -0.033 
 
0.065 0.147 ** 0.070 -0.010 
 
0.193 0.007 
 
0.050 -0.040 
 
0.050 -0.204 ** 0.101 
35-44 0.009 
 
0.057 0.119 ** 0.059 0.001 
 
0.177 0.019 
 
0.038 0.027 
 
0.035 -0.065 
 
0.099 
55-64 -0.058 
 
0.087 -0.022 
 
0.088 -2.922 
 
239.007 -0.006 
 
0.038 0.004 
 
0.042 -0.084 
 
0.174 
65 plus -0.287 * 0.165 0.041 
 
0.157 0.000 
 
0.000 0.043 
 
0.059 0.009 
 
0.072 0.000 
 
0.000 
Employment status (reference: employed 
Self-employed -0.088 
 
0.058 0.041 
 
0.064 -0.467 
 
0.315 0.041 
 
0.042 -0.040 
 
0.042 -0.036 
 
0.103 
Unemployed/ 
other 
-0.080 
 
0.058 0.011 
 
0.077 -0.125 
 
0.141 -0.088 
 
0.058 -0.019 
 
0.049 0.288 ** 0.112 
Retired 0.044 
 
0.101 0.032 
 
0.118 2.813 
 
239.007 -0.064 
 
0.054 0.008 
 
0.054 0.162 
 
0.332 
Education (reference: secondary) 
Primary 0.010 
 
0.054 -0.011 
 
0.057 0.163 
 
0.135 0.006 
 
0.032 0.041 
 
0.034 0.000 
 
0.000 
Tertiary -0.086 
 
0.058 0.033 
 
0.050 0.233 * 0.122 -0.011 
 
0.029 -0.070 
 
0.044 0.056 
 
0.070 
Income quintiles (reference: Third) 
First -0.187 
 
0.132 0.094 
 
0.098 0.148 
 
0.294 0.015 
 
0.049 0.026 
 
0.059 0.148 
 
0.138 
Second 0.056 
 
0.067 0.069 
 
0.072 0.306 
 
0.191 0.031 
 
0.039 0.052 
 
0.047 0.121 
 
0.095 
Fourth -0.062 
 
0.062 -0.021 
 
0.065 0.181 
 
0.166 -0.017 
 
0.037 0.033 
 
0.038 0.002 
 
0.085 
Fifth 0.035 
 
0.060 -0.075 
 
0.071 0.010 
 
0.172 0.008 
 
0.036 0.053 
 
0.039 0.095 
 
0.101 
Log assets -0.035 
 
0.038 0.063 * 0.034 0.124 
 
0.088 -0.041 
 
0.029 0.047 ** 0.022 -0.069 
 
0.056 
Log liabilities -0.002 
 
0.022 -0.007 
 
0.021 -0.009 
 
0.062 -0.002 
 
0.013 0.004 
 
0.013 0.092 ** 0.037 
Household size (reference: 2 persons) 
1 -0.185 
 
0.133 0.039 
 
0.066 0.040 
 
0.223 0.000 
 
0.035 0.061 
 
0.048 -0.018 
 
0.134 
3 -0.039 
 
0.068 0.114 
 
0.077 0.111 
 
0.210 0.018 
 
0.042 -0.021 
 
0.039 0.004 
 
0.104 
4 0.063 
 
0.066 0.041 
 
0.083 0.153 
 
0.198 0.010 
 
0.046 -0.005 
 
0.043 -0.090 
 
0.112 
5 plus -0.032 
 
0.088 0.121 
 
0.081 0.303 
 
0.229 0.004 
 
0.055 0.012 
 
0.060 -0.197 
 
0.157 
HH with child. < 
14 yrs. 
0.027 
 
0.054 -0.100 
 
0.063 0.001 
 
0.182 -0.008 
 
0.044 -0.021 
 
0.035 0.031 
 
0.086 
N 402 328 89 622 1,013 223 
R2_P 0.06 0.06 0.15 0.04 0.02 0.08 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, b: coefficient; SE: standard error.  
Source: Own calculations based on HFCS (2010). 
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Loan 1 
Austria Belgium Cyprus Germany Spain France 
Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. 
Men -0.001 
 
0.055 -0.017 
 
0.037 -0.097 *** 0.031 -0.066 ** 0.026 -0.054 *** 0.019 0.009 
 
0.015 
Age group (reference: age 45-54) 
16-34 0.077 
 
0.083 -0.007 
 
0.063 0.006 
 
0.049 0.005 
 
0.038 0.013 
 
0.034 -0.064 ** 0.025 
35-44 0.070 
 
0.083 -0.045 
 
0.053 0.036 
 
0.039 0.043 
 
0.038 -0.017 
 
0.029 -0.020 
 
0.021 
55-64 0.138 
 
0.107 -0.043 
 
0.062 0.067 
 
0.045 0.077 ** 0.039 -0.004 
 
0.026 0.028 
 
0.024 
65 plus 0.276 ** 0.137 0.022 
 
0.124 0.104 
 
0.099 0.047 
 
0.071 0.025 
 
0.033 0.049 
 
0.038 
Employment status (reference: employed 
Self-
employed 
-0.110 
 
0.130 -0.121 
 
0.130 0.042 
 
0.035 0.030 
 
0.044 0.051 * 0.027 -0.031 
 
0.021 
Unemployed/ 
other 
-0.105 
 
0.094 0.054 
 
0.050 -0.021 
 
0.047 0.096 *** 0.034 0.022 
 
0.024 -0.033 
 
0.031 
Retired -0.146 
 
0.117 -0.004 
 
0.107 -0.089 
 
0.097 -0.012 
 
0.061 -0.004 
 
0.035 -0.079 ** 0.031 
Education (reference: secondary) 
Primary 0.068 
 
0.074 0.010 
 
0.050 0.031 
 
0.041 0.071 * 0.040 -0.000 
 
0.024 0.024 
 
0.018 
Tertiary 0.039 
 
0.088 0.032 
 
0.043 0.046 
 
0.034 0.020 
 
0.028 0.009 
 
0.025 -0.052 *** 0.018 
Income quintiles (reference: Third) 
First -0.018 
 
0.102 -0.028 
 
0.071 -0.018 
 
0.054 -0.008 
 
0.047 0.020 
 
0.034 0.005 
 
0.032 
Second 0.025 
 
0.087 -0.056 
 
0.066 -0.039 
 
0.043 -0.048 
 
0.043 -0.010 
 
0.028 0.006 
 
0.025 
Fourth -0.051 
 
0.080 -0.136 ** 0.057 -0.078 * 0.044 -0.058 
 
0.039 -0.021 
 
0.026 -0.018 
 
0.022 
Fifth -0.120 
 
0.092 -0.092 * 0.053 -0.079 * 0.044 -0.016 
 
0.038 -0.049 * 0.028 -0.014 
 
0.023 
Log assets 0.033 ** 0.016 0.007 
 
0.011 0.004 
 
0.010 0.023 *** 0.008 0.044 *** 0.007 -0.003 
 
0.005 
Log liabilities -0.042 *** 0.014 -0.006 
 
0.012 -0.002 
 
0.011 -0.011 * 0.006 -0.030 *** 0.003 -0.011 ** 0.005 
Household size (reference: 2 persons) 
1 -0.029 
 
0.073 0.091 
 
0.066 -0.058 
 
0.087 0.037 
 
0.038 -0.023 
 
0.033 0.007 
 
0.023 
3 0.057 
 
0.094 0.141 ** 0.062 -0.033 
 
0.059 0.016 
 
0.036 -0.014 
 
0.025 -0.011 
 
0.022 
4 -0.103 
 
0.118 0.143 ** 0.065 0.070 
 
0.047 -0.114 ** 0.056 -0.004 
 
0.028 0.019 
 
0.025 
5 plus 0.120 
 
0.136 0.212 *** 0.077 0.098 * 0.052 -0.118 * 0.066 0.039 
 
0.033 0.002 
 
0.030 
HH with 
child. < 14 
yrs. 
-0.109 
 
0.102 -0.033 
 
0.052 -0.069 * 0.037 0.075 * 0.040 0.019 
 
0.025 0.024 
 
0.023 
N 252 382 405 697 1,287 4,130 
R2_P 0.10 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.20 0.01 
 
Loan 1 
Greece Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Portugal Slovakia 
Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. 
Men -0.030 
 
0.033 -0.094 *** 0.036 0.136 
 
0.113 -0.020 
 
0.095 -0.046 
 
0.030 -0.043 
 
0.048 
Age group (reference: age 45-54) 
16-34 -0.027 
 
0.047 0.011 
 
0.055 -0.239 
 
0.200 0.178 
 
0.114 0.021 
 
0.048 -0.001 
 
0.068 
35-44 0.006 
 
0.043 -0.008 
 
0.051 0.082 
 
0.119 0.174 
 
0.112 -0.001 
 
0.042 0.040 
 
0.069 
55-64 -0.052 
 
0.079 -0.014 
 
0.062 -0.149 
 
0.135 -0.178 * 0.099 0.006 
 
0.044 -0.124 
 
0.167 
65 plus -0.009 
 
0.099 -0.000 
 
0.116 -0.188 
 
0.296 -0.229 
 
0.184 -0.001 
 
0.064 -0.097 
 
0.289 
Employment status (reference: employed 
Self-
employed 
-0.009 
 
0.044 0.060 
 
0.054 -0.220 
 
0.172 -0.021 
 
0.133 0.019 
 
0.046 0.008 
 
0.075 
Unemployed/ 
other 
0.028 
 
0.043 0.054 
 
0.053 0.029 
 
0.134 0.084 
 
0.103 -0.048 
 
0.049 0.069 
 
0.072 
Retired 0.023 
 
0.089 0.058 
 
0.076 0.171 
 
0.170 0.211 
 
0.168 0.019 
 
0.050 0.270 
 
0.209 
Education (reference: secondary) 
Primary -0.022 
 
0.040 0.027 
 
0.044 0.213 * 0.119 0.250 *** 0.089 -0.003 
 
0.039 -0.115 
 
0.182 
Tertiary -0.050 
 
0.048 -0.005 
 
0.045 -0.074 
 
0.146 0.033 
 
0.088 -0.054 
 
0.058 0.069 
 
0.059 
Income quintiles (reference: Third) 
First 0.018 
 
0.059 -0.048 
 
0.080 -0.298 
 
0.227 0.213 
 
0.142 0.098 * 0.053 0.113 
 
0.091 
Second -0.014 
 
0.051 0.049 
 
0.061 -0.156 
 
0.131 0.061 
 
0.119 0.023 
 
0.048 -0.081 
 
0.094 
Fourth 0.001 
 
0.047 -0.020 
 
0.065 -0.052 
 
0.127 0.089 
 
0.105 0.007 
 
0.039 0.102 
 
0.066 
Fifth 0.020 
 
0.047 0.055 
 
0.058 -0.040 
 
0.144 0.077 
 
0.100 0.022 
 
0.044 0.124 * 0.071 
Log assets 0.003 
 
0.011 -0.014 
 
0.011 -0.019 
 
0.033 0.024 
 
0.030 0.015 
 
0.010 -0.006 
 
0.013 
Log liabilities -0.020 * 0.010 0.010 
 
0.012 0.050 
 
0.033 0.033 
 
0.029 -0.004 
 
0.008 0.005 
 
0.017 
Household size (reference: 2 persons) 
1 -0.075 
 
0.061 0.027 
 
0.065 0.259 
 
0.216 -0.115 
 
0.100 -0.007 
 
0.049 -0.000 
 
0.108 
3 -0.080 
 
0.049 -0.141 
 
0.097 -0.021 
 
0.166 0.190 
 
0.119 -0.013 
 
0.039 -0.027 
 
0.075 
4 -0.037 
 
0.047 0.065 
 
0.056 0.151 
 
0.157 -0.046 
 
0.119 -0.019 
 
0.048 0.017 
 
0.082 
5 plus -0.062 
 
0.068 0.016 
 
0.070 0.123 
 
0.191 -0.058 
 
0.141 0.065 
 
0.052 0.050 
 
0.100 
HH with 
child. < 14 
yrs. 
0.011 
 
0.041 0.004 
 
0.051 -0.032 
 
0.122 -0.194 * 0.115 -0.041 
 
0.041 0.021 
 
0.065 
N 381 292 103 214 554 293 
R2_P 0.06 0.14 0.18 0.10 0.04 0.07 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, b: coefficient; SE: standard error.  
Source: Own calculations based on HFCS (2010). 
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3. Comparing the joint distribution of intergenera-
tional transfers, income and wealth across the 
Euro area 
3.1. Introduction 
Private wealth is a crucial factor of economic well-being for individuals and households. Re-
search suggests that saving rates from income and wealth transfers (inheritances and gifts)58 
are two key determinants of wealth held by private households (for an overview see Davies & 
Shorrocks 2000; for more recent research see for example Semyonov & Lewin-Epstein 2013, 
Arrondel, Roger & Savignac 2014, Mathä, Porpiglia & Ziegelmeyer 2014, Fessler & Schürz 
2015). Since the 1980s a debate over which of the two determinants contributes more to the 
current net wealth of private households (Modigliani 1986, 1988 Kotlikoff & Summer 1981, 
Kotlikoff 1988) is ongoing. Research stresses that wealth transfers are a dominant factor 
(Piketty 2011, 2014, Piketty & Zucman 2015), thus fueling the discussion about the legitimacy 
of wealth without effort with some economists arguing that this development may even pose 
a threat to democracy (Piketty 2014, Corneo, Bönke & Westermeier 2016).  
We investigate the current role of wealth transfers in the Euro area (Austria, Belgium, France, 
(West) Germany, Cyprus, Greece, Portugal and Spain). As the availability of data was limited, 
this is the first time that cross-country comparisons focusing on Europe are possible. We ana-
lyze the percentages of households with a transfer as well as the conditional present values of 
transfers received (absolute view). Additionally, we tackle the crucial question of how im-
portant are wealth transfers for the current distribution of household net wealth59 in Europe, 
computed as the capitalized present values of transfers as a percent of net wealth (relative 
view). For both parts we observe different patterns along the distribution of wealth, income 
and age.  
The paper is structured as follows: In section 3.2 we give an overview of the literature about 
wealth transfers in absolute and relative terms in developed countries. In section 3.3 we de-
scribe the data we are using, the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS), as well 
as our reasoning concerning the country selection. We also give an overview of the inheritance 
and gift taxation in each country (see also table A.3.1 in the appendix). In section 3.4 we pre-
sent the distribution of wealth transfers in the Euro area in absolute terms and analyze the 
sociodemographic characteristic of heirs applying several regression analyses via logit and OLS. 
                                                          
58
  Periodical transfers are counted as income.  
59
  Definition: Assets minus liabilities.  
Comparing the joint distribution of intergenerational transfers, income and wealth across the Euro area 
52 
Additionally, we analyze the role of past intergenerational transfers for current net wealth 
using recently established methods by Wolff & Gittleman (2014) and Piketty, Postel-Vinay & 
Rosenthal (2014) as well as a fractional logit model explaining the relative importance of trans-
fers received. Section 3.5 summarizes and concludes.  
3.2. Literature 
3.2.1. The role of inheritance and gifts in absolute terms  
Künemund & Vogel (2011) provide an overview of the studies for Germany (for example, 
works by Kohli, Künemund, Schupp, Schäfer & Vogel 2006; Kohli, Künemund, Vogel, Gilles, 
Heisig, Schupp, Schäfer & Hilbrich 2005), finding that transfers are positively correlated with 
education, income and wealth of both the donors as well as the recipients. For Germany it is 
well established that parents of children with higher education usually also hold a higher de-
gree, which, in turn, results in higher income and therefore more possibilities to accumulate 
wealth which can be bequeathed (see for example Deutsches PISA-Konsortium 2001). In addi-
tion, the offspring also typically cash in on their higher education, profiting from higher earn-
ings and savings. Szydlik & Schupp (2004) find that there are no differences between genders. 
Albuquerque (2014) describes a downward flow of monetary gifts from parents to their chil-
dren for several countries in Europe, which may either be motivated by altruism, accident or in 
a strategic manner (Brunner 2014). In the first case parents gain utility from knowing that their 
children will enjoy their bequest. In the second it is assumed that lifetime is uncertain, thus, 
parents accidentally leave bequests if they die younger than expected. In the last case parents 
expect something from their children, such as visits, in exchange for a bequest.60 For Austria, 
Schürz (2007) finds that workers receive wealth transfers less often than the average house-
hold; while entrepreneurs receive, on average, the highest transfers. Karagiannaki (2011) and 
Wolff & Gittleman (2014) report similar findings for the UK and the US, respectively.  
Studies comparing several countries are rare: Semyonov & Lewin-Epstein (2013) report the 
percentage of households older than 50 that received inheritances for many European coun-
tries, Israel and the US. The data (for most countries SHARE) was collected between 2004 and 
2007. The prevalence range between 46.2 percent in Switzerland, followed by Belgium with 42 
percent, to 17 percent in Austria and 4.4 percent in the UK. Schürz (2007) and Fessler, Moos-
lechner & Schürz (2008) relate means and medians for heirs and non-heir households and 
come to the conclusion that the heir-households are better off with regard to their social situa-
tion. They use LWS data, which was surveyed around the year 2000.  
                                                          
60
  The motives are discussed in more detail in chapter 4.  
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3.2.2. The role of inheritances and gifts in relative terms 
Analyzing inheritances and gifts in relative terms, meaning the capitalized present values of 
transfers as a percent of net wealth, requires decisions that imply methodological differences. 
Namely, Modigliani (1986, 1988) solely adjusts past wealth transfers for inflation to compute 
the present value of wealth transfers. Conversely, in Kotlikoff & Summer (1981) and Kotlikoff 
(1988), past wealth transfers are additionally capitalized, with the reasoning that transfers are 
usually invested in some kind of portfolio and are not held in cash. The first case results in 
quite low shares of current wealth due to past wealth transfers in the U.S. (at most 25 per-
cent). The second approach yields shares that are considerably higher (45 to 80 percent of 
wealth due to past wealth transfers). However, both approaches have in common that the 
share of wealth transfers due to past wealth transfers can exceed 100 percent, as the summa-
rized past transfers are not capped at a household’s net wealth. Piketty et al. (2014) explicitly 
combine the two rival approaches (for details see section 3.4). However, as Piketty et al. use 
data from the late 19th and early 20th century, their results are only of historical interest and 
not immediately relevant to the 21st century. Wolff & Gittleman (2014) using the same meth-
od, find for the US in 2007 that the present value of transfers as a percent of net wealth varies 
between 20 and 25 percent. Corneo et al. (2016) analyze, in a study similar to this one, the role 
of inheritances and gifts for the total net wealth of (West) Germany in 2010. They conclude 
that one-third of wealth is the result of capitalized wealth transfers. Additionally, they com-
pute that the share of wealth transfers on total net wealth for the richest one percent might 
exceed 80 percent. 
Our analyzes in section 3.4, as well as the studies from Piketty et al. (2014) and Wolff & Git-
tleman (2014), are based on the joint distribution of wealth and capitalized wealth transfers, 
which we use to compute the relative importance of wealth transfers. Only a few studies use 
comparable data; some studies need additional assumptions in order to apply macroeconomic 
estimation techniques.61 Reil-Held (2004) estimates that inheritances and gifts account for 
approximately 34 percent of Germany’s total net wealth; another macroeconomic estimate, 
from Piketty & Zucman (2015), is considerably higher: 51 percent. For France, Kessler & Mas-
son (1989) estimate that the share of wealth transfers is 35 percent. The value computed by 
Klevmarken (2004) for Sweden is 19 percent. To the best of our knowledge, cross-country 
analyses analyzing the impact of wealth transfers on the distribution of wealth in absolute and 
relative terms are not available yet.  
                                                          
61
  Note that the HFCS (which we use in this chapter) only surveys inheritances and gifts that are re-
ceived from a person not living within the same household. Any macroeconomic estimate includes 
tax-relevant transfers within households (e.g. widowhood) and should be, logically, higher than re-
sults based on the HCFS for intergenerational transfers. 
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3.3. Data, country selection and institutional environment 
3.3.1. Data 
The Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) contains information about house-
holds’62 net wealth, income and indicators of consumption and credit constraints from almost 
all Euro-countries63 around the year 2010 (ECB 2013a, 2013b). In addition, it provides infor-
mation about wealth transfers from outside the household – which therefore are probably in 
most cases transfers between generations. Each household’s reference person64 retrospective-
ly answered a question about how many inheritances or substantial gifts the household re-
ceived from any person who was not a member of the same household.65 Consequently, the 
total number and amount of wealth transfers is underestimated because, among others, trans-
fers due to the death of a partner who was part of the same household are not included. In 
addition, it affects the comparisons of countries with different household structures e.g. adult 
children still living with their parents. In the HFCS survey, the values of up to three wealth 
transfers were collected. In a separate module the mode of acquisition of the household main 
residence was collected; the choices include “inherited” and “gifted”.66 The respondents sorted 
all transfers according to their subjective importance for their current financial situation.67 It is 
also collected in which year the household received the transfer, what kind of assets the port-
folio contained, if it was a gift or inheritance and from whom it was received.  
3.3.2. Country selection and classification 
The HFCS “is a milestone for cross-country comparisons” and its data quality with regard to 
institutional environment, relevance, coherence, timeliness, accessibility, comparability and 
accuracy is quite high (Tiefensee & Grabka 2016, p. 137).68 Nevertheless Tiefensee & Grabka 
                                                          
62
  Our unit of analysis is, therefore, the household and not the individual. However, we provide a ro-
bustness check applying a per (adult) capita definition for the total present value of transfers in the 
appendix part B (table B.3.4). In the multivariate analyzes we control for household structure. 
63
  Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Greece, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. Estonia, Ireland and Latvia will take part in the next wave. 
64
  For selection criteria see ECB (2013a), pp. 16-17. 
65
  As past wealth transfers are collected retrospectively, it is highly likely that the data is plagued by 
under-reporting problems and the estimates are biased downwards. This is even more probable the 
more members live in a household. We do not know, and it is hard to quantify, whether under-
reporting varies systematically for different age classes or demographic characteristics of the re-
spondents.  
66
  In France household main residence is part of the wealth transfers module and not collected sepa-
rately.  
67  
This implies that the sorting does not generally reflect the absolute value of the transfer, but it 
should be closely related. 
68
  For more information about the HFCS also see chapter 2. 
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(2016) show that net wealth positions are not unlimitedly comparable between all countries 
due to methodological differences. Based on their analysis and the fact that not all countries 
surveyed wealth transfers, we include the following countries in our analysis: Austria, Belgium, 
France, (West) Germany, Cyprus, Greece, Portugal and Spain.69  
Historic, economic and welfare state circumstances, as well as wealth and household struc-
tures, affect net wealth and consequently, the patterns of transfer reception in private house-
holds. Larger households tend to accumulate more wealth than smaller ones, which are more 
prevalent in core European countries (ECB 2013b). Furthermore, owner-occupied real estate, 
which is especially common in Mediterranean countries and usually represents the largest 
share of net wealth, is likely to be transferred as inheritance, while financial wealth might be 
passed on to the next generation as gifts. Fessler & Schürz (2015) show that welfare state 
spending is negatively correlated with household wealth. Though the effect on transfers is 
uncertain.70 
To account for these differences, we divide our country selection into two groups. The core 
European countries (Austria, Belgium, France, (West) Germany) possess a generous welfare 
state regime with high social expenditures71 at least since the 1980s and on average smaller 
households with similar structures (based on figure 3.1, ECB 2013b and Fessler, Lindner & 
Segalla 2014). The Mediterranean countries (Cyprus, Greece, Portugal and Spain) comprise the 
second group with, on average, larger households and less generous welfare state expendi-
tures. In addition, these countries were without stable financial markets – and consequently, 
without comparable investment opportunities – due to e.g. civil wars and military dictatorships 
for several years following World War II. 
                                                          
69
  For Germany, we base our analysis on the western part due to problems of capitalization for past 
intergenerational transfers that date from before the fall of the wall. For the rest of the analysis, we 
use Germany and (West) Germany as synonyms. We restrict the analysis to households with a head 
of at least 21 years of age. Additionally, not all countries in the HFCS oversample wealthy house-
holds. Therefore, our analysis for most countries is likely not representative for the very top (Ver-
meulen 2014). To account for missing values, the data is multiply imputed (five implicates) by the da-
ta providers (ECB 2013b). Our calculations are based on standard applications for multiply imputed 
data; we use the provided replicate weights and all standard errors are bootstrapped. 
70
  The life-cycle theory suggests that households consume their wealth during retirement. Therefore 
one could conclude that this is particularly the case in countries with low social expenditures/old age 
provision. However, especially in Mediterranean countries one might factor in (adult) children living 
in the same household, who support their parents.  
71 
 This includes: public, mandatory and voluntary private social expenditure in the following fields: old 
age, survivors, incapacity-related benefits, health, family, active labor market programs, unemploy-
ment, housing, and other social policy areas. 
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Figure 3.1: Social expenditurea as percentage of gross domestic product (GDP)b 
 
a This includes: public, mandatory and voluntary private social expenditure in the following fields: old age, survi-
vors, incapacity-related benefits, health, family, active labor market programs, unemployment, housing, and other 
social policy areas. 
b Data for Cyprus is not available from OECD.Stat. 
Source: OECD.Stat: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SOCX_AGG (10.10.2015) 
3.3.3. Inheritance and gift taxation 
The inheritance and gift taxation background is quite diverse for the different countries. Effec-
tive inheritance and gift tax rates depend on tax rates, allowances, exemptions etc. and are 
complex to calculate and not available for all countries over time. Based on the tax rates, the 
thresholds for the maximum tax rate, the maximal tax allowances (see table A.3.1 in the ap-
pendix) and the tax revenues (figure 3.2) we define three types of gift and inheritance taxation 
regimes: (1) no or low inheritance and gift tax; (2) moderate inheritance and gift tax with mod-
erate or high allowances; and (3) high inheritance and gift tax with low or moderate allowanc-
es. As demonstrated by Piketty (2014) the wealth transfer flow collapsed following the shocks 
of 1914-1945, but again gained momentum starting in the 1990s in several European countries 
(namely France, Britain and Germany). In addition, figure 3.2 demonstrates that tax revenues 
diverged, particularly in the 2000s. Therefore, our analysis of the institutional backgrounds 
starts in 2000 and ranges through the time of the survey (year 2010). For a more thorough 
summary, we refer to table A.3.1 in the appendix, where all key information is provided in 
table form. 
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Figure 3.2: Inheritance and gift tax revenue as percentage of GDPa 
 
a
 Data for Cyprus is not available from OECD.Stat. 
Source: OECD.Stat: http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=REV (10.10.2015). 
The first group (no or low inheritance and gift tax) consists of Cyprus, Austria and Portugal. 
Cyprus and Austria abandoned the taxation of inheritances and gifts completely after 
2000/2008, respectively, with only a land transfer tax levied, which is in the one-digit area. In 
Austria, before 2008 the taxation depended on the level of relationship between testator and 
heir, with moderate or high tax rates, but low tax allowances. In Portugal since 2004 only a 
stamp duty is levied on all wills. Transfers between spouses, or other immediate relatives, are 
largely exempt. Before the changes occurred, tax rates were moderate and tax allowances low.  
The second group (moderate taxation of inheritances and gifts with moderate or high tax al-
lowances) consists of Greece and Germany. In both countries the tax rate varies depending on 
the relationship and the value of the transfers received. The tax rates are lower in Greece, the 
tax allowances higher in Germany where they become usable again after 10 years. 
The third group (high inheritance and gift tax with low or moderate tax allowances) consists of 
Spain, France and Belgium. In Spain the applicable tax rate varies not only depending on the 
relationship and the value of the transfers received, but it also takes into account the net 
wealth of the heir. However, since 2004 several regional governments factually abandoned the 
taxation of wealth transfers. The tax system in France is similar to that in Germany, but with 
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higher tax rates and lower allowances. In Belgium we observe varying gift taxes depending on 
the region, the relationship and the value since 2001; and for the inheritance tax since 2002. 
Another peculiarity in Belgium is a considerable difference between the taxes on inheritances 
and gifts. 
Almost all countries we consider have more or less extensive exemption clauses applying to 
the transfer of businesses and owner-occupied property. 
Taken together, the inheritance and gift tax regimes probably do not strongly influence the 
incidence of wealth transfers, because in all countries within the closer family tax rates never 
exceed 50 percent72 and are accompanied by allowances and further exceptions. As for the 
levels of inheritances and gifts in the Mediterranean countries, they will probably be the high-
est in Cyprus (no inheritance and gift tax for several years) and the lowest in Spain. In the Core 
European countries they will be the lowest in Belgium and France.  
3.4. Incidence and value of transfers and their share of 
wealth 
In the first step of our empirical analysis (sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2) we give an overview of the 
distribution of wealth transfers73 from outside the household (as defined by the HFCS ques-
tionnaire) for eight European countries. We first tabulate the incidence as well as the condi-
tional mean values of inherited wealth. We calculate the present value of all past wealth trans-
fers that a household received, in 2010 prices and capitalize the past wealth transfers using a 
real annual rate of return of three percent. In the second step we calculate the capitalized 
present value in prices of 2010 as a percent of the current net wealth on the household level 
(relative value of transfers). The whole analysis relies on the intertemporal budget constraint 
of private households as described by Piketty et al. (2014) in more detail. In short, the idea is 
as follows: for all households we observe the joint distribution of all past wealth transfers and 
net wealth at time 𝑦. Note that y = 2010 on average for the surveyed households in our analy-
sis. We capitalize the past wealth transfers using a real annual rate of return 𝑟, which yields 
the present value of wealth transfers 𝑃𝑉𝑊𝑇𝑦𝑖 for all households 𝑖 in any sample or subsample 
at time 𝑦. This deserves an explanation: we assume that at the point in time any household 
receives a wealth transfer it always has the option to make a secure investment yielding a real 
                                                          
72
  For Austria, Belgium, France and (West) Germany this is also already the case since the 1950s 
(Scheve & Stasavage 2012).  
73
  Gifts and inheritances are analyzed together. If only looking at gifts, the sample sizes are quite small 
in some countries. This is probably due to missing tax incentives in these countries and different as-
set portfolios (e.g. if households mainly possess a household main residence it will be most likely be 
passed on after death). 
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rate of return 𝑟. Hence, similar to Wolff & Gittleman (2014), we calculate the present value of 
wealth transfers 
(3.1) 𝑃𝑉𝑊𝑇𝑦𝑖 =  ∑ 𝑊𝑇𝑡𝑖
𝑦
𝑡=𝑡0
∗ 𝑒𝑟(𝑦−𝑡) . 
For each single household, 𝑖, in our sample we determine the actual sum of inheritances and 
gifts based on our assumptions: If a household’s net wealth is larger than the present value of 
transfers, it follows that the household has real savings as high as the residual (𝑊𝑦𝑖 −
𝑃𝑉𝑊𝑇𝑦𝑖). If a household has a net wealth less than the present value of wealth transfers, we 
conclude that the household consumed part (or all) of the wealth transfer instead of choosing 
a secure financial market investment (or lost over time). The residual resulting from the secure 
investment is, therefore, interpreted as the household’s savings, as it was the investment deci-
sion of the household to either invest differently (and potentially more risky) or consume the 
wealth transfer. The total present value of wealth transfers for any given country j in year 𝑦 is 
then given by  
(3.2) 𝑇𝑃𝑉𝑊𝑇𝑦 = ∑ min𝑖 ( 𝑃𝑉𝑊𝑇𝑦𝑖, 𝑤𝑦𝑖). 
Additionally, we are interested in calculating the total value of wealth transfers as a percent of 
positive net wealth, which, according to the literature, are computed at the aggregate level as 
the total inherited wealth divided by the total current wealth  
(3.3) 𝛽𝑦 =  
𝑇𝑃𝑉𝑊𝑇𝑦
∑ 𝑤𝑦𝑖𝑖
=
𝑇𝑃𝑉𝑊𝑇𝑦
𝑊𝑦
. 
However, in our application we calculate the ratio on the household levels and average within 
countries or subpopulations, as this definition seems more useful with regard to the typing of 
households. In line with Piketty et al. (2014), any population can be divided into three groups 
of households. For those households that (1) never received a transfer or has negative net 
wealth, 𝛽𝑦𝑖 is always zero. For those households that (2) received a transfer and the present 
value falls below the net wealth, 𝛽𝑦𝑖 is the ratio of the present value to net wealth 𝑤𝑦𝑖. For the 
third group of households that (3) received a transfer but the present value exceeds the net 
wealth in year 𝑦, it follows that 𝛽𝑦𝑖 is 100%, hence all of the net wealth can be attributed to 
the transfers, as the household consumed more than he could have afforded from its own 
labor or deviating investment decisions. Based on this reasoning we conclude that the residual 
that cannot be attributed to the inherited portion of the net wealth must be the result of a 
household’s saving decision and attributed to the portion resulting from its own efforts. 
The most arbitrary assumption in our analysis is the choice of the real rate of return r. The base 
rate we choose is r = 3% in accordance to Wolff & Gittleman (2014). Very similar to Wolff & 
Gittleman, we add a few robustness checks (see appendix part B) in order to identify systemat-
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ic changes, if we vary the real rate of return between r = 1% and r = 5%. Additionally, we check 
the variation of 𝛽𝑦𝑗  depending on a wealth related rate of return, as it seems reasonable that 
richer households are financially better educated, have the possibility to invest more diverse 
and therefore, might realize higher rates of return (these results are presented in the appendix 
part B). For some countries (Belgium, France and Germany) it would also be possible to use the 
yields of investments in long-term government bonds, as these investments are in line with 
our definition of a secure investment. As the time series are not available for all countries from 
the 1950s onward, we add the results to the appendix part B and note that the differences to a 
flat real interest rate of 3% are negligible. 
3.4.1. Incidence and levels of past wealth transfers 
As shown in table 3.1, the incidence of transfers received varies slightly across the European 
countries we analyze. In Portugal, the share of households that received at least one wealth 
transfer is the lowest (27 percent), with the highest shares observed in (West) Germany (38 
percent) and France (roughly 40 percent).  
In the core European countries, we find that with increasing household income74 the probabil-
ity that a household already received a wealth transfer increases. Households finding them-
selves in the highest income quintile record double the incidence of transfers (more than 50 
percent of all households) as compared to the first quintile. The Mediterranean countries on 
the other hand do not exhibit similar variation along the distribution of income. For instance, 
in Portugal the incidence varies independently of income around 25 percent. This can be, 
amongst other things, explained by the expansion of secondary and tertiary education since 
the 1960s, which has greatly improved the educational mobility for the current generation of 
heirs.  
The higher the observed net wealth of a household is, the higher is the likelihood that it re-
ports a wealth transfer. The picture is very similar for all countries in our analysis. For the pop-
ulation reporting a net wealth below 20,000 Euro it is well below 20 percent and then it quickly 
rises to 70 percent-75 percent in countries where this correlation seems to be the most pro-
nounced (see Austria, France and (West) Germany).  
                                                          
74
  The current gross household income refers to the last 12 months / the last calendar year before the 
time of the survey and is composed of the following components: all earned income, pensions (pub-
lic, occupational and private), unemployment benefits and other regular social transfers, regular pri-
vate transfers, rental income, income from financial assets, income from private companies / part-
nerships plus additional other income. 
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In general, the likelihood that a household75 reports a wealth transfer increases with age.76 
However, in addition to the lifecycle, cohort effects can be identified. Due to lifecycle effects, 
the age classes between 45 and 64 have significantly higher percentages of households with a 
wealth transfers than the younger age classes, as their older relatives (especially parents and 
grandparents) more likely already deceased. The age classes over 65, on the other hand, have 
decreasing percentages of households that report a wealth transfer. Their older relatives, of 
which the majority is likely to be deceased already, presumably lived in much poorer condi-
tions (e.g. due to the two World Wars) and did not bequest (large) fortunes. For instance, in 
Cyprus the effect is extremely pronounced, as the oldest cohort reports only half as many in-
heritances and gifts compared to the second oldest cohort. The patterns are very similar across 
Europe with a few exceptions. Some countries do not experience a drop for the oldest cohorts 
like Portugal and Belgium.  
In the next step, we look at the capitalized conditional mean present value of wealth transfers 
across Europe (see table 3.2). Therefore, we limit the sample to all households reporting at 
least one transfer, adjusting the original values of transfers for inflation, capitalizing them and 
summing them up by households (see formula 3.1). Belgium and Greece are fairly close to each 
other (155,000 Euro and 152,000 Euro, respectively). The conditional mean present values in 
Austria and Germany are considerably higher (230,000 Euro and 193,000 Euro). Spain records 
174,000 Euro and France 137,000 Euro. There are two outliers: Portugal at only 85,000 Euro 
and Cyprus at 274,000 Euro. Linking this to the inheritance and gift tax regimes, we find indeed 
that the present values are highest for Cyprus among the Mediterranean countries. However, 
they are significantly lower in Portugal than in Spain in spite of the much steeper taxation in 
Spain, this is probably because the overall wealth levels are much lower in Portugal for histori-
cal reasons. In addition, as expected based on the tax regimes, Belgium and France do have the 
lowest wealth transfer values among the core European countries. 
With regard to the joint distribution of income, the capitalized present value is highest in the 
highest income quintile. This confirms the strong relationship between a household’s income 
position and the expected wealth transfers from previous generations indicating low intergen-
erational mobility. While the incidence does vary less for Mediterranean countries, the abso-
lute value does increase with income as in the core European countries.   
                                                          
75
  Most sociodemographic characteristics of the households are referring to its head. We use “house-
hold” and “household’s head” synonymously. 
76
  Age class according to the age of the head of the household as reported in the HFCS survey data. In 
the multivariate part we will investigate the last two age classes together due to the low numbers of 
cases.  
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Table 3.1: Percentage of households with a transfera 
  I. Core European countries II. Mediterranean countries 
  Austria Belgium France West Germany Cyprus Greece Portugal Spain 
  % Std.err. % Std.err. % Std.err. % Std.err. % Std.err. % Std.err. % Std.err. % Std.err. 
All households 35.7 1.3 31.7 1.2 39.9 0.7 38.1 1.7 31.5 1.7 30.7 1.5 26.7 1.3 30.1 1.1 
Income quintiles 
                1st quintile 26.2 2.3 25.3 2.9 31.0 1.5 24.6 3.1 22.8 3.7 28.3 3.0 26.5 2.2 32.9 2.0
2nd quintile 29.7 2.7 32.5 3.2 33.8 1.6 32.2 3.8 30.8 4.1 33.7 2.6 30.4 2.6 29.9 2.1 
3rd quintile 34.3 2.9 27.6 3.0 38.2 1.6 37.6 3.4 30.3 3.8 31.4 2.7 26.6 2.6 25.2 2.6 
4th quintile 38.0 2.7 35.0 2.9 43.1 1.5 44.6 3.0 40.3 4.0 29.2 2.9 26.2 2.3 29.8 2.4 
5th quintile 50.3 3.1 37.9 2.8 53.2 1.3 51.8 3.0 33.1 3.8 31.0 2.8 24.1 1.9 32.9 2.3 
Wealth levels 
                Under €20,000  11.6 1.6 12.9 2.3 17.9 1.1 13.1 2.2 7.9 2.8 4.1 1.1 11.8 1.3 7.9 1.7
€20,000 - €99,999 31.3 2.7 27.6 4.2 35.5 1.9 28.2 3.2 18.7 4.4 34.8 2.9 28.1 2.1 24.8 2.7 
€100,000 - €249,999 45.8 2.7 27.6 2.9 44.5 1.4 49.3 3.2 30.3 3.8 39.4 2.2 34.9 2.2 27.4 1.8 
€250,000 - €499,999 54.4 3.2 39.1 2.7 56.5 1.5 65.3 2.9 36.5 4.3 37.5 3.9 34.1 3.5 39.2 2.5 
€500,000 - €999,999 71.6 4.3 48.8 3.7 69.0 2.1 63.0 5.8 38.1 4.9 42.7 5.6 33.4 4.3 46.4 3.9 
€1,000,000 or over 68.4 6.8 51.3 5.0 75.1 2.3 69.7 5.8 51.7 4.8 51.1 15.6 44.5 6.3 62.1 5.3 
Age classes 
                21-35 22.9 2.4 16.1 2.8 24.8 1.6 22.3 3.8 28.7 4.0 22.5 1.9 12.9 2.3 16.0 2.3
35-44 34.8 3.1 25.3 2.9 32.0 1.5 36.1 3.0 31.0 3.8 34.3 2.6 20.8 2.4 20.4 2.1 
45-54 38.6 2.5 29.2 2.8 38.3 1.6 46.8 3.1 38.3 3.6 33.8 2.8 28.0 2.3 33.0 2.2 
55-64 44.4 2.4 43.0 3.1 51.7 1.7 46.2 3.4 33.3 4.2 33.4 3.3 30.5 2.3 40.6 2.6 
65-74 37.1 3.1 40.0 3.2 51.9 1.7 39.9 3.6 31.5 4.7 30.4 3.0 29.9 2.3 40.7 2.3 
75 and older 35.1 4.5 42.2 3.4 46.1 1.9 33.5 4.2 17.2 4.9 30.6 3.6 34.2 2.5 32.7 2.2 
Sample size n 2,337 2,307 14,929 2,826 1,234 2,915 4,393 6,188 
Weighted in Mio. N 3.71 4.66 27.51 28.64 0.30 4.06 3.92 16.97 
a 
The figures record the proportion of households who indicate receiving a wealth transfer at any time before the time of the survey. 
Source: Own computations based on HFCS (2010). Means over 5 implicates, standard errors bootstrapped. 
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Table 3.2: Mean present value of transfers received (in €1,000), in 2010 prices and capitalized with r = 3%, recipients onlya 
  I. Core European countries II. Mediterranean countries 
  Austria Belgium France West Germany Cyprus Greece Portugal Spain 
  mean Std.err. mean Std.err. mean Std.err. mean Std.err. mean Std.err. mean Std.err. mean Std.err. mean Std.err. 
Mean present value 230 19 155 10 137 4 193 13 274 23 152 8 85 7 174 11 
Median present value 110 
 
77 
 
46 
 
107 
 
165 
 
113 
 
38 
 
77 
 A. Income quintiles 
                1st quintile 119 28 116 26 73 6 97 21 157 57 98 9 50 5 98 8 
2nd quintile 140 21 114 14 95 8 130 20 154 26 119 10 60 6 126 14 
3rd quintile 205 27 142 18 95 8 158 20 266 78 151 19 63 7 148 43 
4th quintile 226 34 173 22 113 7 194 21 344 49 167 29 65 8 180 19 
5th quintile 361 47 208 28 252 11 304 33 389 61 226 22 201 37 310 36 
B. Wealth levels 
                Under €20,000  6 1 6 1 5 0 6 1 6 2 10 2 6 1 6 1 
€20,000 - €99,999 42 3 34 5 31 2 33 3 47 7 59 2 38 2 40 3 
€100,000 - €249,999 118 6 98 9 73 3 116 5 133 12 141 3 82 5 85 6 
€250,000 - €499,999 231 13 135 12 143 5 204 12 199 22 246 13 116 14 141 9 
€500,000 - €999,999 435 33 220 23 256 14 414 29 277 40 436 54 252 44 300 36 
€1,000,000 or over 904 145 478 74 739 44 818 105 584 79 931 278 696 198 734 108 
C. Age classes 
                21-35 176 48 60 15 45 5 116 38 244 37 139 10 42 8 149 31 
35-44 197 31 131 30 97 7 188 28 287 42 152 9 81 13 164 24 
45-54 285 28 136 19 133 9 196 18 296 40 193 21 65 6 171 24 
55-64 239 34 154 19 141 9 201 30 310 79 191 28 83 19 190 25 
65-74 245 51 170 18 176 13 233 23 242 73 93 9 104 21 173 16 
75 and older 181 49 226 33 200 14 182 22 154 36 109 18 104 18 185 48 
a 
The figures show the present value of all wealth transfers as of the survey year which were received up to the time of the survey and capitalized at a real interest rate of 3 percent. 
Source: Own computations based on HFCS (2010). Means over 5 implicates, standard errors bootstrapped. 
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Not surprisingly, most countries experience a sharp rise in the conditional mean present value 
of transfers received from the second highest wealth level to the highest with household net 
wealth above 1 million Euros. For all countries the value at least doubles. Generally, the condi-
tional present value of the transfers seems to increase monotonically with the wealth level. 
The wealth levels above 250,000 Euro show values in the six to seven-digit euros region, 
whereas for the lowest wealth level below 20,000 Euro the conditional value never exceeds 
10,000 Euro. 
Computing the conditional mean present value for age classes reveals that it is only for Bel-
gium and France that it peaks for the oldest cohort aged 75 or older. In Portugal and Spain the 
variation across the age classes is rather low. In Austria we observe a spike for the age class 45 
to 54 (285,000 Euro), in Germany it only increases slightly for cohorts older than 44. The rather 
liberal legislation concerning the taxation of gifts clearly left its mark in the distribution for 
younger households. Overall, Austria, Greece, (West) Germany and Cyprus all exhibit a re-
versely U-shaped pattern. This is in line with the observations of the percent of households 
with transfers, i.e. not only did the middle aged households report having received a wealth 
transfer considerably more often, those transfers were considerably higher as well. Presuma-
bly, this is the result of the cohort effect offsetting the life-cycle effect in wealth transfers in 
those countries.  
As the observed patterns and especially mean and median present values, might strongly de-
pend on the household size, we add a robustness check in the appendix part B (table B.3.4) 
and check for the variation in per (adult) capita wealth transfers instead. Using per capita 
transfers expectedly reduces the values, but does not change the patterns reported in this 
section. 
3.4.2. Correlates of the incidence and value of past wealth transfers 
We estimate a logit model characterized by the specification 
(3.4) 𝑝𝑗 = 𝐹 (𝛼 +  𝛽𝑋𝑗 +  𝜀𝑗), 
with 𝑝𝑗  denoting the probability of households in country 𝑗 of having received a transfer, 𝛼 is 
an intercept, 𝜀𝑗 are unobservable variables. 𝑋𝑗 is the matrix of all explanatory variables: age, 
education, work and marital status as well as gender of the reference person, income77 of the 
household and its size.78 Additionally, we estimate the following OLS specification:  
                                                          
77
  In the HFCS gross income was collected, usually referring to the calendar year prior to the survey 
year or the 12 months preceding the survey. 
78
  Except for income, all explanatory variables relate to the time of the interview (around 2010). Due to 
endogeneity, net wealth is not used as an explanatory variable. Further information about the trans-
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(3.5) 𝑦𝑗 = 𝛼 +  𝛽𝑋𝑗  +  𝜀𝑗  
with 𝑦𝑗  denoting the capitalized present value of all wealth transfer for households in country 
𝑗. We sum up all capitalized past wealth transfers in prices of 2010. 𝛼 is the intercept and 𝜀𝑗 
denotes unobservables. 𝑋𝑗 is the matrix of all explanatory variables, which are the same as for 
the logit estimation.  
The results regarding the probability of receiving a transfer in the individual countries are 
shown in table 3.3. Table 3.4 shows the results for the OLS regressions regarding the mean 
wealth transfer value (as log) in each country for the heir population only. 
For the household income the following pattern emerges: The higher the income, the higher 
the probability that the household reports a wealth transfer. This is especially pronounced in 
the core European countries. Both findings also hold for the average amount of transfers a 
household receives: Households of higher income quintiles tend to report higher transfers. 
This is the case in the majority of our sample and the pattern is most salient at the edges of the 
income distribution. These findings are probably connected to those regarding education and 
intergenerational mobility: In the core European countries, we find for all countries that 
households with primary education had a smaller propensity to receive a transfer compared to 
those with secondary education. Households with tertiary education, on the other hand, are 
characterized by higher propensities. Interestingly, in Cyprus households with lower education 
had a higher chance to receive a transfer as compared to secondary education. This might be a 
hint that intergenerational mobility is still comparatively high. Considering the present values, 
the relationship between education levels and the value of transfers received is very pro-
nounced in France, Portugal and Greece, i.e. those households that received a transfer expect 
a higher value if their head has tertiary education. Research suggests that children of parents 
with higher education usually also hold a higher degree, which in turn results in higher income 
and more possibilities to accumulate wealth to bequest (see for example Deutsches PISA-
Konsortium 2001). 
We also confirm part of our other findings from the descriptive part regarding the age of the 
household head. Again life-cycle effects are visible: With increasing age, the likelihood of losing 
family and friends and thus, receiving a wealth transfer is monotonically increasing for most 
countries. The age classes between 45 and 64 have, for almost all countries, significantly high-
                                                                                                                                                                          
fers cannot be used in the analysis due to the pooled estimation of the transfers. Information about 
the tax regimes are only available on the country level and can therefore not be considered due to 
the low number of cases. To use the household head as reported in the survey is standard in the lit-
erature. However, in an alternative specification we used the oldest person in the household as its 
head. The results suggest that the estimates are fairly robust (exact results are available upon re-
quest). 
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er probabilities of having already received a transfer than the younger ones. However, the 
cohort effects, decreasing transfers for old cohorts due to poorer living conditions, which are 
reported in table 3.1, are not visible or significant once we control for other sociodemographic 
variables. In Belgium, France and Spain the lifecycle patterns of transfer recipients are the 
most pronounced and significant. For the mean present value (table 3.4) of those who re-
ceived a transfer, in many countries the 45 to 54 age cohort has received higher transfers than 
younger cohorts.  
Looking at work status, we find that self-employed households (compared with employed 
ones) have, in the majority of the countries, a higher chance to receive a transfer and also a 
larger transfer. One explanation for this might be that the self-employed often inherit the 
business that they are working in. Compared with the status married, households led by wid-
owed or divorced persons have smaller chances of having received an inheritance or gift. Keep 
in mind that the inheritance from the deceased spouse is not reported in the survey, if the 
spouse used to be part of the same household (see section 3.3). In the case of a divorce, it is 
logical that the incidence is reduced because high transfers mostly come from (grand-) par-
ents(-in-law) and after a divorce the chances naturally halved for a household. Differences 
between genders are only significant in Austria, Germany, Cyprus and Spain. In these countries 
men have a smaller probability to receive a wealth transfer or the wealth transfers are lower 
than that for women. 
Taken together the patterns we find for the probability to receive a transfer and the average 
transfer value for the heir population are quite similar over the countries. Specifically, the cor-
relations between education and income with the present values of transfers received are high 
for all countries. The question arises, what exactly is the role of wealth transfers for the overall 
wealth situation of households in Europe? In the next section we explore household’s net 
wealth and transfers simultaneously by computing the transfers received as a percent of ob-
served net wealth, thereby obtaining an indicator for the impact of wealth transfers on the 
distribution of net wealth. 
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Table 3.3: Average marginal effects of the logit estimations for probability of wealth transfer received 
Logit 
I. Core European countries II. Mediterranean countries 
Austria Belgium France (West) Germany Cyprus Greece Portugal Spain 
Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. 
Income quintiles (reference: 3rd)                                           
1st  -0.090 * 0.039 -0.061 
 
0.037 -0.088 *** 0.014 -0.074 * 0.039 -0.059 
 
0.058 -0.034 
 
0.029 -0.033 
 
0.025 0.006 
 
0.023 
2nd -0.042 
 
0.035 0.017 
 
0.035 -0.048 *** 0.013 -0.035 
 
0.034 -0.058 
 
0.050 0.030 
 
0.026 -0.001 
 
0.023 0.008 
 
0.022 
4th  0.045 *** 0.034 0.057 *** 0.034 0.031 *** 0.013 0.037 
 
0.033 0.001 
 
0.046 -0.011 
 
0.030 -0.014 
 
0.027 0.050 *** 0.022 
5th  0.106 *** 0.034 0.093 *** 0.035 0.111 *** 0.012 0.048 
 
0.030 0.033 
 
0.046 -0.004 
 
0.029 0.015 
 
0.025 0.088 *** 0.020 
Age group (reference: age 45-54) 
                     21-34 -0.153 *** 0.034 -0.131 *** 0.041 -0.155 *** 0.016 -0.199 *** 0.039 -0.223 *** 0.047 -0.085 *** 0.028 -0.122 *** 0.034 -0.191 *** 0.033
35-44 -0.056 ** 0.030 -0.058 * 0.033 -0.044 *** 0.013 -0.061 * 0.030 -0.127 *** 0.038 0.019 
 
0.025 -0.058 ** 0.024 -0.121 *** 0.022 
55-64 0.097 *** 0.034 0.171 *** 0.034 0.078 *** 0.014 0.056 * 0.029 -0.077 
 
0.050 0.034 
 
0.031 0.010 
 
0.023 0.040 ** 0.018 
65 plus 0.059 
 
0.042 0.232 *** 0.051 0.101 *** 0.018 0.045 
 
0.045 0.052 
 
0.098 0.006 
 
0.040 0.041 
 
0.029 0.062 *** 0.022 
Education (reference: secondary) 
                     Primary -0.042 
 
0.028 -0.074 *** 0.027 -0.079 *** 0.010 -0.069 ** 0.036 0.009
 
0.042 0.036 * 0.021 0.006
 
0.022 -0.027
 
0.017
Tertiary 0.083 *** 0.030 0.063 *** 0.023 0.099 *** 0.010 0.096 *** 0.020 -0.032 
 
0.034 -0.005 
 
0.024 0.021 
 
0.029 0.023 
 
0.017 
Employment status (reference: employed) 
                    Self-employed 0.155 *** 0.034 0.066 
 
0.044 0.100 *** 0.012 0.083 ** 0.032 0.031
 
0.043 0.132 *** 0.024 0.108 *** 0.023 0.159 *** 0.019
Unemployed/ other -0.020 
 
0.036 -0.009 
 
0.035 0.007 
 
0.016 0.023 
 
0.032 0.024 
 
0.051 0.031 
 
0.025 0.012 
 
0.025 0.046 *** 0.018 
Retired 0.025 
 
0.035 -0.045 
 
0.044 0.086 *** 0.016 0.005 
 
0.040 -0.182 ** 0.087 0.038 
 
0.035 0.045 * 0.025 0.059 *** 0.021 
Marital status (reference: married) 
                     Single 0.017 
 
0.033 -0.010
 
0.033 -0.069 *** 0.013 0.031
 
0.036 -0.055
 
0.077 -0.003
 
0.029 -0.028
 
0.028 0.124 *** 0.020
Widowed 0.007 
 
0.043 0.028 
 
0.038 -0.087 *** 0.017 -0.111 *** 0.043 -0.233 *** 0.079 0.006 
 
0.036 -0.069 ** 0.028 -0.019 
 
0.022 
Divorced -0.081 ** 0.036 -0.048 
 
0.036 -0.083 *** 0.015 -0.047 
 
0.036 -0.056 
 
0.064 -0.008 
 
0.036 -0.140 *** 0.031 -0.036 
 
0.027 
Men -0.044 ** 0.020 -0.010 
 
0.020 0.011 
 
0.009 -0.056 ** 0.020 -0.022 
 
0.032 -0.009 
 
0.019 0.022 
 
0.019 -0.006 
 
0.013 
Household size (reference: 2 persons) 
                     1 0.051 
 
0.033 -0.030
 
0.031 0.032 ** 0.013 -0.074 ** 0.033 0.036
 
0.072 -0.010
 
0.031 0.050 ** 0.024 -0.018
 
0.021
3 0.116 *** 0.032 -0.040 
 
0.032 -0.062 *** 0.013 0.029 
 
0.029 0.039 
 
0.049 0.004 
 
0.025 -0.015 
 
0.020 0.003 
 
0.016 
4 0.051 
 
0.037 -0.047 
 
0.036 -0.038 *** 0.014 0.058 * 0.033 0.053 
 
0.049 0.043 
 
0.026 -0.014 
 
0.023 0.019 
 
0.019 
5 plus 0.189 *** 0.046 -0.049 
 
0.045 -0.085 *** 0.017 0.066 
 
0.045 0.026 
 
0.051 0.068* 
 
0.036 -0.022 
 
0.032 -0.049* 
 
0.027 
Sample size (n) 2,380 2,296 15,004 2,828 1,220 2,971 4,399 6,197 
Weighted in Mio. 
(N) 
3.77 4.61 27.86 28.66 0.30 4.11 3.93 17.02 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own computations based on HFCS (2010). All 5 implicates are used, standard errors bootstrapped. 
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Table 3.4: OLS regression for present value of wealth transfer received, in 2010 prices and capitalized with r = 3%, recipients only 
OLS 
I. Core European countries II. Mediterranean countries 
Austria Belgium France (West) Germany Cyprus Greece Portugal Spain 
Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. 
Income quintiles (reference: 3rd)                                           
1st  -0.677 ** 0.263 -0.612 * 0.317 -0.480 *** 0.136 -0.422 
 
0.314 -0.0180 
 
0.431 -0.251 ** 0.119 -0.253 
 
0.242 -0.577 *** 0.213 
2nd -0.356 * 0.201 -0.413 * 0.236 -0.171 
 
0.119 -0.120 
 
0.226 -0.184 
 
0.403 -0.204 * 0.108 0.0641 
 
0.196 -0.103 
 
0.212 
4th  -0.0106 
 
0.214 0.328 
 
0.225 0.190 * 0.100 0.337 * 0.203 0.605 * 0.309 0.00263 
 
0.163 -0.0905 
 
0.277 0.241 
 
0.205 
5th  0.313 
 
0.227 0.509 
 
0.265 0.712 *** 0.0905 0.634 *** 0.192 0.455 
 
0.346 0.228 * 0.128 0.475 ** 0.219 0.427 ** 0.210 
Age group (reference: age 45-54) 
                      
21-34 -0.652 ** 0.272 -0.567 * 0.342 -0.968 *** 0.160 -0.534 
 
0.361 0.0316 
 
0.328 -0.253 ** 0.125 -0.492 ** 0.246 -0.460 
 
0.332 
35-44 -0.480 ** 0.202 -0.450 
 
0.281 -0.324 ** 0.127 0.124 
 
0.214 0.0659 
 
0.260 -0.130 
 
0.0799 -0.00676 
 
0.212 -0.222 
 
0.214 
55-64 0.0404 
 
0.231 -0.0545 
 
0.297 0.148 
 
0.126 0.135 
 
0.194 0.353 
 
0.341 -0.0532 
 
0.165 0.0332 
 
0.194 0.107 
 
0.176 
65 plus 0.116 
 
0.279 0.105 
 
0.355 0.781 *** 0.159 0.903 *** 0.269 0.397 
 
0.648 -0.319 
 
0.210 0.380 
 
0.257 0.174 
 
0.252 
Education (reference: secondary) 
                      
Primary 0.113 
 
0.212 -0.206 
 
0.224 -0.350 *** 0.0914 -0.242 
 
0.213 -0.363 
 
0.278 -0.192 ** 0.0951 -0.619 *** 0.199 -0.229 
 
0.172 
Tertiary 0.00948 
 
0.166 0.208 
 
0.154 0.334 *** 0.0765 0.213 
 
0.148 0.176 
 
0.215 0.299 *** 0.108 0.530 * 0.281 0.0562 
 
0.195 
Employment status (reference: employed) 
                    
Self-employed 0.632 *** 0.198 0.195 
 
0.414 0.727 *** 0.112 0.608 *** 0.193 0.368 
 
0.291 0.0939 
 
0.113 0.638 *** 0.190 0.712 *** 0.207 
Unemployed/ other -0.363 
 
0.268 -0.394 
 
0.343 -0.246 
 
0.184 -0.0712 
 
0.248 -0.326 
 
0.353 0.0603 
 
0.0931 0.236 
 
0.250 0.165 
 
0.199 
Retired 0.0265 
 
0.256 0.594 ** 0.265 0.0697 
 
0.129 -0.0881 
 
0.227 -0.429 
 
0.623 -0.00858 
 
0.188 0.268 
 
0.210 0.304 
 
0.278 
Marital status (reference: married) 
                     
Single -0.0362 
 
0.226 -0.411 
 
0.268 -0.0772 
 
0.118 -0.259 
 
0.312 -0.702 
 
0.530 -0.0802 
 
0.112 0.0581 
 
0.212 0.427 ** 0.210 
Widowed -0.512 
 
0.313 -0.0266 
 
0.313 -0.261 
 
0.162 -0.217 
 
0.326 -0.507 
 
0.585 -0.0101 
 
0.143 -0.122 
 
0.237 0.145 
 
0.216 
Divorced -0.441 
 
0.306 -0.145 
 
0.274 -0.379 *** 0.130 -0.361 
 
0.280 -0.307 
 
0.492 -0.118 
 
0.155 0.0700 
 
0.334 -0.177 
 
0.264 
Men 0.162 
 
0.129 -0.0346 
 
0.160 -0.113 
 
0.0827 -0.0907 
 
0.147 -0.452 ** 0.209 0.0522 
 
0.0814 -0.0958 
 
0.182 -0.269 ** 0.132 
Household size (reference: 2 persons) 
                     
1 -0.00521 
 
0.261 -0.0127 
 
0.245 0.123 
 
0.118 -0.135 
 
0.269 0.524 
 
0.532 -0.102 
 
0.125 0.0299 
 
0.245 0.0682 
 
0.198 
3 0.416 ** 0.204 0.128 
 
0.235 -0.0553 
 
0.117 0.0987 
 
0.173 0.427 
 
0.278 0.0945 
 
0.0874 0.286 * 0.166 0.0523 
 
0.166 
4 0.481 ** 0.239 0.0113 
 
0.311 0.0489 
 
0.135 -0.194 
 
0.262 0.280 
 
0.333 0.0680 
 
0.111 0.188 
 
0.216 0.0203 
 
0.214 
5 plus 0.989 *** 0.247 -0.415 
 
0.363 -0.255 
 
0.203 0.383 
 
0.367 0.108 
 
0.353 -0.0421 
 
0.140 0.334 
 
0.315 -0.107 
 
0.356 
Constant 11.28 *** 0.269 10.86 *** 0.285 10.38 *** 0.147 11.01 *** 0.218 11.65 *** 0.500 11.74 *** 0.143 10.32 *** 0.361 10.94 *** 0.281 
Sample size (n) 813 777 6,663 1,251 410 844 1,042 2,404 
Weighted in Mio. (N) 1.30 1.42 10.34 10.71 0.91 12.4 1.01 5.09 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own computations based on HFCS (2010). All 5 implicates are used, standard errors bootstrapped. 
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3.4.3. Intergenerational wealth transfers and the distribution of wealth  
In the previous section, we find that the prevalence of transfers received differs greatly be-
tween socio-economic groups. In addition, some households have not yet received a gift or 
inheritance, while others may never receive (a significant) one. In this section, we investigate 
past wealth transfers as a percent of net wealth (see table 3.5).  
Overall there are basically two tiers of countries. The first consists of the core European coun-
tries Austria and (West) Germany and the Mediterranean country Greece. For these countries, 
the share is around 31 percent, meaning the share of inheritances and gifts is just under one-
third in those countries. Rather low shares are computed for the second tier: Belgium, Portu-
gal, Spain and Cyprus. In Portugal both the percent of households with a transfer and the con-
ditional present values of those transfers tend to be lower than in the core European coun-
tries, resulting in an overall lower share (15 percent). In Spain the mean present values tend to 
be on par with the rest of Europe (table 3.2), however, households receive the wealth trans-
fers later in their lifecycle. In combination with an overall higher net wealth level for Spanish 
households, the result is a rather low share of wealth transfers.79 In Cyprus, the low share of 
wealth transfers is the result of a very high mean and median of net wealth (ECB 2013b, c); the 
capitalized values of the transfers are rather low in comparison. The result for Belgium is sur-
prisingly similar to most of the Mediterranean countries and differs greatly from France and 
Germany, which deserves an explanation. For one, the percentage of households with a trans-
fer is significantly lower than in Germany or France, especially for the households with a net 
wealth above 1 million Euros. Since those households account for a great share of the wealth 
transfers in Germany and France and the overall wealth level in Belgium is rather high — the 
median net wealth of all households is almost four times as high as in Germany (see ECB 
2013b, c) — this results in an overall small fraction of the total Belgian net wealth that can be 
attributed to capitalized wealth transfers. 
The correlations between the relative importance of transfers received and the income posi-
tion are the following: Even though the present value significantly increases with income, a 
household’s opportunities to save wealth from income flows are increasing as well, which re-
sults in a lack of variation, once we compare wealth transfers as a percent of net wealth for 
several income quintiles (see Austria, Belgium and France). In (West) Germany, for the highest 
income quintile the percentage drops by about 17 percentage points as compared to the sec-
ond highest. Overall, the high-income households receive significantly higher wealth transfers, 
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  Keep in mind that at the time the survey was conducted in Spain, the aftermath of the financial crisis 
was not yet fully in effect; housing prices were still high. A repetition of the survey with more up-to-
date data presumably would reveal another pattern. 
Comparing the joint distribution of intergenerational transfers, income and wealth across the Euro area 
70 
but are equally capable of saving significant amounts, resulting in a decreasing relevance of 
inheritances and gifts for their wealth position.  
The analysis of the relative importance of transfers along the distribution of wealth reveals two 
sets of countries. In Austria and (West) Germany the share of capitalized wealth transfers is 
highest for the wealth level 500,000 Euro to 1 million Euros and quickly decreases for the net 
wealth above 1 million Euros. Cyprus exhibits a similar picture, albeit on an overall lower level. 
On the other hand in Belgium, France, Portugal and Spain the shares do not vary a lot between 
the wealth levels and stay approximately at their overall level. In Greece we observe a pro-
nounced U-shaped pattern. We conclude that, as in most applications, the relative importance 
of wealth transfers does not significantly increase with the level of wealth. For the core Euro-
pean countries plus Cyprus it even decreases with a net wealth higher than 1 million Euros. 
This observation presents a stark contrast to the observations in the first part (tables 3.1 and 
3.2) – whereas the percentages of households with a transfer as well as the conditional pre-
sent value of those transfers are increasing with the wealth level – the value of transfers as a 
percent of net wealth drops for the wealthiest households. On the one hand, this result might 
show that those households accumulated a lot more of their large fortunes through their own 
efforts, independent of transfers. On the other hand, financially educated persons tend to 
have better options for investment, are less risk averse and realize higher rates of return on 
their investment. The assumed real rate of return (3 percent) might be too low for those 
households. However, as can be seen in appendix part B the patterns are largely robust against 
both overall higher interest rates and wealth-related interest. 
Transfers as a percent of net wealth are steadily increasing over the lifecycle in Belgium and 
France, as well as in Portugal and Spain. This is in line with the result that the cohort effect 
does not offset the lifecycle effect in those countries (see tables 3.3 and 3.4). As expected from 
those same results, the connection is less clear in Austria and Germany, for the older cohorts 
the transfers as a percent of net wealth is varying at around one-third. The younger cohorts 
exhibit rather high shares of transfers as well, but gifts drive them: more than 50 percent of 
the transfers received are gifts. The high shares for younger generations hardly come as a sur-
prise in Germany with rather generous tax exempt amounts (since 2009, 400,000 Euro per 
child for a gifts from each parent every ten years are free of tax, up from already 205,000 Euro 
before).  
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Table 3.5: Present value of wealth transfers received as a percent of net wealth, in 2010 prices and real interest rate = 3%a 
  I. Core European countries II. Mediterranean countries 
  Austria Belgium France (West) Germany Cyprus Greece Portugal Spain 
  % Std.err. % Std.err. % Std.err. % Std.err. % Std.err. % Std.err. % Std.err. % Std.err. 
Mean present value 30.9 4.2 14.4 1.0 23.2 0.8 31.4 2.6 12.8 1.5 31.4 1.8 14.8 1.4 18.0 1.1 
A. Income quintiles 
                1st quintile 41.4 7.6 18.7 4.1 26.8 2.2 39.3 9.4 13.3 5.7 36.8 4.1 19.5 2.3 22.6 1.8
2nd quintile 30.6 9.1 14.7 2.4 26.8 2.1 36.1 5.6 14.5 4.0 40.1 3.9 21.5 2.5 20.8 2.3 
3rd quintile 34.0 7.6 12.4 2.0 23.0 1.9 39.6 4.4 19.2 6.5 33.9 4.1 15.2 2.1 15.8 3.7 
4th quintile 30.3 6.6 15.8 2.3 21.5 1.5 37.7 5.0 19.5 3.7 30.1 4.6 12.5 1.7 18.5 2.1 
5th quintile 29.2 5.0 13.3 1.8 22.7 1.3 25.4 3.5 8.0 1.9 26.1 3.0 13.2 2.6 16.7 1.9 
B. Wealth levels 
                Under €20,000  -
 
-
 
-
 
-
 
-
 
-
 
-
 
-
 €20,000 - €99,999 25.8 2.8 16.6 3.5 21.0 1.6 17.5 2.5 14.7 4.3 34.5 3.1 18.4 1.5 16.3 2.0
€100,000 - €249,999 31.6 2.6 15.5 2.3 18.8 0.9 34.8 2.9 23.4 3.4 35.1 2.0 18.2 1.4 13.7 1.5 
€250,000 - €499,999 36.1 2.7 14.8 1.6 23.1 1.1 38.5 2.7 20.4 3.5 27.2 2.9 11.8 1.6 15.9 1.5 
€500,000 - €999,999 45.9 4.6 16.0 2.3 25.6 1.6 39.2 4.5 14.9 2.8 27.3 5.1 12.1 2.8 20.1 3.2 
€1,000,000 or over 23.9 6.7 12.2 2.0 24.5 2.1 22.6 4.6 10.0 2.0 34.9 13.6 12.8 4.6 21.4 3.5 
C. Age classes 
                21-35 35.7 8.4 8.9 2.4 16.3 2.2 34.5 8.1 23.4 3.8 32.1 3.0 8.5 2.1 16.5 3.9
35-44 24.0 7.1 12.6 3.0 15.9 1.3 36.7 3.9 13.3 2.4 33.1 2.8 13.2 2.7 15.3 2.3 
45-54 28.0 5.4 10.7 1.8 18.6 1.3 34.5 3.0 11.6 2.9 35.3 3.6 12.2 1.5 16.4 2.0 
55-64 34.9 6.8 15.1 2.0 21.0 1.8 24.2 5.3 11.2 3.0 31.3 4.8 11.0 2.6 17.5 2.6 
65-74 37.3 6.3 13.6 1.9 27.7 1.7 32.1 4.0 12.3 5.0 21.2 2.8 18.9 3.8 21.4 1.8 
75 and older 34.8 9.6 21.9 3.2 38.5 2.3 31.7 5.1 11.5 4.0 30.2 4.7 25.7 3.9 22.3 4.6 
a  
The figures show the present value of all wealth transfers as of the survey year which were received up to the time of the survey and accumulated at a real interest rate of 3.0% as a ratio to the 
respective net wealth in the overall population or subpopulations.  
Source: Own computations based on HFCS (2010). All 5 implicates are used, standard errors bootstrapped. 
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In several countries young households have a comparably high share, because of low initial 
savings levels. The shares are also high again for old households because of high absolute val-
ues of the capitalized wealth transfers. For middle-aged households the value of their own 
savings tends to be higher than their relative low absolute transfer value. The differences be-
tween the age classes are minimal though. In Belgium, France and Portugal (as well as in Spain) 
the share increases with age and peaks for the oldest cohort. In Austria, (West) Germany, Cy-
prus and Greece the share of transfers as a percent of net wealth is surprisingly high for some 
or all young cohorts. One of the reasons why the share is not substantially higher for older 
cohorts might be the Second World War and its aftermath, resulting in a situation where there 
simply was not much to inherit by heirs of the war generation.  
3.4.4. Correlates of the relative value of wealth transfers 
Using a fractional logit model we further investigate the share of current wealth due to past 
wealth transfers for those who received a transfer. The advantage of this model is that it ex-
plicitly accounts for proportions in the (0, 1) interval. We estimate the following equation: 
(3.6) 𝑞𝑗 = 𝐹 (𝛼 +  𝛽𝑋𝑗 +  𝜀𝑗) 
where 𝑞𝑗 denotes the sum of past wealth transfers as a percent of current net wealth for 
households, which received a transfer in country 𝑗. In addition to the inflation adjustment we 
capitalize transfers as a percentage of net wealth – with a cap at 100%, i.e. the sum of capital-
ized wealth transfers within a household cannot be possibly higher than the net wealth of a 
household. 𝛼 is an intercept, 𝜀𝑗 denotes unobservables. 𝑋𝑗 is the matrix of all explanatory vari-
ables: age, education, work and marital status as well as gender of the reference person, in-
come of the household and its size. 
Table 3.6 shows the results for the fractional logit regressions analyzing capitalized inherited 
wealth in prices of 2010 as a percent of current household wealth. We look at all households 
that received at least one gift or inheritance. The income of the household matters: Compared 
with the third income quintile, the first and second quintiles show a positive relationship and 
the fourth and fifth a negative one. This means that with increasing income, wealth transfers 
exhibit a decreasing impact on inherited wealth as a percent of net wealth. Naturally, with 
higher incomes it is easier to save from it and accumulate wealth, thus, even though the abso-
lute present value of transfers is higher for high income households, their relative importance 
is decreasing along the distribution of income.  
With regard to the age classes, the results do not reveal a unified pattern. It seems like the 
households over 65 have higher shares of current wealth due to transfers in comparison with 
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the middle aged ones (45 to 54). However, this finding is only significant in France and Portu-
gal. For the households under 45 the coefficients point into both directions, no matter if they 
are located in core or Mediterranean countries. Positive correlations give a hint that in Belgium 
and Spain younger households have already received large fortunes. So far they have had less 
time to accumulate wealth off their own income. Hence, transfers have a much higher impact 
on their financial situation than for older cohorts.  
Self-employed households have lower shares of current wealth due to past wealth transfers 
than employees (except for Spain). However, in the analysis it is assumed that all accumulated 
wealth exceeding the capitalization is due to own efforts, if business owners inherited their 
business and consistently generate a higher rate of return, the resulting wealth is defined as 
savings. For the self-employed population, an initial transfer might be the reason for the latter 
wealth though. In the majority of the countries studied, singles have a higher share of current 
wealth due to past wealth transfers compared to households led by married person. For 
households led by a widowed or divorced person the share of past wealth transfers also tend 
to be higher, it seems that a divorce or widowhood is diminishing the possibilities to increase 
savings and accumulate wealth. The gender of the household head does matter significantly, 
especially in the southern European countries and France. Men have a smaller share of wealth 
transfers as a percent of net wealth than women. As is shown in the first part, there are not 
many significant differences for absolute present value of transfers between men and women, 
resulting in the overall conclusion that, all things equal, men tend to accumulate more wealth.  
Taken together many results from the absolute investigation are reversed. Especially the find-
ing that the share of current wealth due to past wealth transfers is decreasing with income 
needs to be emphasized. Remember from the first part of this empirical analysis that those 
households with higher income have higher chances of receiving inheritances and gifts while 
also receiving larger transfers in absolute terms. This points into the direction that these 
households are able to build up wealth out of both their annual income as well as substantial 
inheritances and gifts.80  
                                                          
80
  Keep in mind that the income variable is only a proxy for life-time earnings, as it does refer to the 
calendar year prior to the survey year (or the 12 months preceding the survey). 
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Table 3.6: Fractional logit regressions for share of current wealth due to past wealth transfers, recipients only 
Fractional Logit 
I. Core European countries II. Mediterranean countries 
Austria Belgium France (West) Germany Cyprus Greece Portugal Spain 
Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. Coeff.   Std.err. 
Income quintiles (reference: 3rd)                                                 
1st  0.457 * 0.279 0.271 
 
0.237 0.621 *** 0.079 0.006 
 
0.211 1.059 *** 0.365 0.208 
 
0.349 0.545 *** 0.209 0.382 *** 0.128 
2nd 0.105 
 
0.237 -0.004 
 
0.200 0.342 *** 0.072 0.120 
 
0.192 0.419 
 
0.314 0.222 
 
0.289 0.266 
 
0.187 0.123 
 
0.133 
4th  -0.038 
 
0.226 0.083 
 
0.187 -0.001 
 
0.068 -0.265 ** 0.152 0.211 
 
0.260 -0.184 
 
0.302 -0.280 
 
0.208 -0.019 
 
0.126 
5th  -0.295 
 
0.214 -0.174 
 
0.196 -0.158 *** 0.062 -0.670 *** 0.136 -0.393 * 0.275 -0.147 
 
0.306 -0.277 
 
0.195 -0.349 *** 0.114 
Age group (reference: age 45-54) 
                        21-34 -0.092
 
0.265 0.468 * 0.267 0.059
 
0.105 -0.608 ** 0.229 0.216
 
0.281 -0.684 ** 0.338 0.069
 
0.310 0.035
 
0.216
35-44 -0.244 
 
0.209 -0.059 
 
0.212 -0.066 
 
0.072 0.018 
 
0.149 -0.133 
 
0.205 -0.526 ** 0.274 0.286 
 
0.209 0.199 * 0.133 
55-64 -0.051 
 
0.224 0.068 
 
0.201 -0.045 
 
0.070 -0.069 
 
0.140 -0.042 
 
0.302 0.071 
 
0.351 0.140 
 
0.189 -0.079 
 
0.102 
65 plus 0.256 
 
0.268 0.463 
 
0.286 0.502 *** 0.090 0.232 
 
0.211 0.440 
 
0.595 0.140 
 
0.463 0.661 *** 0.243 0.173 
 
0.125 
Education (reference: secondary) 
                        Primary 0.162
 
0.225 0.031
 
0.159 0.138 *** 0.051 0.026
 
0.202 -0.084
 
0.239 0.326
 
0.241 -0.275
 
0.195 -0.116
 
0.104
Tertiary 0.159 
 
0.214 -0.103 
 
0.134 0.156 *** 0.049 -0.177 
 
0.096 0.110 
 
0.191 0.055 
 
0.280 -0.310 
 
0.255 -0.137 
 
0.102 
Employment status (reference: employed) 
                        Self-employed -0.176
 
0.209 -0.401
 
0.250 -0.477 *** 0.060 -0.079
 
0.157 -0.275
 
0.254 -0.727 ** 0.280 -0.274
 
0.189 0.186 * 0.109
Unemployed/other -0.190 
 
0.242 0.023 
 
0.222 0.196 * 0.097 -0.025 
 
0.159 0.123 
 
0.313 -0.510 
 
0.296 -0.367 * 0.216 0.099 
 
0.111 
Retired 0.029 
 
0.228 -0.221 
 
0.239 -0.073 
 
0.076 -0.247 
 
0.189 -0.074 
 
0.584 -0.040 
 
0.407 0.225 
 
0.211 0.075 
 
0.121 
Marital status (reference: married) 
                        Single 0.005
 
0.210 0.448 ** 0.206 0.188 ** 0.073 0.291
 
0.193 -0.075
 
0.629 0.728 * 0.344 0.466
 
0.257 0.435 *** 0.124
Widowed 0.080 
 
0.370 0.729 *** 0.235 0.118 
 
0.089 0.288 
 
0.242 -0.449 
 
0.583 0.726 * 0.408 -0.075 
 
0.250 0.216 * 0.133 
Divorced 0.054 
 
0.260 0.609 *** 0.221 0.116 
 
0.083 0.420 ** 0.181 0.726 
 
0.440 0.616 
 
0.437 0.210 
 
0.292 0.114 
 
0.152 
Men -0.178 
 
0.143 -0.095 
 
0.119 -0.108 ** 0.046 -0.044 
 
0.100 -0.331 
 
0.181 -0.478 ** 0.217 -0.421 ** 0.179 -0.170 ** 0.081 
Household size (reference: 2 persons) 
                        1 -0.027
 
0.242 0.035
 
0.206 0.126 * 0.073 -0.028
 
0.186 -0.206
 
0.565 -0.696 ** 0.372 0.253
 
0.221 -0.030
 
0.127
3 0.145 
 
0.228 0.211 
 
0.192 -0.058 
 
0.067 0.012 
 
0.136 -0.216 
 
0.291 0.054 
 
0.299 0.259 * 0.165 0.069 
 
0.096 
4 0.000 
 
0.333 0.188 
 
0.227 -0.006 
 
0.074 -0.212 
 
0.154 0.116 
 
0.287 0.041 
 
0.292 0.355 * 0.201 0.031 
 
0.110 
5 plus 0.103 
 
0.339 -0.125 
 
0.290 0.035 
 
0.095 0.034 
 
0.220 0.009 
 
0.336 0.164 
 
0.391 0.882 *** 0.285 0.229 
 
0.162 
Constant 0.688 ** 0.279 -0.703 *** 0.233 -0.394 *** 0.088 0.747 *** 0.181 -0.003  0.391 2.363 *** 0.391 0.260   0.332 -0.204  0.161 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Own computations based on HFCS (2010). All 5 implicates are used, standard errors bootstrapped. 
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3.5. Conclusion 
We conduct a detailed investigation of the distribution of wealth transfers in eight countries in 
the Euro area (Austria, Belgium, France, (West) Germany, Cyprus, Spain, Greece and Portugal). 
Our main finding is that high-income households in European countries have, in the past, in-
herited significantly higher amounts than low-income households. Using a series of country-
specific regressions, we confirm these findings and additionally discover that high education 
levels strongly correlate with both the probability of receiving a transfer and the value of those 
transfers. At the same time, capital transfers seen to be less relevant to the current wealth 
position for high-income households. Through their strong income positions and persistently 
low intergenerational mobility, these households are presumably able to build wealth both 
from their own regular incomes and from inheritances and gifts.  
Overall we observe quite similar patterns in all European countries included in our sample. The 
share of households that received at least one wealth transfer varies between 27 percent (Por-
tugal) and roughly 40 percent (France). The capitalized conditional mean present value of 
wealth transfers lies between 274,000 Euro (Cyprus) and 85,000 Euro (Portugal). Expressing 
the mean present value of transfers in relative terms, as a percent of current net wealth, it 
never exceeds 32 percent and shares are lower in the Mediterranean countries (Greece devi-
ates from the other Mediterranean countries, as does Belgium compared to the rest of core 
Europe). In most countries the percentages of households with a transfer as well as the mean 
present value of those transfers is expectedly increasing along the distribution of net wealth. 
However, the importance of those transfers for the current net wealth level does not increase 
with the level of wealth. In addition, we find that self-employed households tend to have a 
higher incidence, compared with employees, to have received a transfer and those transfers 
tend to be higher than those of employees.  
Overall inheritances and gifts may be considered as a channel through which the existing ine-
quality of opportunity and the resulting economic inequality are amplified. However, in Aus-
tria, Cyprus, Portugal and some regions of Spain, inheritance and gift tax has been de facto 
abolished or abandoned. In other countries like Germany large general allowances or exemp-
tions for business assets are granted.81 We observe the pattern that households from higher 
income quintiles are able to accumulate more wealth through an increased capacity to save on 
their own. In addition, once high income households report an inheritance or gifts, the values 
are substantially higher than for low income households, therefore increasing the gap between 
                                                          
81
  See more on this point in chapter 4. 
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rich and poor households. If policy-makers aim to reduce wealth inequality and more general-
ly, economic inequality, they must therefore revisit the strong link between high incomes and 
high expected values of wealth transfers.  
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Appendix 
Part A: Table 
Table A.3.1: Taxation of inheritances and gifts: a European comparison 
Country 
Reference period: 
2000-2010 
Tax rate depending on level of relation (1) Max. tax rate threshold Max. tax allowance (renewed) 
 
Exemptions/special regulations 
 (1) No or low inheritance & gift tax 
Cyprus since 2000 No inheritance or gift tax, but land transfer tax for gifts 
  
Spouses & 
Children 
3-8% 
€170,860 (since 2008, € 100.000 
before) 
--- 
 
business transfers within fami-
lies 
  
Other Per-
sons 
 
Austria  since 2008 No inheritance or gift tax, but land transfer tax 
  
Spouses & 
Children 
2% 
--- €1,100 
 
business transfers 
  
Other Per-
sons 
2-3.5% 
 
 
before 2008 Moderate inheritance & gift tax with low allowances 
  
Spouses & 
Children 
2-15% 
€4,380,000 
€2,200 (10 yrs.) 
 
business transfers 
    
Other Per-
sons 
4-60% €110/440/2,200 (10 yrs.) 
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Country 
Reference period: 
2000-2010 
Tax rate depending on level of relation (1) Max. tax rate threshold Max. tax allowance (renewed) 
 
Exemptions/special regulations 
Portugal since 2004 Stamp duty 
 
 
 
  
Spouses & 
Children 
0% inheritance 
 
--- 
 
business transfers (tax rate 
25%) 
  
0.8% property gift 
 
 
  
Other Per-
sons 
0/10% inheritance 
 
 
  
0.8/10.8% property gift 
 
 
 
before 2004 Moderate inheritance & gift tax with low allowances 
  
Spouses & 
Children 
3-24% 
€355,343 
€3,641 tax free, children under age tax 
free (never) 
 
 
    
Other Per-
sons 
7-50% 
€374, plus €1,820 if inheritance in as-
cending line (never) 
 
  
 (2) Moderate inheritance & gift tax rate with moderate or high allowances 
Greece since 2010 inheritance & gift tax 
  
Spouses & 
Children 
1-10% €600,000 
€400,000 if inheritance - married at 
least 5 years, only children under age  
 primary residence, shares and 
business transfers 
  
Other Per-
sons 
1-40% €267,000 
€6,000-€30,000 from this amount on 
taxes are due, depending on level of 
relation 
 
shares and business transfers 
  before 2010 
Numerous changes, e.g. tax allowances (2004: €19,076 spouses & children), tax rates (2004: 5-25% and up to 60% for other persons, 2008: depending on 
asset: for spouses & children property max. 1%, shares max. 0.6%) 
Germany since 2010 inheritance & gift tax 
 
 
 
  
Spouses & 
Children 
7-30% 
€26,000,000 
€500,000, €400,000 for children, (10 
yrs.) 
 owner-occupied property, 
business transfers  
  
Other Per-
sons 
7-50% €20,000/100,000/200,000 (10 yrs.) 
 
business transfers  
 
before 2010 less exemptions, lower tax allowances, thresholds in tax brackets lower, lower tax rate for some “other persons” 
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Country 
Reference period: 
2000-2010 
Tax rate depending on level of relation (1) Max. tax rate threshold Max. tax allowance (renewed) 
 
Exemptions/special regulations 
 (3) High or moderate inheritance & gift tax rate with low or moderate allowances 
Spain since 2010 inheritance & gift tax (on national level, regional differences) 
 
 
 
  
Spouses & 
Children 
7.65-34% + multiplier: 1-
1.2%* 
€797,555, multiplier depending on 
heir’s wealth (max. threshold 
€4,020,770)  
€15,956, €47.858 for children under age 
(3 yrs.) 
 
business transfers, property 
  
Other Per-
sons 
7.65-34% + multiplier: 1.59-
2.4%* 
€0/7.993/15,956 (3 yrs.) 
 
  
* The corresponding tax rate (amount of transfer relevant) is applied to the taxable amount. The resulting balance is then multiplied with the corresponding 
multiplier (results from the existing assets of the heir and the degree of relationship). 
 
before 2010 
hardly changes (e.g. lower allowances), but regional governments may deviate from national legislation since 2004, this resulted in tax exemptions of up 
to 99% of estate value 
France since 2000# inheritance & gift tax 
  
Spouses & 
Children 
5-45% (except for spouses 
since 2008) 
€1,805,677 €156,956 (10 yrs.) 
 
business transfers, tax reduced 
if three children under age  
  
Other Per-
sons 
5-60% €0-1,805,677 €1,520-€156,359 (10 yrs.) 
 
    # only slight adjustments of the allowances and the limit for the maximum tax rates 
Belgium  since 2010 inheritance tax (regional differences) 
  
Spouses & 
Children 
3-30% €250,000-€500,000 
€15,000-€25,000, €65,000-75.000 for 
children under age (3 yrs.) 
 
owner-occupied property, 
business assets and others 
depending on region 
  
Other Per-
sons 
3-80%  €75,000-€500,000 €620-1,250/€15,000-25,000 (3 yrs.) 
 
 
since 2010 gift tax (regional differences) 
  
Spouses & 
Children 
1-30% (max. 7.7% for mova-
ble assets) 
€500,000  --- 
 
owner-occupied property, 
business assets and others 
depending on region 
  
Other Per-
sons 
1-80% (max. 7.7% for mova-
ble assets) 
€75,000-€500,000  --- 
 
  before 2010 Regional legislation of gift tax possible since 2001, inheritance tax since 2002 
 (1) In some countries spouses and partners have the same legal rights. This is not documented here.  
Sources: Legal texts from individual countries, Mennel & Förster (2014), Schupp & Szydlik (2004) und EY (2014). 
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Part B: Robustness Checks 
In table 3.5 we assume that the time invariant interest rate on the investment of all wealth 
transfers is 3 percent for all households. In order to check the impact of this assumption on 
the relative importance of wealth transfers for the net wealth along the distribution, we con-
duct a series of robustness checks. Additionally, as the wealth transfers received are not inde-
pendent of the number of adults in a household, we check by how much the present value of 
transfers would change, if we apply a per capita definition of transfers.  
Long-term interest rates on governme nt bonds 
In section 3.4 we argue that a secure investment would be in line with a rate of return of three 
percent (r = 3%), as this is a capitalization rate quite common in the literature (for example 
Wolff & Gittleman 2014). Alternatively, one might assume that the most secure investment a 
citizen may choose is a long-term investment in government bonds (cf. Corneo et al. 2016). 
The nominal rate of return then is the (yearly average) nominal yield of such an investment. 
The data does not allow us to compute the resulting capitalized values of inheritances and 
gifts, as the time series are not entirely available for any of the Mediterranean countries. 
However, they are available for Belgium, France and Germany from the 1950s onward. In table 
B.3.1 the results are shown for a capitalization of past inheritances and gifts using the nominal 
yields of long-term government bonds.82 
This change of method would have almost no effect on the overall inheritances and gifts as a 
percent of net wealth, the maximum deviation would be in France with +0.9 percent. For the 
individual wealth classes all changes are bellow one percent, no patterns are visible. For 
household income this change would affect lower quintiles slightly more, but again the chang-
es are negligible. The shares are somewhat higher for the older cohorts, probably due to high-
er interest rates on government bonds in the 1970s and 1980s as compared to a real interest 
rate of 3 percent. The variation for both the conditional mean and median value of transfers 
received is below 5,000 Euro. In summary, applying government bonds instead of a flat real 
interest rate hardly affects the outcomes for the countries where time series are available.  
Real interest rate r = 1% versus r = 5% 
The second robustness check assesses the impact of a flat low versus a flat high interest rate. 
We compare the different outcomes of r = 1% and r = 5% on the wealth transfers received as a 
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  Extracted from the OECD database on long-term interest rates, which refer to government bonds 
maturing in ten years. Available online: https://data.oecd.org/interest/long-term-interest-rates.htm 
(10.02.2016). 
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percent of net wealth and conditional mean and median present values (table B.3.2). Most 
importantly, the general patterns we observe along the distribution of wealth are largely inde-
pendent of the chosen real interest rate, even though the higher wealth classes are affected 
more by a higher rate of return. For the income quintiles there are no changes of the patterns 
visible either. The overall increase of share is the lowest in Portugal (3.9 percentage points) 
and highest in Austria (9.5 percentage points). However, in most countries the increase is 
spread almost equally among the income quintiles. Only in Belgium the lowest quintile seems 
to be affected slightly more. In (West) Germany and Cyprus the middle income classes are 
experiencing a slightly sharper surge. The conditional mean values are varying considerably 
between low and high interest rates: in Cyprus the mean is up by about 121,000 Euro, in 
Greece and Portugal it is affected the least (around +25,000 Euro). For the remaining country 
the difference varies between 47,000 Euro and 71,000 Euro. 
Wealth related interest rates  
However, assuming that the interest rate is the same no matter the position along the distri-
bution of wealth may not seem reasonable. It is more likely that households with a higher level 
of wealth are better informed about financial markets and investment opportunities. In addi-
tion, they hold enough money to be able to divide it into different investments; consequently 
they might take higher risks and realize higher rates of returns than the middle class or house-
holds from the bottom half. Hence, in this step we assume that the real interest rate corre-
lates with the net wealth position: The wealth class below 20,000 Euro includes a significant 
number of net borrower and zero wealth observations and is excluded from the analysis. The 
next class realizes an interest rate of 3 percent, which then is increasing with every wealth 
class by 1 percent, thus leading to an interest rate of 7 percent for households with net wealth 
higher than 1 million Euros. We then compare the results for the assumption that all realize 
the same real interest rate (3 percent) to the wealth related interest rate in table B.3.3.  
As expected, the changes in percentage points are highest for the highest wealth class. In 
comparison to a flat real interest rate the changes vary between 2.8 percentage points in Por-
tugal and 10.8 in Greece. In the core countries Germany, Austria and Belgium and in Cyprus 
the second wealthiest class stays ahead of the top class after adjusting to a wealth related 
interest rate, only in France we observe a change, albeit the difference is not statistically sig-
nificant. As for the Mediterranean countries, compared to a real annual interest rate of 3 per-
cent we do not observe any considerable structural differences. The conclusion that there is 
relatively small variation in the importance of inheritances and gifts for net wealth between 
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the wealth classes is still viable. We conclude that this observation is not the result of an arbi-
trarily chosen interest rate. 
Per capita present value 
Computing the per capita wealth transfers (table B.3.4) instead of the total present values per 
household (table 3.2), yields a similar picture, albeit on an expectedly lower level. Mean and 
median values are depending on the household sizes, which are somewhat higher in some 
Mediterranean countries. The patterns we observe do not change: the present values are in-
creasing with the level of wealth, exhibit various patterns depending on the age class and are 
again highest for the highest income quintile. We conclude that choosing per capita transfers 
would have reduced the numbers, but not changed the outcomes of our study. 
Table B.3.1: Present value of wealth transfers received as a percent of net wealth, capi-
talized using country-specific yields of long-term government bonds 
  Belgium France (West) Germany 
  % Std.err. % Std.err. % Std.err. 
All households 14.7 1.0 24.1 0.8 31.9 2.7 
Cond. mean present value in €1000  158,412 10,140 142,615 4,205 196,039 13,096 
Cond. median present value in €1000  79,177 
 
46,665 
 
106,981 
 Wealth levels 
      Under €20,000  -
 
-
 
-
 €20,000 - €99,999 16.3 3.4 21.3 1.7 17.5 2.5
€100,000 - €249,999 15.5 2.3 19.2 0.9 35.0 2.8 
€250,000 - €499,999 15.3 1.7 23.9 1.1 39.0 2.7 
€500,000 - €999,999 16.4 2.3 26.4 1.6 39.3 4.5 
€1,000,000 or over 12.6 2.0 25.8 2.2 23.5 4.9 
Income quintiles 
      1st quintile 19.3 4.0 27.9 2.3 39.9 9.5
2nd quintile 15.7 2.5 28.0 2.2 36.6 5.6 
3rd quintile 12.8 2.1 23.8 1.9 40.1 4.5 
4th quintile 15.9 2.3 22.1 1.5 38.0 5.0 
5th quintile 13.4 1.8 23.6 1.3 26.0 3.7 
Age classes 
      21-35 19.3 4.0 27.9 2.3 39.9 9.5
35-44 15.7 2.5 28.0 2.2 36.6 5.6 
45-54 12.8 2.1 23.8 1.9 40.1 4.5 
55-64 15.9 2.3 22.1 1.5 38.0 5.0 
65-74 13.4 1.8 23.6 1.3 26.0 3.7 
75 and older 19.3 4.0 27.9 2.3 39.9 9.5 
a  
The figures show the present value of all wealth transfers as of the survey year which were received up to the 
time of the survey and accumulated at a nominal interest rate of long-term government bonds as a ratio to the 
respective net wealth in the overall population or subpopulations.  
Source: Own computations based on HFCS (2010). Standard errors are shown in parentheses. All 5 implicates are 
used, standard errors bootstrapped. 
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Table B.3.2: Present value of wealth transfers received as a percent of net wealth, real interest rate = 1% versus real interest rate = 5% 
  I. Core European countries II. Mediterranean countries 
  Austria Belgium France (West) Germany Cyprus Greece Portugal Spain 
  r = 1% r = 5% r = 1% r = 5% r = 1% r = 5% r = 1% r = 5% r = 1% r = 5% r = 1% r = 5% r = 1% r = 5% r = 1% r = 5% 
All households 25.3 34.8 11.7 17.2 19.2 27.2 26.3 35.8 10.2 15.9 28.5 33.7 12.7 16.6 14.5 21.4 
Cond. mean present value in €1000 188 259 125 185 114 161 162 220 218 339 138 164 73 95 141 207 
Cond. median present value in €1000 94 130 58 94 37 56 89 125 114 199 104 119 31 42 60 97 
A. Wealth levels 
                Under €20,000  -
 
-
 
-
 
-
 
-
 
-
 
-
 
-
 €20,000 - €99,999 23.6 27.6 15.5 17.5 18.6 23.0 15.2 19.5 12.0 15.3 33.4 35.0 16.8 19.6 14.3 17.6
€100,000 - €249,999 28.2 34.1 13.3 17.0 15.8 21.5 31.0 38.0 20.2 25.8 33.0 36.4 15.8 20.0 11.4 15.9 
€250,000 - €499,999 31.0 39.6 12.3 17.4 19.0 26.8 32.8 43.5 16.8 23.7 23.7 30.1 9.8 14.0 13.1 18.5 
€500,000 - €999,999 38.1 50.7 12.6 19.2 21.4 29.9 33.4 42.8 11.1 18.7 23.6 30.4 9.6 14.0 16.1 23.8 
€1,000,000 or over 17.9 28.4 9.5 15.5 19.9 29.6 17.5 27.9 8.0 13.0 28.7 41.8 10.6 14.3 16.8 26.5 
B. Income quintiles 
                1st Quintile 35.9 46.6 14.6 22.8 22.5 30.8 36.0 41.6 9.9 15.4 34.1 38.1 16.6 22.1 18.1 26.1
2nd Quintile 25.9 34.2 11.1 18.2 22.4 31.1 30.9 40.9 11.1 18.4 37.5 42.3 18.7 24.3 17.7 23.8 
3rd Quintile 28.8 37.4 9.7 15.1 19.5 26.4 33.6 43.8 15.5 23.8 31.2 35.7 13.1 17.3 12.6 19.4 
4th Quintile 25.6 34.0 13.3 18.3 17.5 25.1 32.0 42.1 15.8 23.7 28.0 32.0 10.9 13.9 15.1 21.0 
5th Quintile 22.9 33.4 11.2 15.7 18.7 26.9 20.7 30.0 6.4 10.2 22.5 29.3 11.1 14.5 13.2 20.5 
a  
The figures show the present value of all wealth transfers as of the survey year which were received up to the time of the survey and accumulated at a real interest rate either r = 1% or r = 5%.  
Source: Own computations based on HFCS (2010). All 5 implicates are used, standard errors bootstrapped. 
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Table B.3.3: Present value of wealth transfers received as a percent of net wealth, real interest rate = 3% versus wealth related interest rates 
Wealth levels 
I. Core European countries II. Mediterranean countries 
Austria Belgium France (West) Germany Cyprus Greece Portugal Spain 
A. real interest rate = 3% 
        Under €20,000  - - - - - - - -
€20,000 - €99,999 25.8 16.6 21.0 17.5 14.7 34.5 18.4 16.3 
€100,000 - €249,999 31.6 15.5 18.8 34.8 23.4 35.1 18.2 13.7 
€250,000 - €499,999 36.1 14.8 23.1 38.5 20.4 27.2 11.8 15.9 
€500,000 - €999,999 45.9 16.0 25.6 39.2 14.9 27.3 12.1 20.1 
€1,000,000 or over 23.9 12.2 24.5 22.6 10.0 34.9 12.8 21.4 
B. wealth related interest rate 
        Under €20,000  - - - - - - - -
€20,000 - €99,999 25.8 16.6 21.0 17.5 14.7 34.5 18.4 16.3 
€100,000 - €249,999 32.9 16.3 20.2 36.6 24.7 35.8 19.2 14.8 
€250,000 - €499,999 39.6 17.4 26.8 43.5 23.7 30.1 14.0 18.5 
€500,000 - €999,999 52.6 20.8 31.9 44.3 20.1 31.8 14.7 25.4 
€1,000,000 or over 32.7 18.9 34.3 31.7 16.7 45.6 15.5 30.6 
a  
The figures show the present value of all wealth transfers as of the survey year which were received up to the time of the survey and accumulated at a real interest rate either r = 3% or wealth 
related, i.e. from €100,000 onwards the interest rate is increasing in steps of one, yielding an interest rate of r = 7% for the highest wealth level. 
Source: Own computations based on HFCS (2010). All 5 implicates are used, standard errors bootstrapped. 
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Table B.3.4: Mean per capita present value of transfers received (in €1,000), in 2010 prices and capitalized with r = 3%, recipients onlya 
  I. Core European countries II. Mediterranean countries 
  Austria Belgium France (West) Germany Cyprus Greece Portugal Spain 
  mean Std.err. mean Std.err. mean Std.err. mean Std.err. mean Std.err. mean Std.err. mean Std.err. mean Std.err. 
Mean present value 122 10 98 8 86 3 105 7 131 14 73 4 41 3 88 5 
Median present value 58 
 
41 
 
27 
 
59 
 
72 
 
52 
 
17 
 
36 
 A. Wealth levels 
                Under €20,000  5 1 5 1 5 0 6 1 6 2 11 1 7 1 7 1
€20,000 - €99,999 42 2 32 3 27 1 38 2 45 4 48 1 29 1 30 2 
€100,000 - €249,999 105 6 67 6 66 2 97 5 91 10 117 4 67 5 68 5 
€250,000 - €499,999 203 15 129 12 141 7 205 14 153 22 192 26 146 26 157 12 
€500,000 - €999,999 448 52 232 37 281 18 357 49 170 43 429 117 174 49 245 26 
€1,000,000 or over 552 161 483 122 787 77 501 92 436 109 786 485 1097 403 909 255 
B. Income quintiles 
                1st quintile 90 19 90 16 62 5 84 20 97 29 72 7 38 4 78 8
2nd quintile 100 13 85 11 71 6 100 17 80 15 68 6 32 3 70 9 
3rd quintile 132 19 98 16 68 8 90 12 157 57 70 11 30 4 76 21 
4th quintile 110 18 100 16 68 4 98 11 152 24 71 14 26 3 81 9 
5th quintile 156 23 114 23 136 7 137 14 153 28 85 7 87 15 131 15 
C. Age classes 
                21-35 100 28 33 8 28 3 65 20 142 22 74 7 29 6 75 18
35-44 99 16 65 13 57 5 92 13 157 25 76 5 36 5 84 12 
45-54 132 15 66 9 66 5 96 10 97 13 73 10 27 3 82 13 
55-64 128 15 98 15 83 5 106 15 140 40 83 10 35 6 86 9 
65-74 150 34 100 10 114 8 137 13 150 68 53 5 56 11 89 8 
75 and older 115 26 186 32 147 11 129 18 100 32 73 12 58 9 114 25 
a  
The figures show the per adult capita present value of all transfers as of the survey year which were received up to the time of the survey in prices of 2010 using country specific inflation rates. 
Adults are all persons in a household aged 16 and older. 
Source: Own computations based on HFCS (2010). Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Means over 5 implicates, standard errors bootstrapped. 
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4. Estate and inheritance taxation 
Tax regimes and effective tax rates in Europe since the 1950s 
4.1. Introduction 
Wealth levels and inequality declined in Europe during and between the two World Wars and 
in the first decades afterwards. However, since the 1980s both started to rise again in several 
countries (Piketty & Zucman 2015). Intergenerational wealth transfers83 are a key determinant 
of wealth (Davies & Shorrocks 2000) and also gained again importance since the 1990s (Piketty 
& Zucman 2015). These two phenomena are linked, which means that part of the accumulated 
wealth is passed on to the next generation via inheritances or gifts. However, the chances of 
getting a (high) wealth transfer are unequally distributed (Davies & Shorrocks 2000) and also 
positively correlated with education and income of the receiving households (Tiefensee & 
Westermeier 2016). Nevertheless, transfers reduce relative wealth inequality84 (Elinder, 
Erixson & Waldenström 2016, Wolff & Gittleman 2014, Bossmann, Kleiner & Wälde 2007, 
Kohli, Künemund, Schäfer, Schupp & Vogel 2006) because even small transfers are more im-
portant for household wealth at the bottom of the distribution than large transfers for house-
holds at the upper edge of the distribution. However, the literature also finds that absolute 
wealth inequality increases due to transfers (Elinder et al. 2016, Künemund & Vogel 2011, 
Kohli et al. 2006). 
One instrument for governments to reduce monetary inequality in a society are taxes; in this 
case especially estate, inheritance and gift taxes. Depending on their structure they can reduce 
the transferred (net) wealth and in addition the tax revenue can be redistributed (Brunner 
2014). The following questions arise: Do countries tax intergenerational wealth transfers dif-
ferently? Did taxation change over time? For both cases holds: If yes, why? Theory finds that 
the optimal intergenerational transfer tax depends among others things on the preference for 
redistribution in a society (Piketty & Saez 2013) and therefore for different tax regimes. Esping-
Andersen (1990) elaborated three categories for developed countries: liberal, conservative and 
social democratic welfare state regimes. Derived from these theories I argue how the taxation 
of intergenerational transfers may look like for the different types of welfare states. I investi-
gate the United Kingdom, Germany and Sweden as typical representatives of these different 
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  The focus in this chapter is on transfers between generations and not within e.g. between spouses. 
Intergenerational wealth transfers include inheritances and gifts. Estate means the whole amount of 
wealth that donors hold at their death. Inheritances and bequests are used as synonyms for the 
transfers of (parts of the) estate from donors to donees. 
84
  Relative inequality is about ratios and absolute inequality about differences (Cowell 2011). 
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welfare state regimes since the 1950s. I calculate effective tax rates for typical households with 
different sizes and portfolios of intergenerational transfers to represent the whole wealth dis-
tribution.  
Comparing estate, inheritance and gift taxation between countries and over time is not that 
simple. Different tax rates, allowances, exemptions etc. for different amounts and types of 
wealth need to be taken into account. So far, studies regarding effective intergenerational 
transfer tax rates either just focus on single countries (Henrekson & Waldenström 2015, Du 
Rietz, Henrekson & Waldenström 2015) or one point in time for several countries (Scheffler & 
Spengel 2004, Heinemann, Spengel, Bräutigam & Evers 2015). Some even only consider the 
top tax rates (Cole 2015, Scheve & Stasavage 2012, Ohlsson 2011), which can be misleading, 
for example due to different allowances and exemptions for real estate or businesses. Those 
studies which claim to look at both (several countries and over time) do this for only one very 
special wealth portfolio which is bequeathed (AGN International 2015) and therefore do not 
represent the whole wealth distribution. 
My contribution to the existing literature is therefore two folded: I combine the optimal inter-
generational transfer tax theory with the theory of Esping-Andersen (1990) on welfare capital-
ism. In addition, I close an empirical research gap on effective intergenerational transfer tax 
rates between countries and over time for the whole wealth distribution. Neither was to my 
knowledge done before. 
In section 4.2 I present summaries of the optimal intergenerational transfer taxation theory as 
well as for the welfare state theory by Esping-Andersen (1990) and form hypotheses how the 
intergenerational transfer taxation therefore may look like in the different regimes. In addi-
tion, I explain the reasoning concerning my country selection. In section 4.3 I describe the de-
velopment of the estate, inheritance and gift taxation in the United Kingdom, Germany and 
Sweden. Next I derive effective intergenerational transfer tax rates to compare the taxation 
regimes among them and over time (section 4.4). Furthermore, I look into and explain specific 
country trends over time and in addition I discuss general trends for tax changes in all coun-
tries based on the current literature. In section 4.5 I summarize my findings and derive a con-
clusion.  
4.2. Theory, Hypotheses and Case Selection 
The recent theory of optimal taxation considers the effects of taxes on economic activities, like 
income generation, consumption or saving as well as the necessity of a government to raise 
taxes to finance government spending (Brunner 2014). Furthermore a tax always needs to 
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been seen in the context of the whole tax system. The general appropriateness of a tax system 
revolves around the social welfare function in an economy, which represents the aggregate of 
all utility positions of each household in this economy. In the basic model of the optimal taxa-
tion theory differences between households are only based on different wage rates, which 
represent different productivity levels (Mirrlees 1971). Based on that Atkinson & Stiglitz (1972, 
1976) find in an extended model, with more than one consumption good, that for an optimal 
tax system an income tax is sufficient.  
4.2.1. Theory of optimal intergenerational transfer taxation and wel-
fare state regimes 
In the discussion about intergenerational transfer taxation the following trade-off is extensive-
ly debated: On the one hand each individual should have equal opportunities and therefore 
transfers should be highly taxed and redistributed. On the other hand the individuals accumu-
lating the wealth should decide what will happen with it even after death due to the protection 
of liberty and property (Brunner 2014, Beckert 2013). Furthermore, (high) taxes might dampen 
incentives to accumulate wealth, cause tax evasion and avoidance behaviors (Henrekson & 
Waldenström 2015). Central aspects for the analyses of the intergenerational transfer taxa-
tion85 are the motives why people give transfers. They have effects on welfare and behavior of 
households and can help to further disentangle the outlined trade-off. The following motives 
can be found: altruism and warm glow, accidental giving and exchange (Brunner 2014, 
Kopczuk 2013). It can be assumed that wealth transfers within a society are given on the basis 
of a mixture of these motives (Cremer & Pestieau 2011). 
In the first two cases (altruism and warm glow) givers (usually the parents) gain utility from 
transferring gifts and inheritances to the receivers (usually their children). In the case of altru-
ism parents decide not only for themselves but also for all their offsprings (the whole dynasty) 
how much each of them will work and consume. The consumption from their offsprings – 
which is partly financed via transfers – is therefore an additional consumption good of the 
parents. In the case of the warm glow motive parents only decide for themselves how much 
they will work and consume and therefore just want to give a certain (net) wealth transfer to 
the next generation (which can be seen as an additional consumption good). If only different 
levels of productivity are taken into account in both cases the findings from Atkinson & Stiglitz 
(1972, 1976) are confirmed: an optimal income taxation is sufficient, inheritance taxes do not 
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 Inheritances and gifts are assumed to be taxed in the same way here. For an overview of the litera-
ture on gifting see Kopczuk (2013). Note that other forms of capital taxation like taxes on (net) 
wealth or capital income can be substitutes for an intergenerational transfer tax. The exact connec-
tions between the different forms of these taxes still need to be outlined (Brunner 2014). 
Estate and inheritance taxation 
92 
increase welfare and should therefore not be levied. On the contrary, subsidization can under 
some circumstances be useful.86 In the case of accidental giving a person dies earlier than ex-
pected. In this case the optimal taxation theory suggests a tax rate of 100 percent (including a 
reduction in income taxes) because the behavior of the households is not influenced and 
therefore no efficiency loss occurs. In the case of the exchange motive parents exchange (fu-
ture) transfers against some sort of performance from their children (which can range from 
dropping by each Sunday for coffee to providing nursing care). The optimal tax can either be 
relatively low or high, depending on the responsiveness of donor and donee (Boadway, Cham-
berlain & Emmerson 2010). Taken together so far the optimal transfer taxation theory finds, 
depending on the bequest motives, tax rates from 0 or even negative rates to 100 percent.  
The conclusions change, if the extended models account not only for different wage rates but 
also for received inheritances, hence for different (initial) endowments in the generation of the 
parents. In this case an inheritance taxation (including a reduction in income taxes) seems in 
general rational (Brunner & Pech 2012a, b, 2013).87 Piketty & Saez (2013) account for different 
wage rates and different preferences for inheritances. They also find that the “optimal tax rate 
is positive and quantitatively large if the elasticity of bequests to the tax rate is low, bequest 
concentration is high, and society cares mostly about those receiving little inheritance” (Piketty 
& Saez 2013, p. 1). Therefore, intergenerational transfers can be an efficient component of a 
tax system. The height of the tax rates (and the progressivity) depends on the preferences for 
redistribution within a society (Brunner 2014). 
“The three worlds of welfare capitalism” by Esping-Andersen (1990) does not explicitly address 
estate, inheritance and gift taxation. However, his theory captures preferences for redistribu-
tion and tax systems in general and can therefore serve as a framework for classification. 
Esping-Andersen (1990) defines three types of welfare state regimes: liberal, conservative and 
social democratic. In the first one the producer of welfare is the market, in the second the fam-
ily and in the third the state. Decommodifiaction, which means the protection against market 
forces and income losses, is minimal in the liberal, moderate (in line with the previous status) 
in the conservative and high in the social democratic regime. Stratification is the division of a 
society in different layers. In the liberal regime existing inequality will be increased. In the con-
                                                          
86
  Donor and donee both gain utility from giving/receiving a wealth transfer. Therefore, the utility from 
the transfer is counted twice in the social welfare function – once in the utility function of the donors 
and once in that of the donees. This causes a positive external effect, which is not noticed by the de-
cision of the donors and therefore needs to be subsidized. In the literature this is known as “double-
counting” and discussed controversially (Brunner 2014). 
87
  This holds under the empirically confirmed assumption that the lowest income groups only get very 
low inheritances. The models take the altruism or warm glow motive into account and also differen-
tiate between exogenous and endogenous (initial) endowments in the generation of the parents. 
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servative regime existing differences in status will be consolidated. The social democratic re-
gime strives for equalization. The redistribution capacity via the tax system (degree of progres-
sivity) and the equality of (high) benefits is strong in the social democratic regime and weak in 
the two others. In the liberal regime only (means-tested) basic benefits are paid which are 
mainly financed via taxes. If further protection is wanted, it can be secured on a private basis 
via the market. In the conservative regime high benefits are paid to those who paid high taxes 
or levies and contributions and the other way round – therefore average benefits are on a 
medium level. Furthermore conservative regimes usually require that the family has to secure 
basic benefits before the state does (principle of subsidiarity).  
4.2.2. Hypotheses on intergenerational transfer taxation preferences  
Before this backdrop it can be assumed that the debate between equal opportunity vs. protec-
tion of liberty and property is solved differently in each welfare state regime. The social demo-
cratic regime is more in favor of the first argument as it strives for equalization and is therefore 
for redistribution in the case here of (transferred) wealth. The conservative regime goes more 
for the second argument and wants to keep ownership as it is – especially regarding transfers 
within the family. For the liberal regime the theory from Esping-Andersen (1990) suggests that 
the protection of liberty and property will get the upper hand. However, the liberal regime also 
propagates the concept of equal opportunity at birth for each individual (Beckert 2004, 2013) 
and therefore it is not clear which view will get the upper hand. Before this backdrop I argue: 
(1) In a liberal welfare state regime intergenerational transfer taxation is  
(1.1) low and not progressive or  
(1.2) high as well as progressive.  
(2) In a conservative welfare state regime intergenerational transfer taxation is low and 
especially lower within the family than outside and progressivity is low as well.  
(3) In a social democratic welfare state regime intergenerational transfer taxation is high 
as well as progressive. 
4.2.3. Case Selection – countries and points in time 
I choose three countries, which are all typical representative of one of the three welfare states 
regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990).88 These countries are: the United Kingdom (liberal regime), 
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  Arts & Gelissen (2002, p.1) find “that real welfare states are hardly ever pure types”. However, they 
also confirm that the classification from Esping-Andersen (1990) can be a good starting point.  
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Germany89 (conservative regime) and Sweden (social democratic regime). In terms of inhabit-
ants they are all the biggest representative for their regime in Europe – today and over time.90 
The gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is comparable between all chosen countries – 
today and over time.91 In all three countries intergenerational transfer taxes are the same for 
all regions within the countries. However, in the United Kingdom (UK) an estate tax is in place 
and in Germany and Sweden an inheritance tax. In the first case the transfer is taxed all to-
gether, based on the transfer value and then distributed among the heirs (tax subject: donor). 
In the two other countries the transfer is distributed among the heirs and then taxed separate-
ly (tax subject: donees) – usually with different rates depending on the value of the transfer 
and the relationship to the donor.  
Wealth levels and inequality declined during and between the World Wars and the first dec-
ades afterwards in the UK, Germany and Sweden. However, since the 1980s both started to 
rise again in all countries (see figures A.4.1 and A.4.2 in the appendix).92 Intergenerational 
wealth transfers also gained again importance since the 1980s (see estimations for inheritanc-
es and gifts in figure 4.1) – part of the accumulated wealth is passed on to the next generation 
via inheritances or gifts. However, revenues from gift and inheritance taxation developed dif-
ferently (see figure 4.2), which is an indication that legislations changed. Estate, inheritance 
and gift revenue is generated by tax rate multiplied by the tax base. This implies that high rev-
enues can be due to high effective tax rates and/or high tax bases. In Sweden revenues more 
or less stayed the same (around 0.1 percent of GDP) until the mid-2000s, when they dropped 
to zero. In the UK revenues dropped dramatically at the end of the 1960s/the beginning of the 
1970s (from a maximum of 0.9 to about 0.2 percent of GDP). Since then they are more or less 
around 0.2 percent of GDP. In Germany revenue rose in the middle of the 1970s to around 0.1 
percent and then to a little bit under 0.2 percent of GDP since the end of the 1990s.93 
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  I cover the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) before the reunification in 1990. After the reunifica-
tion the inheritance and gift taxation of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was abolished. For 
an overview of the taxation in the GDR see Duda (2010). 
90
  Based on data of the UN (total population, both sexes): https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/ 
Standard/Population/ (26.08.2016). 
91
  Based on data of the OECD (GDP per capita, USD, constant prices, 2010 PPPs): 
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=PDB_LV# (26.08.2016). 
92
  In Germany the rise of the levels already started earlier which is probably connected to higher dam-
ages due to the wars. There is no comparable long term data available on wealth inequality for Ger-
many.  
93
  A presentation of the gift and inheritance taxes as a percent of total taxation leads to the same 
trends (see figure A.4.4 in the appendix). Data before 1965 is not available for estate, inheritance 
and gift tax revenue. 
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As I am interested in the big changes of the estate, inheritance and gift taxation over time I do 
not look at every single legislative change. I describe the general changes for each country and 
look more closely on four points in time. The first one covers the legislation after the end of 
World War II. As it took some time to get back to a “normal” government flow, especially in 
Germany, my first point in time is around94 the year 1955. The second one is around the year 
1975. As described before, estate, inheritance and gift revenues have changed in two of the 
three countries around that year. The third point in time is 1995. In all three countries the in-
heritance flow rose since the 1980s. However, the tax revenue stayed more or less the same – 
a hint that taxation has changed. The last point in time is around 2015 which stands for the 
present. 
Figure 4.1: Inheritance and gift flow as percent of national income* in the UK, Germany 
and Sweden, 1910-2010** 
 
*  national income = GDP – capital depreciation + net foreign factor income  
** Estimations based on mortality multiplier approach.  
Source: Based on Ohlsson, Roine & Waldenström (2014) and data appendix of Piketty & Zucman (2015): 
http://gabriel-zucman.eu/ (29.03.2016) 
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  “Around” means that I check for significant legislative changes directly before or after the respective 
time points.  
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Figure 4.2: Estate, inheritance and gift tax revenue as percent of GDP in the UK, Germa-
ny and Sweden, 1965-2014* 
 
* Not available before 1965. 
Source: Based on OECD.Stat (2016) 
4.3. Legislation of estate, inheritance and gift taxation over 
time95 
4.3.1. Legislation in the United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom introduced in 1894 an estate tax between 1 and 7 percent based on the 
value of the total estate. It replaced a number of different inheritance taxes, which dated back 
until 1694. Family relationships usually do not play a role for an estate tax – the estate is taxed 
all together and then distributed among the heirs. From the beginning the revenue belonged 
completely to the state. First it was possible to avoid the tax by handing on gifts during the 
                                                          
95
  I describe the facts relevant for gifting and inheritance in direct line (spouses, children, grandparents 
and grandchildren) with a focus on the rules for children. The information regarding the indirect line 
(other relatives and third parties) can be found in tables A.4.3-5 in the appendix. I take into account 
the rules for transferred money, (family) business as well as shares in a corporation and real estate. 
For simplicity reasons I do not take into account the rules for agricultural and forestry assets, trans-
fers to (family) trusts, institutions and foundations or to charitable organizations as well as specific-
purpose transfers and insurance claims. I have the assumption that donor and heir are natural per-
sons who are nationals of the respective country, with residence in the respective country and un-
limited tax liability. The inherited or gifted wealth is located within the respective country. If not ex-
plicitly noted otherwise the rules apply for inheritances and also for gifts. 
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lifetime of the donor. This led to summation rules starting with one year. This means all gifts 
made within one year before death are added to the estate lot and taxed accordingly. Until 
World War I the top tax rate was several times modestly increased. After the war it doubled 
from 20 to 40 percent. During World War II it increased further up to 80 percent in the 50s 
(Butler 2016, Atkinson 2013, Scheve & Stasavage 2012, Boadway et al. 2010). 
Legislation in 1955, 1975, 1995, 2015 
In 1955 an estate duty was still in force, in 1975 it was replaced by a capital transfer tax and in 
the 80s an inheritance tax was implemented (for details on all aspects see table A.4.3 in the 
appendix). However, the basic principle that the lot is taxed all together and then distributed 
among the heirs has never changed. Therefore tax classes based on family relationship do not 
exist in the UK.  
In 1955 estates were taxed with a maximum rate of 80 percent (applicable for amounts above 
£ 1,000,000/£ 17,543,860 in prices of 201096). The estate is taxed completely with the maxi-
mum tax rate applicable to the total amount (e.g. £ 33,000 would be taxed at 21 percent).97 
Gifts within five years before death of a person are counted to the estate and taxed. Gifts da-
ting back longer than five years were not taxed. In 1975 tax rates ranged between 10 and 75 
percent (maximum tax rate applicable to amounts above £ 2,000,000/£ 11,173,184 in prices of 
2010) for estates and gifts within three years before death.98 Gifts over three years before 
death were taxed between 5 and 75 percent (again maximum tax rate applicable to amounts 
above £ 2,000,000). Now tax rates were cumulative (e.g. the first £ 15,000 of the £ 33,000 
would be taxed with nil, the next £5 000 with 10 percent and so on). At the third time point 
(1995) estates above £ 154,000 (£ 205,060 in prices of 2010) were taxed with a flat tax of 40 
percent. Gifts are again tax free, if the donor lives for another seven years. If the donor dies 
before, the tax rates vary between 8 and 40 percent – depending on the years between trans-
fer and death. In 2015 the same system still applied with the difference that the estate/gift is 
now taxed if it lies above £ 325,000 (£ 290,698 in prices of 2010). Taken together the maxi-
mum tax rate decreased over the years and transferred into a flat tax. The limit above which it 
is due also decreased (in prices of 2010).  
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  Price adjustment is done via the consumer price index (cpi) due to the lack of an asset price index for 
the whole time period and country selection (see for an example for the period since 2000 Enderlein 
& Ständer 2016). The usage of the cpi can also be justified on the basis that assets can be liquidated 
for consumption.  
97
  Exceptions if acquisition is just above the next value limit (small margins rule). 
98
  Gifts over three years before death are taken into account to determine the rate of tax (Chown 
1975). 
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Figure 4.3: Maximum estate tax rates and nil-rate bands in the UK, 1955-2015 
 
Source: Own presentation based on legislation in the UK.  
Each donor has a tax free amount the so called nil-rate band. For the first time point the fol-
lowing applies: If the acquisition is below the taxable limit, no tax has to be paid. If the acquisi-
tion is above it, the entire lot is taxed (Harding 1958). For the other time points the rules 
changed: Below the threshold no tax has to be paid, everything above is taxed with the respec-
tive tax rate. The nil-rate band was £ 3,000 in 1955, £ 15,000 in 1975, £ 154,000 in 1995 and 
£ 325,000 in 2015, which also corresponds to a real increase (£ 53,000, £ 84,000, £ 205,000 
and £ 291,000 in prices of 2010 – see also figure 4.3). As described above gifts are exempt 
from the tax (except for one time period) if the donor still lives for several years. Therefore 
with some tax planning estate tax can be avoided – at least to some extent. Expenditures out 
of normal income are generally exempt, like Christmas or birthday presents. Also wedding gifts 
are tax free depending on value and relationship. In addition, there are small but annually re-
newed amounts which can be gifted (which increased modestly over time). Since 1975 the 
transfers between spouses (and nowadays also civil partners) are completely exempt. In 2015 
the not used nil-rate band can be transferred to the husband’s, wife’s or civil partner’s estate 
when they die.  
The valuation is based on market values for all assets and liabilities over the whole time period 
with only minor exceptions. In 1955 the valuation of shares in some companies took place by 
reference to the value of the assets of the company. Also in that time period reduced rates of 
duty (appropriate tax rate reduced by 45 percent) applied for industrial hereditaments, plant 
and machinery used in business.99 In 1975 no such exemptions were in force. In 1995 and 2015 
(shares in) businesses are 50 or 100 percent exempt from tax – depending on the business 
purpose100 and some other achievable requirements like the one that the donor must have 
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  As it depends on the individual asset composition of each company I make the assumption that in 
general half of the business estate is applicable to the reduction.  
100
  Exemptions are not applicable if the company mainly deals with securities, stocks or shares, land or 
buildings, or in making or holding investments.  
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been owner for a minimum of two years before the transfer. If the transfer was a gift the do-
nee must keep the business until the donor dies to keep the relief. However, then (which 
means also in the case of an inheritance) the business can be sold – with the requirement that 
the business will be carried on. 
4.3.2. Legislation in Germany 
Germany introduced an inheritance and gift tax in 1906. It was based on the Prussian law from 
1873. One third of the revenue went to the federal states. The tax rates differed depending on 
the relationship to the deceased and were slightly progressive. Wealth transfers between 
spouses and to children where exempt, this corresponded to estimated 80 percent of the 
wealth transfers. In 1919 tax rates were raised and transfers from spouses and children taxed. 
The already existing wealth from heirs was considered for taxation, which means that wealthi-
er heirs were taxed with higher rates. In addition an estate tax was introduced. Most of these 
changes were already withdrawn in 1922. The estate tax was abolished, most spouses were 
again exempt from the tax (exception: marriages younger than five years and spouses with age 
differences over 20 years) and progression was reduced. 1923 the consideration of the already 
existing wealth from heirs was also abolished. Transfers in childless marriages where taxed 
from 1925 on. Between 1946 and 1948 the allied control council law regulated the inheritance 
and gift taxation. During that period only one tax class (including spouses and children) with 
rates from 14 to 60 percent existed (all Beckert 2004). 
Legislation in 1955, 1975, 1995/96, 2015/16101 
Since the two World Wars the tax revenue from inheritance and gift tax is completely entitled 
to the federal states (Houben & Maiterth 2011). It can be distinguished between five different 
tax classes in 1955. There are still four different ones in 1975 and in 1995/96 and 2015/16 
three tax classes exist. The first class always contains the spouses and children of the donor. 
However, nowadays this also includes civil partners as well as children born outside of mar-
riages. This was not the case in the 50s (for details on all aspects see table A.4.4 in the appen-
dix). The lower the tax class the higher the degree of relationship between donor and donee. 
Abolished tax classes were included into lower ones.  
Tax rates are identical for inheritances and gifts and increase with the received amount and 
also with tax classes. This means that closer relatives are taxed at lower rates. The transfer is 
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  Due to decisions of the federal constitutional court in 1995/2014 the legislation (especially for valua-
tion rules / for business and shares) was changed in 1996/2016. Therefore I report the legislation in 
1996/2016. 
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taxed completely with the maximum tax rate applicable to the total transferred amount.102 In 
1955 tax rates were at maximum 15 percent in tax class one (for acquisitions over 
5,112,919 Euro/22,724,084 Euro in prices of 2010). In 1975 the maximum tax rate was 35 per-
cent in tax class one (for acquisitions over 51,129,188 Euro/119,460,720 Euro in prices of 
2010). In the third phase it had declined to 30 percent (for acquisitions higher than 
25,564,594 Euro/31,757,260 Euro in prices of 2010). This did not change much until today: 30 
percent in tax class one (for acquisitions over 26,000,000 Euro/24,321,796 Euro in prices of 
2010). The maximum and even the minimum tax rates for the other classes were higher at all 
time points. Taken together the maximum tax rate doubled over the years. The limit above 
which it is due first increased and then decreased again (in prices of 2010).  
Figure 4.4: Maximum inheritance tax rate and allowances for children in Germany, 1955-
2015 
 
Source: Own presentation based on legislation in Germany. 
Allowances (usable for inheritances and/or gifts) are granted every ten years and are higher for 
close family members. They also steadily increased over time – for children from 15,339 Euro 
over 46,016 Euro and 204,517 Euro to 400,000 Euro (plus care allowances depending on the 
age of the heir in case of inheritance for the last three time points), which also corresponds to 
a real increase (from 68,173 Euro over 107,514 Euro and 254,058 Euro to 374,181 Euro in pric-
es of 2010 – see also figure 4.4). At all time points spouses where applicable to allowances 
which were higher than that for children, but they were never completely exempted from the 
tax. The valuation changed several times. In the 50s and 70s unit values were used for real 
estate and business property. In the 90s for these types of assets earning values were used. 
Both valuations yield a lower rating than market value – depending on the time point only 20-
70 percent of the market value were due to taxation (applicable proportion increased over 
time – see table A4 in the appendix). For all other asset types (except for business assets) mar-
ket values were used. In several judgments the federal constitutional court complained about 
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  Exceptions if acquisition is just above the next value limit (Härteausgleich). 
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this unequal treatment (Bundesverfassungsgericht 1976 I BvR 360/74, 1995 2 BvR 552/91 
BStBl 1995 II p. 671, 2006 1 BvL 10/02), which led to the outlined changes. Nowadays assets 
are supposed to be valuated at market prices. 
Business assets get a preferable treatment due to a public interest (e.g. preservation of jobs), 
which is to a certain extend allowed by the federal constitutional court (Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht 2014 1 BvL 21/12). Business assets were/are valuated below market value. Guide 
values for this undervaluation are only available for 1995/96 and 2015/16 (Sureth, Müller, 
Houben & Maiterth 2008, Scholz & Truger 2016). Since the 90s, business assets get further 
preferential treatment. First an allowance of 255,646 Euro was granted and 40 percent of the 
value of the business was exempt if it was continued for at least five years. Today business 
assets can be completely exempt under certain circumstances, like holding the company for at 
least another seven years and aggregate wages must not fall below 700 percent of the average 
wages paid per year before transferring the company with more than 16 employees.103 This 
applies for business valued below 26 million Euros; no exemptions are granted if transfer is 90 
million Euros or more; in between the exemptions decrease steadily. Some minor exemptions 
for household goods are granted already since the 50s. In 2015/16 also owner-occupied prop-
erty can be exempt if the spouse/civil partner or the children are living in it for at least 10 years 
(and in the case of children if the property size is smaller than 200m²). The value of rented 
property is only subjected to tax with 90 percent of market value. 
4.3.3. Legislation in Sweden 
Different kinds of fees and duties on estates, inheritances and wills existed in Sweden since 
1698. A stamp ordinance, which means that a single (estate) tax – the stamp – is due on the 
total estate value, was introduced in 1884. Since then the tax revenue goes completely to the 
state. For direct heirs the tax rate amounted to 0.5 percent (Du Rietz et al. 2015). In 1895 a 
progressive tax schedule was laid down, which is “considered to be the first modern inher-
itance tax” (Du Rietz et al. 2015, p. 8). It contained three tax classes and the maximum tax rate 
for children, spouses and descendants was 1.5 percent. In 1910 the progressivity of the tax 
schedule was increased. Maximum tax rate amounted to 4 percent for direct heirs. From 1914 
on the taxation also included gifts. In 1918 and then again in 1933 the tax rates were drastical-
ly increased. The maximum tax rate for direct heirs was first 8 percent and then 20 percent (Du 
Rietz et al. 2015).  
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  I use the lower regular exemption of 85 percent of the transferred value. Here the holding period is 
only five years and the aggregate wages must not fall below 400 percent of the average wages paid 
per year before transferring the company with more than 16 employees. The number of employees 
is only relevant for the rule regarding the wages. 
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Legislation in 1955, 1975/78,104 1995, 2015 
In 1955 four different tax classes were available – for the second and third time point (1975/78 
and 1995) three. The first class always contains spouse, children and descendants, the second 
one parents and siblings and the third one non-profit organizations. The fourth class in the 50s 
contained the other heirs and was later included into the second class (for details on all as-
pects see table A5 in the appendix).  
Like in Germany the closer relatives are taxed at lower rates and the tax rates increase with 
the received amount. In 1955 acquisitions higher than SEK 400,000 (SEK 5,194,805 in prices of 
2010) were taxed with 20 percent (maximum tax rate). In addition an estate tax was levied on 
inheritances and gifts (Ohlsson 2011). In practice the whole estate was first taxed via the es-
tate tax between 5 and 50 percent (starting at SEK 50,000 up to over SEK 5,000,000). The tax 
payment was conducted from the estate, which was then distributed among the heirs and 
then taxed via the inheritance tax. At the second time point (1975/78) the maximum tax rate 
in class one was 65 percent (for acquisitions higher than SEK 5,000,000/SEK 24,875,621 in pric-
es of 2010). At the third time point (1995) only three different tax rates were applicable: 10, 20 
and 30 percent. In tax class one the maximum tax rate was due by acquisitions over 
SEK 600,000 (SEK 711,743 in prices of 2010). Taken together the maximum inheritance tax rate 
first increased and then decreased over the years. The limit above which it is due followed the 
same trend (in prices of 2010).  
Figure 4.5: Maximum inheritance tax rate and allowances for children in Sweden, 1955-
2015* 
 
*In 1955 also an estate tax was in place (maximum tax rate: 50 percent).  
Source: Own presentation based on legislation in Sweden. 
In 1955 no allowances but taxable limits were granted. This means that no tax has to be paid, if 
the acquisition is below the taxable limit, but the entire lot is taxed, if the acquisition is above 
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  The valuation for some assets was elementarily changed in 1974 and then again in 1978. Both imply 
a reduction of the tax base. The reform from 1978 goes further. Therefore I report the legislation in 
1978.  
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the taxable limit (Henrekson & Waldenström 2015). For children they amounted to SEK 3,000 
(SEK 38,961 in prices of 2010). For the estate tax an allowance of SEK 50,000 was granted and 
for a surviving spouse half of the estate was exempt. In 1975/78 children were granted an al-
lowance of SEK 15,000 (SEK 74,627 in prices of 2010). At the third point (1995) they got an 
allowance of SEK 70,000 (SEK 83,037 in prices of 2010), which also corresponds to a real in-
crease – see also figure 4.5. Summation rules for inheritances and gifts from the same person 
amount up to four years for the whole period under analysis.  
Assets and liabilities are valuated at market value at the time of the death of the deceased (Du 
Rietz et al. 2015). However, exceptions for several asset types are granted. For the whole anal-
ysis period real estate was valued at the tax-assessed value in the year before the death of the 
deceased (this corresponds to about 75 percent of the market value). Businesses were valued 
at the sales value estimated by trustees. Since time point two (1975/78) businesses taxable net 
worth was at most 30 percent of book value. Listed shares were subjected to tax with only 75 
percent of market value. Unlisted shares with only 30 percent of quoted or book value.  
The inheritance and gift tax was abolished in Sweden at the end of the year 2004 – the last 
time point (2015) covers this decision. 
4.3.4. Interim summary 
This overview of the most important legislations of estate, inheritance and gift taxation over 
time in the UK, Germany and Sweden already shows that countries tax intergenerational trans-
fers differently and that a link can be drawn to the welfare state theory by Esping-Andersen 
(1990). In the UK (liberal regime) the nil-rate band is for every estate the same, the transfer is 
taxed all together, based on the transfer value (not on any kind of (family) relationship) and 
then distributed among the heirs. Progressivity decreases over time, but the flat-tax of 40 per-
cent is still on a medium level. The inheritance and gift taxation in Germany (conservative re-
gime) shows a “family-oriented conception of property” (Beckert 2004, p. 275). The transfer is 
distributed among the heirs and then taxed separately – (close) family members get higher 
allowances and face lower tax rates as other (family) heirs.105 Before abolishing the taxation, 
the system in Sweden (social democratic regime) was comparable to that in Germany, but with 
higher maximum tax rates – at least until the 1990s.  
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  In Germany and Sweden close family members can claim an obligatory share of the estate (Beckert 
2010, Bogdan 2001). In the UK this is also the case in Scotland but not in England and Wales 
(Schmeilzl 2016). This also supports the hypothesis for the conservative regime. 
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4.4. Effective intergenerational transfer tax rates since the 
1950s 
4.4.1. Estimation strategy 
To calculate the effective intergenerational transfer tax rates I focus on two child heirs106 who 
will inherit equal shares from one of their parent with the other parent already dead. I analyze 
the default situation, how the estate is transferred in each country, if the deceased has not left 
a will. In all three investigated countries the intestate succession requires, that all children 
inherit equal shares of the whole estate if their parents are already both dead and no will ex-
ists.107 No gifts have been received before.108 The effective tax rate is calculated as follows: 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡,𝑠,𝑝 =
(
𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡,𝑠,𝑝
2 − 𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑡,𝑠,𝑝 − 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡,𝑠,𝑝) ∗ 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡,𝑠,𝑝 ∗ 2
𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡,𝑠,𝑝
 
Comment: In the case of the UK the estate in the numerator is not divided by two and the whole numerator is also 
not multiplied by two. 
Allowances are subtracted from the estate and exemptions are accounted for to calculate the 
tax base at time point 𝑡, for the size of estate 𝑠 and the portfolio of estate 𝑝. Then the tax base 
is multiplied with the respective tax rate and the value is put in relation to the untaxed es-
tate.109 In the case of Germany and Sweden the estate is divided by two (children) before cal-
culating the tax base and then the payable tax amount is multiplied by two before putting it 
into relation to the untaxed estate. In the UK the number of heirs does not play a role for cal-
culating the effective tax rate. Therefore neither the estate in the numerator is divided by two 
nor is the whole numerator multiplied by two.  
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  The birth rate per woman was on average 2.06 children between the years 1960 and 2014 (there is 
no data before and after these years available) in all three countries together (Worldbank, fertility 
rate: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN, 12.07.2016). Therefore I split each estate 
in two equal halves. For Germany and Sweden this has the consequence that the effective tax rates 
are lower as if the estate would not have been shared due to lower tax rates for lower values and al-
lowances which can be used twice etc. In addition, the heirs do not encounter the whole progressivi-
ty of the inheritance tax, as (close) family members face lower tax rates as other heirs. 
107
  If the other parent is still alive it depends if they were married. If yes in Sweden the spouse (later 
also the civil partner) will inherit the whole estate if only joint children are left. In Germany and the 
UK the spouse (later also the civil partner) will only inherit part of the estate and part will already be 
distributed among the children (for further details see table A.4.3-5 in the appendix). These rules ap-
ply, if not stated otherwise in a will by the deceased. 
108
  Especially for large estates the effective tax rates payable in reality are probably smaller as in all 
countries at most of the time points taxes can be (in part) avoided with some tax planning via gifting.  
109
  I do not account for the indirect capital gains tax which would be due in the UK and Sweden at sev-
eral time points if heirs (have to) sell off part of their inheritance (e.g. real estate, business, shares) 
to pay the estate or inheritance tax. 
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Comparable to Henrekson & Waldenström (2015)110 I investigate typical households with dif-
ferent sizes and portfolios of estates to represent the whole wealth distribution: 
 Small estate: Equivalent to nominal111 average wealth per capita112 in the respective coun-
try and at the respective time point.  
 Medium estate: Equivalent to 10 times nominal average wealth per capita in the respec-
tive country and at the respective time point.  
 Large estate: Equivalent to 100 times nominal average wealth per capita in the respective 
country and at the respective time point.  
 Top estate: Equivalent to 1000 times nominal average wealth per capita in the respective 
country and at the respective time point.  
The small estate consists of money. The medium, large and top estate consist in in three dif-
ferent scenarios either of money or a (family) business or shares in a listed corporation with 
more than 50 percent of the voting rights.113 
To get an impression of the sizes of the transferred estates, table 4.1 shows the values for 
2015 and table A.4.1 in the appendix for the other time points. For example in Germany in the 
year 2015 the small estate is worth 131,630 Euro which implies an inheritance for each child 
worth almost 66,000 Euros. According to simulations from Bach & Thiemann (2016) the medi-
an inheritance is below 50,000 Euro between 2011 and 2020 in Germany. In the UK regarding 
to the inheritance tax statistics the average estate was around £ 300,000 in 2013/14 (HM Rev-
enue & Customs 2016) – which is twice the amount of the small estate defined in this paper 
for 2015. However, the inheritance tax statistics does not include the estates from all deaths – 
especially not the low ones. Therefore the average and median estate for all donors was lower. 
                                                          
110
  Henrekson & Waldenström (2015) use multiples of average worker’s annual salary as an approxima-
tion of estates of different sizes. I use nominal average wealth per capita in the respective country 
and at the respective time point instead as estates consist of the wealth of a dead person and there-
fore only indirectly of his/her salary (one source of wealth is savings out of income). In an alternative 
scenario of my estimations I use GDP per capita (as a proxy for income) as a base (2 times GDP per 
capita for the small estate, 10 times the small estate for the top estate, 100 times the small estate 
for the large estate, 1000 times the small estate for the medium estate, see table A.4.2 in the ap-
pendix). The effective average tax rates differ in some cases in level, but the overall picture that will 
be described hereafter does not change (exact results are available upon request).  
111
  I argue that politics directs decision on tax rates, allowances etc. based on nominal values, therefore 
I do not adjust for inflation. 
112
  Data is based on the systems of national accounts (SNA). The survey concept of the SNA also takes 
wealth of the non-profit institutions serving households, like churches, trade unions or political par-
ties, into account (SNA 2008). Therefore average wealth per capita might be a little bit overestimat-
ed as a proxy for average estates. However, it is not possible to prove that for all time points and 
countries due to a lack of data.  
113
  Medium wealth typically predominantly consists of real estate. Therefore I investigate this case in an 
additional scenario in the appendix part C. Shares in a listed corporation with less than 25 percent of 
the registered share capital are taxed in the same way as money in the UK and Germany, but not in 
Sweden. This case is also covered in an additional scenario for the medium estate in the appendix 
part C. 
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For Sweden inheritance tax statistics are only accessible for the years 2001 to 2005. Before 
that period the information is not available centrally and after that period no inheritance tax 
was levied anymore (Elinder, Erixson, Escabor & Ohlsson 2014). Taken together it can be as-
sumed that the majority of the population will leave a small or at maximum a medium sized 
estate.  
For Germany Bach & Thiemann (2016) also find that one third of the total transmission volume 
is shared by only 1.5 percent of all heirs. As it is well known that wealth is highly concentrated 
in all investigated countries this perfectly fits into the picture (for Germany: Deutsche Bundes-
bank 2016, for the UK: Crawford, Innes & O'Dea 2016, for Sweden: Lundberg & Waldenström 
2016). Therefore it can be also suggested that the large and top estate are only relevant for a 
very small part of the population but that they stand for a significant part of the transferred 
estate volume. In addition, it can be said that these estates consist more often than the other 
two estate types of (family) businesses or large shares in a corporation (Bach & Thiemann 
2016, HM Revenue & Customs 2016). 
Table 4.1: Nominal private wealth per capita in the UK, Germany and Sweden in 2015* 
2015 Small estate Medium estate Large estate Top estate 
United Kingdom 
£ 151,780 £ 1,517,800 £ 15,178,000 £ 151,780,000 
(€ 176,500) (€ 1,765,000) (€ 17,650,000) (€ 176,500,000) 
Germany € 131,630 € 1,316,300o € 13,163,000 € 131,630,000 
Sweden 
SEK 1,569,460 SEK 15,694,600 SEK 156,946,000 SEK 1,569,460,000 
(€ 164,000) (€ 1,640,000) (€ 16,400,000) (€ 164,000,000) 
* Data is actually from 2014. 
Source: Based on data appendix of Waldenström (2016): http://www.uueconomics.se/danielw/SNWD.htm, ONS 
national balance sheet: https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/uksectoraccounts/bulletins/national 
balancesheet/2016estimates, ONS population: http://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/popula 
tionandmigration/populationestimates/bulletins/annualmidyearpopulationestimates/2015-06-25, Deutsche Bun-
desbank & Destatis (2015), Destatis population: https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesellschaftStaat/ 
Bevoelkerung/Bevoelkerungsstand/Tabellen_/lrbev03.html (all 28.08.2016). 
The estates consist of net values – which means possible liabilities are already deducted. In 
general the valuation of transferred assets and liabilities is based on market values in all coun-
tries at all time points. However, there exist deviating valuation rules for business and real 
estate assets especially in Germany and Sweden (for details see last section and tables A.4.3-5 
in the appendix). In both countries real estate assets are valued below market price (at some 
time points). There is literature available, estimating the average share of this undervaluation 
(Du Rietz & Henrekson 2015, Bach & Bartholmai 2002, AGN Europe 2008). In the case of busi-
ness assets rules are closely tied to special circumstances like the income of a company or the 
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composition of assets types within a company. Average values for this undervaluation are not 
available for all time points in Germany and can therefore not be taken into account here.114 
4.4.2. Effective intergenerational transfers tax rates in the United 
Kingdom 
In the UK the maximum effective tax rates for all three estate portfolios (money, (family) busi-
ness and shares in a corporation) were over 60 percent after World War II. However, the effec-
tive tax rate for a small estate is 0 for all time points. Medium estates consisting of money are 
effectively higher taxed over time – starting at 6 percent in 1955 and increasing to a little bit 
over 31 percent in 2015. Large money estates started at almost 50 percent in the 1950s, expe-
rienced a slight increase from the first to the second time point, then decreased and then 
stayed the same at a little bit below 40 percent. For the top money estate the rate started at 
almost 77 percent and already decreased from the first to the second time point and then 
further to the third and then also stayed the same at almost 40 percent. Due to the flat tax the 
effective tax rates for large and top estates are (almost) the same for the last two time points. 
The slight difference arises due to the nil-rate band which is the same for all estates. Progres-
sivity therefore decreased at the upper end of the distribution as large and especially top 
money estates experienced tax relieves over time. Whereas medium money estates where 
taxed with higher rate (see figure 4.6).  
The (family) business estate shows exactly the same development for all three estates sizes, 
just on different levels: first an increase and then a decrease to 0 for the last two time points. 
The tax rates in the 1970s are the same as for the money estate – at all other time points tax 
relieves were available. The effective tax rates for the shares in a corporation estate are the 
same as for the money estate for the first two time points. For the last two time points the 
effective tax rates for the large and top estate are on half of the level (almost 20 percent) due 
to exemptions for shares in a corporation. The tax burden for the medium estate first increases 
and then more or less stays the same until today – almost 16 percent in 2015. Therefore pro-
gressivity decreased dramatically for (family) business and shares in corporation estates. De-
ductions for (family) business are always higher than for shares in a corporation (for the same 
estate size). 
                                                          
114
  The literature so far also only accounts for this issue when looking at one time point (Scheffler & 
Spengel 2004) and therefore leaves room for future research.  
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Figure 4.6: Effective estate tax rates in the UK in 1955, 1975, 1995 and 2015 
 
* Shares in a listed corporation with >50 percent of the voting rights. 
Source: Own calculation based on legislation in the UK. 
Taken together it can be said that for the first and second time point the effective tax rates 
were quite high for all estate portfolios (over 60 percent for top estates) as well as progressivi-
ty. Therefore, the concept of equal opportunity clearly had the upper hand. For the last two 
time points the story changes – the concept of protection of liberty and property gained influ-
ence: Progressivity decreases (due to the nil rate band it cannot vanish), but the introduced 
flat tax is still on a medium level. Due to the flat tax, deductions are given for all large and top 
estates. In addition, exemptions for (family) businesses and shares in a corporation estate are 
available. The medium money estates experienced an increase in taxation. However, small 
estates and therefore probably a large portion of estates are not taxed over the whole time 
frame. 
Scheve & Stasavage (2012) look for reasons why inherited wealth is significantly taxed and also 
capture the UK (as well as Germany and Sweden). They test via a difference-in-differences 
estimation two main arguments: Significant tax rates are due to (1) the extension of suffrage 
and (2) mass mobilization for war. They do not find strong support for their first hypothesis in 
their data set covering 19 countries from 1816-2000 (only maximum inheritance tax rates are 
captured). However, the second is strongly supported. Reasons might be that poorer individu-
als are more likely to fight in the war and therefore demand a comparable sacrifice from 
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wealthier individuals. It could also be that wealthier individuals profit via their companies from 
the war consumption and again poorer individuals demand compensation. Furthermore, they 
argue that high taxation will continue for some time after the war due to increased debt. This 
seems to perfectly fit to the developments in the UK. However, it could also be argued that the 
introduction of the flat tax in 1988 was due to the general decrease of taxation under M. 
Thatcher as prime minister (for an overview of her reforms see Rhodes 2000). 
4.4.3. Effective intergenerational transfers tax rates in Germany 
In Germany the effective tax rate for a small estate is like in the UK 0 over the whole time. 
However, all other effective tax rates are in the majority of the cases lower than the ones in 
the UK. The tax burden for transfers from parents to children never exceeded 30 percent since 
the 1950s. The effective tax rates of all sizes of the money estate increased steadily until the 
1990s – since then no further increase for the top estate and only small increases for the other 
two. Progressivity also slightly increased over time and more for the upper part of the distribu-
tion (see figure 4.7). 
The effective tax rates for (family) businesses and the shares in a corporation estate are the 
same for all time points and never much more than 20 percent.115 The tax burdens first in-
creases and then decreases again for all estate sizes (the large estates stagnate). The develop-
ments from the 1990s to today are different for all sizes: the medium one stays at 0, the large 
one decreases and the top one increases.  
                                                          
115
  Effective tax rates for (family) businesses and shares in a corporation can be seen as maximum levels 
here. Special valuation rules existed over the whole time frame which imply that business assets 
were not valued at market price (due to missing information on the extend of undervaluation this 
cannot be accounted for here). Furthermore for the last time point the large (but not the top) estate 
levels for (family) businesses and the shares in a corporation estate could also be tax free. 
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Figure 4.7: Effective inheritance tax rates in Germany in 1955, 1975, 1995/96 and 
2015/16 
 
* Shares in a listed corporation with >50 percent of the voting rights. 
Source: Own calculation based on legislation in Germany. 
Taken together it can be seen that there have been changes on the intergenerational transfer 
taxation system, but compared to the UK and Sweden less pronounced ones. Probably the 
majority of inheritances is not taxed in Germany since World War II – due to the tax free small 
estate. Within an estate type higher estates values always involve higher effective tax rates – 
however, they never exceed 30 percent (for inheritances from parents to children). Further-
more, tax rates are lower within the family than outside. This confirms the established hypoth-
esis on the conservative welfare state. In addition, deductions are given to (family) businesses 
and shares in a corporation – in Germany large and top estates (nowadays) predominantly 
consist of these two kinds of assets (Bach & Thiemann 2016). This preferential treatment is 
justified (even by the federal constitutional court) as these estate portfolios bring along a 
higher level of responsibility for others (e.g. jobs in transferred businesses).  
Beckert (2004) investigates changes in the Germany inheritance law by evaluating in detail 
contemporary parliamentary print since the 19th century until the turn of the millennium. He 
also finds that the changes since the two World Wars were rather moderate but all served 
different priorities. He shows that the system is based on a “family-oriented conception of 
property” (Beckert 2004, p. 275). In the 1950s the law from the 1920s is carried over – imple-
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menting a low taxation. In the parliamentary debate about the changes (e.g. increase of taxa-
tion at the upper end) implemented in the 1970s the social democratic speakers (who were in 
government together with the liberals) mainly named the argument of social justice. The 
changes in the 1990s reversed those from the 1970s. However, the government argued to 
increase tax revenue: High inheritances were taxed less but the sharper valuation rules (espe-
cially for real estate) would compensate that. The speakers from the coalition (conservatives 
and liberals) predominantly named stimulation of economic growth and securing of jobs in the 
debate (especially for the exemptions for businesses). Beckert (2010) investigates the changes 
since the turn of the millennium and finds a continuation of the family orientation also with 
regard to business – which is in addition again justified with economic reasons. The work from 
Beckert (2004) can also be seen as an indication that the mass mobilization hypothesis by 
Scheve & Stasavage (2012) does not capture the (full) story for Germany.  
4.4.4. Effective intergenerational transfers tax rates in Sweden 
In Sweden the inheritance and gift tax was abolished at the end of 2004. Therefore the last 
time point is of course always 0. Before that the small and medium estates for all types faced 
higher effective tax rates in Sweden than in Germany and in many cases also higher ones than 
in the UK. For the large and top estate for the majority of the cases the UK had larger tax rates 
than Sweden – which had larger or comparable tax rates to Germany. 
Different than in the other two regimes small inheritances were taxed before the abolishment. 
The tax burden even increased over time – from almost two percent to over 6 percent. For the 
medium estate consisting of money the effective tax rate first grew and then stagnated 
(around 25 percent). For the large and top estate they also first grew but then already de-
creased (to a little bit less than 30 percent). Therefore, regarding progressivity it can be said 
that higher estate values were taxed with higher effective tax rates. However, the differences 
decreased sharply for the third time point and for the large and top estate even almost van-
ished (see figure 4.8).  
For (family) businesses and shares in a corporation estates tax reliefs were introduced in the 
1970s. The effective tax rates therefore fell (dramatically) for all these estates sizes from the 
first to the second time point (exception: medium shares in a corporation estate). The reduc-
tions for (family) businesses were larger than the ones for the shares in a corporation. The 
further decrease from the second to the third time point – especially for the shares in a corpo-
ration estates – was due to the general reduction of tax rates for all estate types.  
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Figure 4.8: Effective inheritance tax rates in Sweden in 1955, 1975/78, 1995 and 2015 
 
* Shares in a listed corporation with >50 percent of the voting rights. 
Source: Own calculation based on legislation in Sweden. 
Taken together it can be said that the effective tax rates were quite high after World War II 
(over 50 percent for all top estates), even the small estate was taxed (at a low level) and pro-
gressivity was high for all estate portfolios. This confirms the established hypothesis on the 
social democratic welfare state. However, already the changes in the 1970s reduced redistri-
bution as (family) business and shares in a corporation estates got tax exemptions. Since the 
1990s all large and top estates got tax deductions. Therefore, the tax burden for the upper 
edge of the distribution decreased over time and even increased for the lower part – until the 
abolishment of the tax.  
Henrekson & Waldenström (2015) examine possible determinants for these changes. They 
start with the mass mobilization hypothesis by Scheve & Stasavage (2012) and demonstrate 
that the largest tax changes took place between or after the world wars (their investigation 
period already starts at the end of the 19th century) and are therefore only part of the story. In 
addition, they find in contemporary parliamentary prints that politicians “explicitly stated that 
the wartime events did not affect inheritance tax policy” (Henrekson & Waldenström 2015, p. 
17). The high effective tax rates seem rather to be motivated by an ideology for redistribution 
in the Social-Democratic Party and its political power after World War II. One possible explana-
tion from Henrekson & Waldenström (2015) for the tax deductions since the 1970s is tax 
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avoidance. They investigate newspapers articles about legal avoidance strategies like debt 
expansion in the 1970s. Possibilities further increased after the deregulation of credit markets 
in the 1980s and are also reported in the press. They also cite interviews with emigrated peo-
ple and name wealthy business owners who name as a major emigration decision (inheritance) 
taxation. In the 1990s the tax rates for mall estates even increased and further decreased for 
the upper part of the distribution. In addition, the housing and stock market boomed, which 
had the consequence that many middle-class heirs had to pay inheritance tax on the received 
wealth transfer. Henrekson & Waldenström (2015, p. 23) also name “the removal of foreign 
exchange controls in 1989 and EU membership in the mid-1990s” as further opportunities for 
tax avoidance for wealthy heirs. They argue that due to these developments the inheritance 
tax lost its legitimacy and in the end was abolished.  
4.4.5. General trends 
Altogether intergenerational transfer taxation rather decreased since World War II – especially 
for the upper part of the distribution. Besides the individual country developments (described 
in the last sections) some general trends can be identified which also lead to this development: 
tax composition and competition, influence of interest groups and the median voter. 
4.4.5.1. Tax (revenue) composition and competition 
To get a complete picture on the taxation of intergenerational transfers all other taxes and 
their changes also have to be taken into account – especially other forms of property taxation. 
It would be optimal to compare effective tax rates for all taxes in all countries over time – 
which are not available. Therefore, tax revenues serve as an approximation.  
Taxes on personal income, goods and services and the social security contributions are in gen-
eral the most import components of total tax revenue (see figure A.4.3 in the appendix). Over 
time the composition of total tax revenue changed. It is an overall trend in all three countries 
that the importance of revenue from direct taxes like the income tax decreased since the 
1970s and revenue from indirect taxes like taxes on goods and services and social security con-
tributions increased. In general it can be said that this tends to decrease the tax burden on 
high incomes and increases it on poor incomes (European Commission 2006). One reason for 
this shift is probably that tax avoidance and evasion are less likely with indirect taxes. Both got 
easier over time due to the stronger tax competition as a result of globalization (Cremer & 
Pestieau 2011, Remeur 2015).  
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Taxes on property and therefore also taxes on intergenerational transfers are direct taxes. The 
relevance of the tax revenue of taxes on property116 as a percentage of total taxation is differ-
ent for each country (see figure 4.9). In the UK it is more important than in the other two, but 
decreased over time. In Germany revenue also decreased and in Sweden it increased and then 
decreased again. Therefore, it does not seem as if the decreasing revenue from estate, inher-
itance and gift taxes in the UK and Sweden was compensated by other taxes on property. 
Figure 4.9: Revenues from taxes on property as a percentage of total taxation* the UK, 
Germany and Sweden, 1965-2014** 
 
*  This includes: recurrent taxes on immovable property, recurrent taxes on net wealth, other recurrent taxes on 
property, estate, inheritance and gift taxes, taxes on financial and capital transactions and non-recurrent taxes 
on property.  
** Not available before 1965. 
Source: Based on OECD.Stat (2016) 
In the UK the most important component of revenues from taxes on property are recurrent 
taxes on immovable property (see figure A.4.4 in the appendix). They also gained importance 
in Sweden since the 1980s and are the most important ones since the 1990s. In Germany they 
                                                          
116
  This includes depending on the country in different combinations (see also figure A.4.4 in the appen-
dix): recurrent taxes on immovable property, recurrent taxes on net wealth, other recurrent taxes on 
property, estate, inheritance and gift taxes, taxes on financial and capital transactions and non-
recurrent taxes on property. 
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are rather stable. However, another change is visible: recurrent taxes on net wealth117 steadily 
decreased and then even vanished. The same happened in Sweden, but on a lover level.118 All 
these developments strengthen the globalization argument – taxation on property shifts from 
movable to immovable assets.  
With regard to intergenerational transfer taxation this also makes sense: The tax burden espe-
cially decreased for the upper part of the distribution (where assets are more mobile) in all 
three countries. With some tax planning assets (future estates) can be shifted to countries with 
lower or even no taxation (see Tiefensee & Westermeier 2016 for an overview for the EU). 
However, in some cases also habitual residence has to be shifted (EY 2016). 
4.4.5.2. Influence of interest groups  
Wealth concentration and therefore probably also estate concentration increased in the UK 
and Sweden since the 1950s (see figure A.4.2 in the appendix) – for Germany the development 
over time is empirically unknown, but wealth and inheritance concentration is also high at the 
present (Deutsche Bundesbank 2016, Bach & Thiemann 2016). Therefore, a relatively small 
group of individuals with more or less homogenous interests – in the case here this would be 
reducing/abolishing intergenerational transfer taxation – might influence public opinion (e.g. 
via the media)119 and politics to their advantage.  
On the theoretical front this issue started to get tackled in the literature on wealth transfers. 
De Donder & Pestieau (2015, p. 389) formulate „an analytical model, together with numerical 
simulations, where agents bequeathing large estates make monetary contributions to play up 
the salience of the encroachment aspects of estate taxation on family decisions and to de-
crease its political support”. However, so far there is no general empirical proof available and 
especially none for the three investigated countries how far the influence of interest groups in 
the case of the estate, inheritance and gift taxation really reaches (especially in the case of 
exemptions for (family) businesses and shares in corporation estates – which are given in all 
three countries over time).  
                                                          
117
  These consisted of a general wealth tax (all private assets minus liabilities) which was abolished in 
1997 (Schratzenstaller 2013).  
118
  The wealth tax for unlisted corporate equity was abolished in 1991 and the wealth tax for all others 
in 2007 (Henrekson & Stenkula 2015). 
119
  Corneo (2006) shows that with high wealth concentration, media reporting favors a small elite.  
Estate and inheritance taxation 
116 
4.4.5.3. Influence of the median voter  
The opposite of interest group models is the median voter theorem – which was spread by 
Downs (1957) and applied to redistribution issues (of income) by Metzler & Richard (1981).120 
The theory says that in a majority rule voting system the median voter’s interest will be served. 
If only looking at the case of wealth transfer taxation one could therefore argue that the medi-
an voter acts against its own interest. As the majority of the population receives only a small 
inheritance they could impose high taxes on the upper part of the distribution and benefit 
from redistribution. Why this is not the case leaves room for further research. What can be 
seen is that the median voter at least makes sure that he/she does not have to pay (high) es-
tate, inheritance or gift taxes himself/herself. This shows the 0 effective tax rates for small 
estates in the UK and Germany. In Sweden the small estate was taxed (on a low level) and the 
system was abolished when the small estate was taxed the highest over the whole period un-
der analysis.  
Furthermore, it can now be argued that as individuals below the median favor tax increases 
and more redistribution they should therefore vote for left parties. Individuals above the me-
dian voter favor on the contrary tax decreases and less redistribution and therefore should 
vote for right parties. Looking into the country cases this is actually a rational decision. It can 
be seen that in the UK and Germany tax increases with regard to intergenerational transfers 
always took place under left governments and decreases under right ones (see figure 4.10). 
Sweden again is a special case, but at least partially confirms the theory. Therefore, it can be 
stated that in the case of wealth transfer taxation it does matter who you vote for.  
                                                          
120
  For a scarce recent overview (also on the empirical findings) see Corneo & Neher (2015). 
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Figure 4.10: Changes in estate, inheritance and gift taxation and ruling party in the UK, 
Germany and Sweden since the 1950s 
 
*2016: less exemptions for the top estate. 
Source: Own presentation and Schröder (2010), Recker (2009), Tuchtenhagen (2008). 
4.5. Conclusion  
In this paper I answer the following questions: Do countries tax intergenerational wealth trans-
fers differently? Did taxation change over time? For both cases holds: If yes, why? I investigate 
the United Kingdom, Germany and Sweden since the 1950s and calculate effective tax rates for 
typical households with different sizes and portfolios of intergenerational transfers. I argue 
and prove that each intergenerational transfer taxation system for the individual countries is 
based on different preferences for redistribution (based on the theory by Esping-Andersen 
1990).  
In the UK (liberal welfare state regime) the general redistribution capacity over the tax system 
is rather low. However, in the case of wealth transfers the argument of equal opportunities at 
the beginning of life is strong and therefore transfers are highly taxed over the whole investi-
gation period. Though, over time progressivity increases and deductions are given to the upper 
part of the estate distribution. In Germany (conservative welfare state regime) the argument 
of protection of liberty and property is strong – ownership should stay as it is (within the fami-
ly). Indeed taxation (within the closer family) is rather low since the 1950s. Over time deduc-
tions are given to business owners, who represent the upper part of the estate distribution in 
Germany. In Sweden (social democratic welfare state regime) transfer taxation was strong and 
redistributive after the World Wars and therefore in line with the argument of equal opportu-
nities. However, the tax burden for the upper part of the estate distribution decreased over 
time and even increased for the lower part – in the end the tax was abolished. 
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The changes over time are on the one hand based on developments in each country. On the 
other hand some overall trends can be noted. First, tax (revenue) composition changed in gen-
eral due to higher (tax) competition between the countries, which came from a more global-
ized world. As assets and therefore also future estates, especially at the upper part of the dis-
tribution, got more mobile, policy makers adopted property taxes (including estate, inher-
itance and gift taxes). This implies decreasing tax burdens or a shift towards less mobile assets. 
Second, another important aspect with regard to wealth and estate concentration is the influ-
ence of interest groups. However, even though the topic is already tackled on a theoretical 
front, the empirical proof with regard to estate and inheritance taxation in the investigated 
countries still needs to be made. Third, what can be seen is, that the median voter never had 
to pay (high) estate or inheritance taxes in the investigated countries. In addition, wealth 
transfer tax increases are more likely under a left government, while decreases are more likely 
under a right government.  
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Appendix 
Part A: Figures 
Figure A.4.1: Private wealth as percent of national income in the UK, Germany, Sweden, 
1940-2010 
 
Source: Based on data appendix of Piketty & Zucman (2014): http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/fr/capitalisback and Walden-
ström (2016): http://www.uueconomics.se/danielw/SNWD.htm (both 29.03.2016) 
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Figure A.4.2: Top 10 and 1 percent share in total wealth in the UK and Sweden, 1945-
2005* 
 
* Data not available for Germany. 
Source: Based on data appendix of Piketty (2014): http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/en/capital21c2 (29.03.2016)  
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Figure A.4.3: Taxes and social security contributions as a percentage of total taxation in 
the UK Germany and Sweden, 1965-2014* 
 
* Not available before 1965. 
Source: Based on OECD.Stat (2016) 
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Figure A.4.4: Components of taxes on property as a percentage of total taxation in the UK 
Germany and Sweden, 1965-2014* 
 
* Not available before 1965. 
Source: Based on OECD.Stat (2016) 
Estate and inheritance taxation 
126 
Part B: Tables 
Table A.4.1: Nominal private wealth per capita in the UK, Germany and Sweden in 1955, 
1975, 1995 and 2014 
    1955 1975 1995 2014* 
United Kingdom Pounds 1,070 4,990 44,380 151,783 
Germany Euro 2,820 17,910 59,620 131,631 
Sweden Kronen 14,730 68,040 396,040 1,569,457 
* 2015 not available  
Source: Based on data appendix of Waldenström (2016): http://www.uueconomics.se/danielw/SNWD.htm, Piketty 
& Zucman (2014): http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/fr/capitalisback, ONS national balance sheet: https://www.ons.gov.uk/ 
economy/nationalaccounts/uksectoraccounts/bulletins/nationalbalancesheet/2016estimates, ONS population 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/bulletins/a
nnualmidyearpopulationestimates/2015-06-25, Deutsche Bundesbank & Destatis (2015), Destatis population: 
https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesellschaftStaat/Bevoelkerung/Bevoelkerungsstand/Tabellen_/lrbev03
.html (all 28.08.2016) 
Table A.4.2: Nominal GDP per capita (twice) in the UK, Germany and Sweden in 1955, 
1975, 1995 and 2015 
Year   1955 1975 1995 2015 
GDP/capita multiplied by 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
United Kingdom Pounds 379 758 1,943 3 886 13,516 27,032 28,644 57,288 
Germany Euro 1,868 3,736 8,912 17,824 23,354 46,708 37,130 74,260 
Sweden Kronen 8,000 16,000 41,419 82,838 213,388 426,776 427,000 854,000 
Source: OECD: http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DatasetCode=PDB_LV, ONS: http://webarchive.nationalarch 
ives.gov.uk/20160105160709/http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/datasets-and-tables/data-selector.html?cdid=IHXT&data 
set=ukea&table-id=X11, Destatis (2016), SCB: http://www.scb.se/en_/Finding-statistics/Statistics-by-subject-
area/National-Accounts/National-Accounts/National-Accounts-quarterly-and-annual-estimates/#c_li_377031 (all 
29.08.2016) 
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Table A.4.3: Estate legislation in the United Kingdom in 1955, 1975, 1995 and 2015 
 1955 (estate duty) 1975 (capital transfer tax)  1995 (inheritance tax) 2015 (inheritance tax) 
Tax classes not applicable not applicable not applicable not applicable 
Tax rates Inheritance and gifts within five years before death from one 
person are accumulated to one estate: 
Value of the 
taxable acquisi-
tion up to and 
including £… 
Rate of tax 
in percent 
Small 
margins 
levels 
3,000 Nil  
4,000 1 3,030 
5,000 2 4,040 
7,500 3 5,051 
10,000 4 7,578 
12,500 6 10,212 
15,000 8 12,771 
17,500 10 15,333 
20,000 12 17,897 
25,000 15 20,705 
30,000 18 25,914 
35,000 21 31,139 
40,000 24 36,381 
Inheritances and gifts within three years before death from one 
person are accumulated to one estate (gifts over three years 
before death are taken into account to determine the starting 
point of the rate of tax): 
Lower limit 
in £ 
Upper limit 
in £ 
Tax £ + Rate of 
tax in 
percent 
0 15,000 0 Nil 
15,000 20,000 0 10 
20,000 25,000 500 15 
25,000 30,000 1,250 20 
30,000 40,000 2,250 25 
40,000 50,000 4,750 30 
50,000 60,000 7,750 35 
60,000 80,000 11,250 40 
80,000 100,000 19,250 45 
100,000 120,000 28,250 50 
120,000 150,000 38,250 55 
150,000 500,000 54,750 60 
Inheritances: 
above £ 154,000: 40 percent 
Gifts (without reservation of benefit):  
- Gifts are tax free, if the donor lives for another 
seven years 
- If donor dies before and all transfers sum up to 
more than £ 154,000, for the amount above the 
threshold the following percentage apply: 
Years be-
tween 
transfer and 
death 
Percentage 
of the rate 
for inher-
itances 
Rate of tax in 
percent 
0-3 100 40 
3-4 80 32 
4-5 60 24 
5-6 40 16 
6-7 16 8 
7+ 0 0 
Inheritance Tax Act 1984, s. 7 and schedule 1, 
Finance Act 1986 schedule 19, para. 2(1)(b), para. 
2(4) 
Inheritances: 
above £ 325,000: 40 percent 
Gifts (without reservation of benefit):  
---
a
 
- If donor dies before and all transfers 
sum up to more than £ 325,000, for 
the amount above the threshold the 
following percentage apply: 
---a 
Inheritance Tax Act 1984, s. 7 and 
schedule 1, Finance Act 1986 schedule 
19, para. 2(1)(b), para. 2(4), Finance 
Act 2007 (c. 11), s. 4 
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 1955 (estate duty) 1975 (capital transfer tax)  1995 (inheritance tax) 2015 (inheritance tax) 
45,000 28 42,222 
50,000 31 46,956 
60,000 35 53,076 
75,000 40 65,000 
100,000 45 81,814 
150,000 50 110,000 
200,000 55 166,666 
300,000 60 225,000 
500,000 65 342,857 
750,000 70 583,333 
1,000,000 75 900,000 
over 1,000,000 80 1,250,000 
Exceptions if acquisition is just above the next value limit 
(max small margins levels see above): The upper limit appli-
cable to the next lower rate is taxed with the lower rate and 
the amount exceeding this upper limit is added. This is the 
tax payable.  
Finance Act 1949, s. 28(1) and schedule 7 and Finance Act 
1954 , s. 32(1), Finance Act 1914, s. 13(1) 
500,000 1,000,000 264,750 65 
1,000,000 2,000,000 589,750 70 
2,000,000  1,289,750 75 
 
Gifts over three years before death: 
Lower limit 
in £ 
Upper limit 
in £ 
Tax £ + Rate of 
tax  
Percent 
0 15,000 0 Nil 
15,000 20,000 0 5 
20,000 25,000 250 7.5 
25,000 30,000 625 10 
30,000 40,000 1,125 12.5 
40,000 50,000 2,375 15 
50,000 60,000 3,875 17.5 
60,000 80,000 5,625 50 
80,000 100,000 15,625 22.5 
100,000 120,000 20,125 27.5 
120,000 150,000 25,625 35 
150,000 200,000 36,125 42.5 
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 1955 (estate duty) 1975 (capital transfer tax)  1995 (inheritance tax) 2015 (inheritance tax) 
200,000 250,000 57,375 50 
250,000 300,000 82,375 55 
300,000 500,000 109,875 60 
500,000 1,000,000 229,875 65 
1,000,000 2,000,000 554,875 70 
2,000,000  1,254,875 75 
Finance Act 1975, s. 37, Chown (1975), p 16 
Allowances Inheritance (nil-rate band, taxable limit): £ 3,000 
If the acquisition is below the taxable limit, no tax has to be 
paid. If the acquisition is above the taxable limit, the entire 
lot is taxed.  
Gifts:  
- Exempt if donor lives for another five years, if not see tax 
rates 
- No tax on individual gifts worth up to £ 100 each (£ 500 in 
special cases). Normal expenditure out of income. No tax on 
wedding gifts. 
Harding (1958), p. 193, Finance Act 1954, s. 32(1), Finance 
(1909-10) Act 1910, s. 59(2), Finance Act 1949, s. 33(1) 
Inheritance (nil-rate band): £ 15,000 
Gifts:  
- Generally exempt: £ 1,000 each year. Leftover annual exemp-
tion can be carried over from one tax year to the next – maxi-
mum exemption £ 2,000. No tax on individual gifts worth up to 
£ 100 each. Normal expenditure out of income. No tax on 
wedding gifts depending on value and relationship. 
All transfers between spouses are exempt. 
Chown (1975), pp. 14-15, Finanance Act 1975, s. 6, 37 
Inheritance (nil-rate band): £ 154,000  
Gifts:  
- Exempt if donor lives for another seven years, if 
not see tax rates for gifts.  
- Generally exempt: £ 3,000 each year. Leftover 
annual exemption can be carried over from one tax 
year to the next – maximum exemption £ 6,000. No 
tax on individual gifts worth up to £ 250 each. 
Normal expenditure out of income. Wedding gifts 
tax free depending on value and relationship. 
All transfers between spouses are exempt. 
Inheritance Tax Act 1984, s. 7, 8A, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 
and schedule 1, Finance Act 1986 Sch. 19, para. 
2(1)(b) 
Inheritance (nil-rate band): £ 325,000  
Gifts:  
---a 
---a 
All transfers between spouses and 
civil partners are exempt. The not 
used nil-rate band (up to £ 325,000) 
can be transferred to the husband’s, 
wife’s or civil partner’s estate when 
they die. 
Inheritance Tax Act 1984, s. 7, 8A, 18, 
19, 20, 21, 22 and schedule 1, Finance 
Act 1986 schedule 19, para. 2(1)(b), 
The Tax and Civil Partnership Regula-
tions 2005 (S.I. 2005/3229), Finance 
Act 2007 (c. 11), s. 4, Finance Act 2008 
(c. 9), s. 10, schedule 4 para. 2 
Valuation Guideline: market value 
Act of 1894, s. 7(5) 
Shares in a company controlled by not more than five per-
sons, where the deceased himself had the control / was 
beneficially interested in more than half of the aggregated 
Guideline: market value 
Finance Act 1975, s. 38 
Guideline: market value 
Inheritance Tax Act 1984, s. 160 
---a 
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 1955 (estate duty) 1975 (capital transfer tax)  1995 (inheritance tax) 2015 (inheritance tax) 
dividends and debenture interest / in at last one-half of the 
nominal capital: valued by reference to the value of the 
company’s assets. 
Harding (1958), p. 13 
Exemptions Industrial hereditaments, plant and machinery used in 
businesses: appropriate tax rate is reduced by 45 percent.  
Finance Act 1949, s. 28(1) and schedule 7 and Finance Act 
1954, s. 32(1) 
 Business / shares (depending on business purpose 
etc. e.g. not applicable if the company mainly deals 
with securities, stocks or shares, land or buildings, or 
in making or holding investments):  
- 100 percent relief on a business or interest in a 
business; shares in an unlisted company which 
secured control over the company 
- 50 percent relief on shares controlling more than 
50 percent of the voting rights in a listed company; 
land, buildings or machinery owned by the deceased 
and used in a business they were a partner in or 
controlled  
Requirements:  
- donor was owner two years before transfer 
- Inheritance: In case of sale it must be to a company 
that will carry on the business and the estate will be 
paid mainly in shares of that company. 
- Gift: Recipient must keep business property or 
assets as a going concern until the death of the 
donor if they want to keep the relief. 
Inheritance Tax Act 1984, s. 104, 105, 106, Finance 
(No. 2) Act 1992 (c. 48), s. 73, schedule 14 para. 1(a, 
b), 8, 9. 
---
a
 
Intestate succes-
sion 
If the deceased was survived by a spouse they will take: 
- without issue (legitimate children, grandchildren and 
remoter descendants): the statutory legacy that applies and 
half of the residue. The other half share goes to surviving 
parents or other relatives 
England & Wales 
- with issue: The personal chattels, the statutory legacy that 
applies and a life interest in half the residue. The issue take 
---a 
Illegitimate children have the right to inherit on the death of a 
parent. 
Family Law Reform Act 1969 
Adopted children have the same rights as natural children.  
Adoption Act 1976, s. 39 (in force since 1976) 
---a 
Illegitimate children have the right to inherit on the 
death of a sibling. 
Family Law Reform Act 1987 
---a 
If the deceased is survived by a 
spouse they will take: 
- without issue (children, grandchil-
dren and remoter descendants): the 
whole intestate estate. 
England & Wales 
- with issue: --- and an absolute 
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 1955 (estate duty) 1975 (capital transfer tax)  1995 (inheritance tax) 2015 (inheritance tax) 
the other half share on statutory trust.  
Scotland 
- with issue: If there are legitimate children then they will be 
entitled to the residue of the estate after payment of any 
prior and legal rights to the spouse.  
Northern Ireland 
- with issue: The personal chattels, the statutory legacy that 
applies and a share of residue (when one legitimate child 
survives, half the residue absolutely, or when more than one 
child survives, one third of the residue absolutely). 
If there was no surviving spouse but the deceased had 
legitimate children the estate will be distributed amongst 
them.  
If there is no surviving spouse and no legitimate children the 
estate will be distributed amongst the deceased's other 
relatives (in the following order: decendents of children, 
parents, siblings or their descendants, half siblings or their 
descendants, grandparents, uncles/ants and their descend-
ants, half uncles/ants and their descendants). 
If no living relatives can be found the estate will pass to the 
Crown as bona vacantia. 
IHTM12111 ff., IHTM 12161 ff., IHTM12141 ff. 
interest in one half of the residue.  
IHTM12111 ff., IHTM 12161 ff., 
IHTM12141 ff. 
Civil partners are equal to spouses.  
Civil Partnership Act 2004 
a --- means „nothing substantially changed compared with the last time point”. 
Sources: Finance Acts, Inheritance Tax Acts, Inheritance Tax Manual (IHTM), Family Law Reform Acts, Adoption Act, Civil Partnership Act, Chown (1975), Harding (1958) 
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Table A.4.4: Inheritance legislation in Germany in 1955, 1975, 1995/96a and 2015/16b 
 1955 1975 1995/96 2015/16 
Tax classes  (I) 
spouse, legitimate or adopted children and step 
children, illegitimate children in case of acquisition 
from the mother, in case of acquisition from the 
father only if he has acknowledged paternity  
(II) 
descendants from all children named under (I) – 
exceptions for adopted children 
(III) 
parents, grandparents and other forefathers, step-
parents, full and halfblooded siblings 
(IV) 
children in-law, parents in-law, descendants of the 
first degree from siblings 
(V) 
all others and special-purpose allocations 
§ 9 ErbStG 
(I) 
spouse, legitimate and illegitimate or adopted 
children and step children, descendants from dead 
children – exceptions for adopted children 
(II) 
descendants from living children and step-children – 
exceptions for adopted children 
(III) 
parents and forefathers, adoptive parents, siblings, 
descendants of the first degree of siblings, steppar-
ents, children in-law, parents in-law, divorced spouse  
(IV) 
all others and special-purpose allocations 
§ 15 ErbStG 
(I) 
spouse, children and step children, descendants from 
children and step children, parents and forefathers by 
acquisition upon death 
(II) 
parents and forefathers if not in tax class (I), siblings, 
descendants of the first degree of siblings, steppar-
ents, children in-law, parents in-law, divorced spouse 
(III) 
all others and special-purpose allocations 
§ 15 ErbStG 
(I) 
spouse / civil partner, children and step children, 
descendants from children and step children, parents 
and forefathers by acquisition upon death 
(II) 
parents and forefathers if not in tax class (I), siblings, 
descendants of the first degree of siblings, steppar-
ents, children in-law, parents in-law, divorced spouse / 
civil partner of a repealed partnership 
(III) 
all others and special-purpose allocations 
§ 15 ErbStG 
Tax rates  
Value of the taxable 
acquisition up to and 
including … Euroc 
Percentage in the tax class 
I II III IV V 
5,113 2 4 6 8 14 
10,226 2.5 5 7.5 10 16 
15,339 3 6 9 12 18 
20,452 3.5 7 10.5 14 20 
25,565 4 8 12 16 22 
51,129 4.5 9 13.5 18 24 
76,694 5 10 15 20 26 
Value of the taxable 
acquisition (§ 10) up 
to and including … 
Euro 
Percentage in the tax class 
I II III IV 
25,565 3 6 11 20 
38,347 3.5 7 12.5 22 
51,129 4 8 14 24 
63,911 4.5 9 15.5 26 
76,694 5 10 17 28 
102,258 5.5 11 18.5 30 
127,823 6 12 20 32 
Value of the taxable acquisition (§ 
10) up to and including … Euro 
Percentage in the 
tax class 
I II III 
51,129 7 12 17 
255,646 11 17 23 
511,292 15 22 29 
5,112,919 19 27 35 
12,782,297 23 32 41 
25,564,594 27 37 47 
over 25,564,594 30 40 50 
Exceptions if acquisition is just above the next value 
Value of the taxable acquisi-
tion (§ 10) up to and including 
… Euro 
Percentage in the 
tax class 
I II III 
75,000 7 15 30 
300,000 11 20 30 
600,000 15 25 30 
6,000,000 19 30 30 
13,000,000 23 35 50 
26,000,000 27 40 50 
over 26,000,000 30 43 50 
Exceptions if acquisition is just above the next value 
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102,258 5.5 11 16.5 22 28 
153,388 6 12 18 24 30 
204,517 6.5 13 19.5 26 32 
255,646 7 14 21 28 34 
306,775 7.5 15 22.5 30 36 
357,904 8 16 24 32 38 
409,034 8.5 17 25.5 34 40 
460,163 9 18 27 36 42 
511,292 9.5 19 28.5 38 44 
1,022,584 10 20 30 40 46 
2,045,168 11 21 32 42 48 
3,067,751 12 22 34 44 51 
4,090,335 13 23 36 46 54 
5,112,919 14 24 38 48 57 
over 5,112,919 15 25 40 50 60 
Exceptions if acquisition is just above the next value 
limit (Härteausgleich).  
§ 10 ErbStG 
153,388 6.5 13 21.5 34 
204,517 7 14 23 36 
255,646 7.5 15 24.5 38 
306,775 8 16 26 40 
357,904 8.5 17 27.5 42 
409,034 9 18 29 44 
460,163 9.5 19 30.5 46 
511,292 10 20 32 48 
1,022,584 11 22 34 50 
1,533,876 12 24 36 52 
2,045,168 13 26 38 54 
3,067,751 14 28 40 56 
4,090,335 16 30 43 58 
5,112,919 18 33 46 60 
12,782,297 21 36 50 62 
25,564,594 25 40 55 64 
51,129,188 30 45 60 67 
over 51,129,188 35 50 65 70 
Exceptions if acquisition is just above the next value 
limit (Härteausgleich). 
§ 19 ErbStG 
limit (Härteausgleich). 
§ 19 ErbStG 
limit (Härteausgleich). 
§ 19 ErbStG 
Allowances  Spouse: €127,823 but only if the couple has children 
(All others in I) €15,339 
Spouse: €127,823 (+ care allowances of €127,823 in 
case of inheritance) 
(All others in I) €46,016 (+ care allowances between 
Spouse: €306,775 (+ care allowances of €255,646 in 
case of inheritance) 
Children as in §15 (1) no 2 and children of dead chil-
Spouse / civil partner: €500,000 (+ care allowances of 
€256,000 in case of inheritance) 
Children as in §15 (1) no 2 and children of dead chil-
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(II) €10,226 
(III & IV) €1,534 
(V) €511 
Each allowance is usable every 10 years. 
§§ 13, 17a,b ErbStG 
€25,565 and €5,113 in case of inheritance for all 
children until the age of 27) 
(II) €25,565 
(III) €5,113 
(IV) €1,534 
Each allowance is usable every 10 years. 
§§ 14, 16, 17 ErbStG 
dren: €204,517 (+ care allowances between €51,129 
and €10,226 in case of inheritance for all children until 
the age of 27) 
(All others in I): €51,129 
(II): €10,226 
(III) €5,113 
Each allowance is usable every 10 years. 
§§ 14, 16, 17 ErbStG 
dren: €400,000 (+ care allowances between €52,000 
and €10,300 in case of inheritance for all children until 
the age of 27) 
Grandchildren and step grandchildren: €200,000 
Parents and grandparents by acquisition upon death: 
€100,000 
All others: €20,000 
Each allowance is usable every 10 years. 
§§ 14, 16, 17 ErbStG 
Valuation Guideline: market value (gemein Wert, Verkehrs-
wert) 
§ 22 ErbStG, §§ 10, 12, 13, 14 RBewG 
Real estate / business property: unit value from 
1935 (Einheitswert); this depends on the tax valua-
tion, I take 20 percent of the market value as an 
approximationd 
business assets: last unit value (Einheitswert) 
§ 22 ErbStG, § 66 RBewG, Spiegel (1970), p. 123 
Guideline: market value (gemein Wert, Verkehrs-
wert) 
§ 12 ErbStG, §§ 9, 10, 11, 12 BewG 
Real estate / business property: unit value from 1964 
(Einheitswert); this depends on the tax valuation, I 
take 28 percent of the market value as an approxi-
matione 
business assets: last unit value (Einheitswert) 
§ 12 ErbStG, §§ 109, 121a BewG, Bach & Bartholmai 
(2002), p. 31 
Guideline: market value (gemein Wert, Verkehrswert) 
§ 12 ErbStG, §§ 9, 10, 11, 12 BewG 
Real estate / business property: earnings value (Ertrag-
swert); this depends on the tax valuation, on average 
this is 70 percent of the market value  
§ 12 ErbStG, AGN Europe (2008), p.3 
business assets: tax balance sheet value (Steuer-
bilanzwert), special valuation rule depending on the 
total property and the income of the companyf 
§ 12 ErbStG, § 109 BewG, AGN Europe (2008), p.3 
Guideline: market value (gemein Wert, Verkehrswert) 
§ 12 ErbStG, §§ 9, 10, 11, 12, 151 BewG 
business assets: simplified earnings value method 
(vereinfachtes Ertragswertverfahren), on average 77 
percent of market value 
§ 109 BewG, Scholz & Truger (2016), p.3 
Exemptions Household goods: 
(I & II) in the value of max. €10,226 + tangible 
movable property in the value of max. €2,556  
(III & IV) in the value of max. €2,556 + tangible 
movable property in the value of max. €1,023 
(all others) in the value of max. €2,556 
§ 18 ErbStG 
Household goods: 
(I & II) in the value of max. €20,452 + tangible 
movable property in the value of max. €2,556  
(III & IV) in the value of max. €5,113 + tangible 
movable property in the value of max. €1,023 
§ 13 ErbStG 
Businesses / shares in stock corporations (>25 percent 
of the registered share capital): allowances of 
€255,646, + 40 percent of value exempt, applicable if 
business is continued / shares are hold for at least five 
years. For all heirs tax rates from tax class I apply. 
§§ 13a, 19a ErbStG 
Household goods: 
(I) in the value of max. €40,093 + tangible movable 
property in the value of max. €10,226  
(II & III) + tangible movable property in the value of 
max. €10,226 
§ 13 ErbStG 
Businesses / shares in stock corporations (>25 percent 
of the registered share capital):g 
- 85 percent of value exempt if transfer max. €26 
million (transfer > €26 million and < €90 million: 85 
percent -1 percent for each €750,000 above €26 
millionen), business is continued / shares are hold for 
at least five years, during that period wages must not 
fall below 400 percent of the average wages paid per 
year before transferring the company (>16 employ-
ees
h
) of the starting wages.  
- complete exemption if transfer max. €26 million 
(transfer > €26 million and < €90 million: 100 percent -
1 percent for each €750,000  above €26 millionen), 
business is continued / shares are hold for at least 
seven years, during that period wages must not fall 
below 700 percent of the average wages paid per year 
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before transferring the company (>16 employees
h
) of 
the starting wages 
- no exemption if transfer >= €90 million  
For all heirs tax rates from tax class I apply. 
§§ 13 a,b, c , 19a ErbStG 
Owner-occupied property: 
spouse / civil partner: complete exemption if heir is 
living in it at least for 10 years 
children and step children, children of own children if 
they are already dead: complete exemption if heir is 
living in it at least for 10 years and max. size 200m² 
§ 13 ErbStG 
Rented property: only 90 percent of value are subject 
to tax 
§ 13c ErbStG 
Household goods: 
(I) in the value of max. € 41,000 + tangible movable 
property in the value of max. €12,000  
(II & III) + tangible movable property in the value of 
max. €12,000 
§ 13 ErbStG 
Intestate succes-
sion  
Relatives are called to succession in the following 
order:  
(I. degree) descendants of the testator. Children (not 
illegitimate) inherit in equal shares. 
The surviving spouse of the deceased inherits next to 
relatives of the first order a quarter, next to relatives 
of the second degree or beside grandparents half of 
the inheritance. If none of them is still alive the 
spouse inherits everything. 
(II. degree) parents of the deceased and their 
descendants 
(III. degree) grandparents of the deceased and their 
descendants 
---i 
Illegitimate children can claim an inheritance substi-
tute claim at the value of their theoretical share in 
the inheritance. (Erbersatzanspruch) 
§ 1934a BGB 
Adopted (underage) children have the same rights as 
natural children. 
§ 1754 f. BGB (in force since 1977) 
---i 
 
---i 
Both legitimate and illegitimate children have the 
same rights. 
§ 1 Erbgleichstellungsgesetz 
Civil partners are equal to spouses. 
§ 10 Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetz 
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(IV. degree) great-grandparents of the deceased and 
their descendants 
(V. degree) all other relatives 
A relative is not called to succession, as long as a 
relative of a previous order exists. 
§ 1924, 1925, 1926, 1928, 1929, 1930, 1931 BGB 
a  Due to a decision of the federal constitutional court in 1995 the legislation (especially for valuation rules) was changed elementarily in 1996. Therefore I report the legislation in 1996. 
b  Due to a decision of the federal constitutional court in 2014 the legislation for businesses / shares was changed in 2016. Therefore I report the legislation in 2016. 
c  Values before 2001 in DM, the official exchange rate applies: 1,95583. 
d  The unit values from 1935 are at the beginning of the 70s at most 20 percent of market value (Spiegel 1970). 
e  § 121a BewG requires to apply 140 percent of the unit value from 1964 (Einheitswert). Bach & Bartholmai (2002) cite a survey from the Federal Court of Auditors which finds that at the end of 
the 80s units values from 1964 where on average between 10 and 20 percent of market value. I will take the upper limit as a base for the unit value. 
f  Sureth et al. (2008) estimate that tax values of sole proprietorship and partnership amounted on average to about 50 percent of market value, shares in non-listed corporations amounted to 70 
percent. 
g  Only the most important rules are reported. For more details see ErbStG or Scholz & Truger (2016). 
h  The number of employees is only relevant for the rule regarding the wages. 
i  --- means „nothing substantially changed compared with the last time point”. 
Source: Erbschaftsteuer- und Schenkungsteuergesetz (ErbStG), Reichsbewertungsgesetz, Bewertungsgesetz, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB), Erbgleichstellungsgesetz, Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetz 
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Table A.4.5: Inheritance legislation in Sweden in 1955, 1975/78a, 1995 and 2015 
 1955 1975/1978 1995 2015 
Tax classes  (I) 
spouse, children and descendants 
(II) 
parents and siblings 
(III) 
non-profit organizationsb 
(IV) 
others 
SFS 1941:416, 780–782  
(I) 
spouse, children and descendants 
(II) 
parents, siblings and others 
(III) 
non-profit organizations 
SOU 1977:91, 236–237 
(I) 
spouse / civil partner, children and descendants 
(II) 
parents, siblings and others 
(III) 
non-profit organizations 
Du Rietz et al. (2015), p. 48 
No inheritance 
and gift tax since 
01.01.2005. 
Inheritances and 
gifts between 
17.-31.12.2004 
are also already 
exempt due to 
the Tsunami 
disaster in 
Southeast Asia. 
SFS 2004:1340-
1348, (SFS 2005: 
194) 
Tax rates  Inheritance and gift tax 
Taxable lot (I) (II) 
Lower limit SEK Upper limit SEK Tax SEK + % Tax SEK + % 
0 1,000 0 1 0 2 
1,000 3,000 10 1 20 4 
3,000 6,000 30 2 100 6 
6,000 12,000 90 3 280 8 
12,000 20,000 270 4 760 10 
20,000 30,000 590 5 1,560 12 
30,000 40,000 1,090 6 2,760 15 
40,000 50,000 1,690 7 4,260 18 
50,000 60,000 2,390 8 6,060 18 
Taxable lot (I) 
Lower limit 
SEK 
Upper limit SEK Tax SEK + % 
0 25,000 0 5 
25,000 50,000 1,250 10 
50,000 75,000 3,750 15 
75,000 100,000 7,500 22 
100,000 150,000 13,000 28 
150,000 250,000 27,000 33 
250,000 350,000 60,000 38 
350,000 500,000 98,000 44 
500,000 1,000,000 164,000 49 
1,000,000 2,000,000 409,000 53 
Taxable lot (I) 
Lower limit 
SEK 
Upper limit 
SEK 
Tax SEK + % 
0 300,000 0 10 
300,000 600,000 30,000 20 
600,000 - 90,000 30 
 
Taxable lot (II) 
Lower limit 
SEK 
Upper limit 
SEK 
Tax SEK + 
% 
0 70,000 0 10 
70,000 140,000 7,000 20 
140,000 - 21,000 30 
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60,000 75,000 3,190 9 7,860 21 
75,000 100,000 4,540 10 11,010 21 
100,000 150,000 7,040 12 21,510 24 
150,000 200,000 13,040 14   
200,000 300,000 20,040 16   
300,000 400,000 36,040 18   
400,000 - 54,040 20   
 
Taxable lot (IV) 
Lower limit SEK Upper limit SEK Tax SEK + % 
1,000 3,000 40 10 
3,000 6,000 200 15 
6,000 12,000 690 20 
12,000 20,000 1,890 25 
20,000 40,000 3,890 30 
40,000 - 9,890 35 
SFS 1933:431, 755–756; SFS 1941:416, 780–782; SFS 1952:246, 455-456; SOU 
1957:48, 56, 57 
Estate tax  
Lower limit SEK Upper limit SEK Tax SEK + % 
2,000,000 5,000,000 939,000 58 
5,000,000 - 2,679,000 65 
 
Taxable lot (II) 
Lower limit 
SEK 
Upper limit 
SEK 
Tax SEK + % 
0 10,000 0 8 
10,000 20,000 800 16 
20,000 30,000 2,400 24 
30,000 50,000 4,800 32 
50,000 70,000 11,200 40 
70,000 100,000 19,200 45 
100,000 150,000 32,700 50 
150,000 200,000 57,700 56 
200,000 500,000 85,700 61 
500,000 1,000,000 268,700 67 
1,000,000 - 603,700 72 
SOU 1977:91, 236–237 
Du Rietz et al. (2015), p. 48 
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50,000 70,000 0 5 
70,000 100,000 1,000 10 
100,000 200,000 4,000 15 
200,000 300,000 19,000 20 
300,000 500,000 39,000 25 
500,000 1,000,000 89,000 30 
1,000,000 2,000,000 239,000 35 
2,000,000 5,000,000 589,000 40 
5,000,000 - 1,789,000 50 
SFS 1947:581; SFS 1952:412, 728; SFS 1957:107; SOU 1957:48, 57 
Allowances  Inheritance and gift tax (taxable limit): 
Spouse: SEK 25,000 
Children: SEK 3,000 
Parents, siblings and other heirs: SEK 1,000 
If the acquisition is below the taxable limit, no tax has to be paid. If the 
acquisition is above the taxable limit, the entire lot is taxed. 
Summation rules for gifts: four years 
Estate tax (allowance): SEK 50,000 
SFS 1957:107; Henrekson & Waldenström 2015, p.8, SOU 1957:48, 9-11, 56, 
57, Du Rietz et al. (2015), p. 4  
Spouse: SEK 3,000 plus a taxable limit of SEK 40,000 and phasing in 
rules of marginal tax rates (tax rate was three percent in the bracket 
SEK 6,000-12,000 and rose gradually; in the bracket above 
SEK 5,000,000 the tax rate was 60 percent).  
Children: SEK 15,000 
Other heirs: SEK 3,000 
Summation rules for gifts: four years 
SOU 1969:54, 70, SOU 1977:91, 236–237, Du Rietz et al. (2015), p. 4 
Spouse / civil partner: SEK 280,000 
Children: SEK 70,000 (children and descendants of 
children: exemption of SEK 10,000 for every year 
remaining until the age 18) 
Other heirs: SEK 21,000 
Summation rules for gifts: four years 
Du Rietz et al. (2015), pp. 4, 48 
Valuation Guideline: market value 
Business: sales value estimated by trustees based on the book net equity 
value. 
Real estate: tax-assessed value in the year before the death, this corresponds 
---c ---c 
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to about 75 percent of the market value.  
Co-operative building society flats: members’ share of wealth of the society 
are subjected to taxation. 
Du Rietz et al. (2015), pp. 5-6, Du Rietz & Henrekson (2015), p. 268  
Exemptions Estate tax 
Half of the estate is exempt in the case of a surviving spouse 
Du Rietz et al. (2015), pp. 5, 11 
Business / shares: 
- Private business / unlisted shares: only 30 percent of quoted or 
book value are subjected to taxation 
- Shares registered on a stock exchange: only 75 percent of market 
value are subjected to taxation 
Du Rietz et al. (2015), pp. 5, 7 
---
c
 
Intestate succes-
sion  
If the deceased is survived by a spouse, he/she inherits before joint children 
or other relatives. 
Exemption: The deceased spouse has separate legitimate children. They 
immediately inherit their legal share. 
Joint children inherit an equal share of one have of the estate of the total 
share (legal share) after the death of the surviving spouse.  
If there is no surviving spouse and no illegitimate children the estate will be 
distributed amongst the deceased's other relatives. 
SFS 1958: 637 
--- 
Both legitimate and illegitimate children have the same rights. 
SFS 1969:621 
Adopted children have the same rights as natural children. 
SFS: 1976:612 
--- 
Civil partners are equal to spouses.  
Lag 1994:1117 
--- 
Civil partners are 
spouses before 
the law.  
SFS 2009:253 
a  The valuation for some assets was elementarily changed in 1974 and then again in 1978. Both imply a reduction of the tax base. The reform from 1978 goes further. Therefore I report the legis-
lation in 1978. 
b  Tax rates, allowances and exemptions for non-profit organizations are not reported. 
c  --- means „nothing substantially changed compared with the last time point”. 
Source: Svensk författningssamling (SFS), Statens offentliga utredningar (SOU), Du Rietz et al. (2015), Henrekson & Waldenström 2015, Mennel & Förster (2015)  
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Part C: Additional Scenarios  
Figure A.4.5 shows the tax rates for the medium estate if it would be solely consist of real estate or 
shares in a listed corporation with less than 25 percent of the registered share capital. Real estate 
gets a preferably treatment in Sweden for all time points and in Germany for the first three. Shares 
get a preferably treatment in Sweden over the whole time frame – in the UK and in Germany exemp-
tions are not available (for details on all aspects also see table A.4.3-5).  
Figure A.4.5: Medium estate (real estate and shares) in the UK, Germany and Sweden in 1955, 
1975, 1995 and 2015 
 
Source: Own calculation based on legislation in the UK, Germany and Sweden. 
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